Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, May 21, 1970, 1355Z.

1982. Subject: Saudi Reaction to Further U.S. Arms Supply to Israel. Ref: State 74125.²

1. Some months ago, we reported anticipated likely adverse Saudi reaction to additional Phantom or arms sale to Israel (Jidda 556).³ We have no reason to believe that such sales are likely to be any more palatable now. If anything, after Israeli deep penetration raids in UAR, massive attack on Lebanon, Abu Zabal school bombing, attack on UAR naval vessels at Ras Banyas, etc., Saudi reaction like that of Arabs elsewhere is certain be emotionally bitter. Fact that such additional sales might be in response to Soviet involvement in UAR defense does not impress Saudis. They regret such further Soviet involvement, but blame what they regard as USG public passivity to earlier Israeli deep penetration raids as having brought about this development. In any case, they argue Soviets are in UAR for defense purposes. Despite Israeli claims, Saudis argue there no evidence thus far that Soviet personnel have been engaged in combat missions.

2. SAG—read Faisal and Saudi establishment—frustrated and bitter about what it continues to regard as USG pro-Israel posture. Same time, if at all possible SAG wants to continue have close relations with US and indeed, as one prominent Saudi official recently quaintly told us, “you are the evil we cannot live without.” In this context, Faisal may be expected try resist to extent possible pressures that might result from additional Phantom sales to Israel. Capability to resist such pressures is questionable and probably decreasing. Isolated as he is, and without much real hope of USG support in the event of external or internal attack, he may increasingly have to trim his sails to prevailing winds. Many of his advisors—including Nawwaf and Dawwalibi—are reportedly making this point too. What punitive action he takes against US will depend in large measure on intensive broader Arab and Saudi domestic pressures on him.

3. While we doubt he would break diplomatic relations with USG, and have been told by Saqqaf present Saudi regime will not take any such step (Jidda 1782),⁴ he might in certain circumstances send away Chief of Mission. If 1967 precedent is any example, he might also be forced to restrict oil imports to US. Boycott of replaceable goods and services and denial of overflight, sea transport and communications facilities, are also possible steps. If he could possibly avoid it, we believe he would not convert massive dollar reserves and shift deposits from US, though some such movement might take place. He is of course dependent to considerable extent on US citizens working in this country and would, we believe, hope that they would remain.

4. We think ARAMCO estimate contained reftel somewhat overdrawn. It was written by senior ARAMCO govt relations official Majid al-Oss. When Amb asked Jungers May 20 whether ARAMCO estimate, including statement that SAG would also break diplomatic relations with USG is attributable to Yamani or other Saudi Cabinet ministers, it developed that it was not. Instead, assessment based on general comments made to ARAMCANs and on estimate of ARAMCO Riyadh rep, Mike Ameen. Latter is extremely well clued in, but on occasion is given to over dramatization.

5. We fully share ARAMCO’s concern re possibility that additional arms sale to Israel could loosen spate of violence against Americans in S.A. SAG would doubtless want to do everything feasible to prevent this, but its deterrent capability is limited. When Amb asked Jungers about possible “massive evacuation US personnel from oil installations,” in event USG announcement of more arms to Israel, he was assured that ARAMCO would keep us informed before taking any such step. Recalling unnecessary near panic which ARAMCO evacuation of some civilians had caused in June, 1967, Amb urged that ARAMCO not take any precipitous evacuation action. Doing so could trigger mass exodus of bulk of American community and could seriously harm our interests. If major security breakdown develops, we would of course be in an E&E situation which would require such an action.

6. We hope USG will not agree to sell additional arms to Israel. Damage to our interests in Arab world, including S.A., could be irreparable. If it does, however, request Embassy be informed sufficiently far in advance to enable us try to alert American official and private personnel scattered throughout this vast country. As Dept aware, our communications with these remote areas are limited and some time is needed to warn Americans.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret. It was repeated to Dhahran, Beirut, and Kuwait.
2. Telegram 74125 to Jidda and Dhahran, May 15, reported that ARAMCO officials predicted that Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and possibly Morocco and Tunisia would break diplomatic relations with the United States should it sell more arms to Israel, that a boycott of U.S. goods and services was also likely, that U.S. companies might be denied the use of facilities for air and sea transport, that the Arabs might convert their dollar reserves and shift deposits from the United States to Europe, and that U.S. firms would be denied new concessions while European, Japanese, and Soviet firms would gain service contracts. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 556 from Jidda, February 13. (Ibid.)
4. On May 8, Saqqaf conveyed Faisal’s belief that any additional U.S. weapons to Israel at this time would be “catastrophic” to all Arabs trying to maintain ties with the United States. (Telegram 1782 from Jidda, May 8; ibid.)