Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

8. Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 15, 1969, 6:30 p.m.

The President wanted to know what the situation on the Dutch ship and crew was.² HAK said they still haven’t located it yet. It has been reported to be in the high seas. The P said he would assume HAK has checked with the lawyers but not the State lawyers. The P said his view would be to pick up the ship. As soon as it has been paid for, is that impossible? HAK said the first reports were that it was. After their discussions, he told them that another look had to be taken. The President said it was impossible to pick up the Pueblo too but they did. We should pick up the crew and take them back to Holland. When they give us the Pueblo, we’ll give them their ship. He asked what kind of ship it was. HAK said it was one of their largest fishing ships. The President said O.K., “I think we should just pick the darn thing up.” We should check with the Dutch to see where it is and all the circumstances. He said he would be willing to take heavy criticism for this.

HAK said he had already put this on a high priority basis. The President said to find a way that international law can be breached. The U.S. became a great nation by breaking international law. The President said we certainly have concluded that we won’t just sit here and do nothing. HAK agreed. The President said even if the peaceniks on HAK’s staff didn’t agree. HAK said he didn’t have any peaceniks on his staff. The President said he was just kidding. HAK said the State Department had a paper on diplomatic actions. The President said the price is too high to pay not to do anything. He said you recall Nasser’s statement³ and said “I just think we have to do something here. If we don’t face up to the Dutch, we have to face the Navy action.” HAK said the Navy was coming in with a plan and that we would suffer little or no losses. They would come in low. The President said (someone) is trying to pursue the line that recon planes are fair game. This was not a regular recon plane, was it? HAK said it definitely was not. This plane has been doing the same thing for 15 years without protest. It had been a deliberate plan to get it. They were moving two Mig 21s which would not signal anything in particular to us about their intentions. The President wanted to know what Defense has said. HAK said they have just put out the facts. That the closest point was 15 miles and that it was attacked 100 miles out. The President said Rogers would have to say something tomorrow to the editors he is meeting with⁴ and that he probably wouldn’t be able to attend the NSC meeting.⁵ HAK said the President wouldn’t be making any decision on this tomorrow anyway. The President said, “no, no, I won’t even discuss it, just listen.”

The President said that ship must not get to North Korea. We’ll just tell the Dutch we’ll buy the darn ship. HAK said he would run it through again.

The President wanted to know if HAK had any lawyers on his staff. HAK said no and that he would have to work through State. The President wanted to know if Justice would do anything. HAK said yes, I’ll try them. The President said, I just happened to have Mitchell here in my office. “I’ll let you talk to him”.

Mitchell wanted to know what the problem was. HAK said he didn’t have the full facts. There is this ship (North Korean) sailing under Dutch crew. The N.K. sent the ship to the Netherlands and when we made some point about picking it up because of the Pueblo, they changed their crew. The President wants to know if it’s illegal to pick up the ship. Mitchell asked if we knew the contractual arrangements between the Dutch and North Korea.HAK said we have very sketchy facts. Mitchell said we should contact the proper Embassy in Holland; they must have the information on the legal arrangements. HAK said he would get all the facts together. The reports have been very bad. Mitchell said do we know where the ship is. HAK said it is reported to be on the high seas but that hasn’t been confirmed as yet.

The President came back on and said we will do all we can do here but he has determined in his own mind that we are going to do something “even if I have to overrule everybody in the State Department.”⁶

HAK said when we move the carrier to another position, we should make it public. If we try to keep it a secret, they will think we are serious, otherwise it might come off as a bluff.

The President wanted to know if HAK had anything good to tell him. HAK said no. The President said he thought HAK’s conversation with Dobrynin⁷ was good.HAK said he was concerned; that we should look dangerous. The President said how about doing the Lunch plan⁸ and getting caught. They took the ship so we get Cambodia. HAK said the Lunch plan would be used only if they turned us down on the other. The President said he wanted every plane into South Korea. HAK said they were all ready to go but that we should go careful on this. The President agreed. The President said it should be easy to pick up that ship. Just go out and get it. HAK said Defense and CIA were working on the location.

The President called back to say that HAK should call Lloyds of London; they should know where the ship is. If not, call that man in the Hague⁹ and tell him we have this problem and want to know where the ship is. HAK said he would follow through.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korean Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/9/69–4/16/69, Vol. I Haig. No classification marking.
2. At 5:40 p.m., Nixon and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about whether any North Korean ships were in the area. According to a transcript of their conversation, Kissinger stated: “We are getting reports on North Korean assets abroad and they’re very discouraging. One Korean ship which is sailing with Dutch registry, and Dutch crew and flag—so it’s almost impossible to seize that.” (Ibid.)
3. According to the transcript of their earlier conversation, Kissinger informed Nixon that “there was an intelligence report of [Egyptian President] Nasser’s conversation with [Jordanian King] Hussein to the effect, ‘After all, it isn’t so risky to defy the United States—look at North Korea and the Pueblo.’” (Ibid.)
4. On April 16, Rogers delivered an address entitled “The Complexity of World Affairs” to the American Society of Newspaper Editors which was meeting in Washington. He did not mention the EC–121 shootdown. The text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1969, pp. 387–388.
5. Scheduled for 10 a.m., April 16. See Document 13.
6. On April 15, Rogers and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about registering some type of diplomatic protest over the EC–121 shootdown. According to a transcript of their conversation, “R[ogers] said he was going to have Dobrynin in at 12:00. K[issinger] said President does not want any protest to anyone. R said he was not going to protest—he wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men.” Kissinger added that he “thinks the President is inclined to play this in low key and to say nothing to anyone until we know where we are headed.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Conversations, Chronological File) No record of Rogers’s conversation with Dobrynin has been found.
7. Kissinger and Dobrynin met on April 14 but did not discuss Korea; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 36 and 37. No record has been found of a Kissinger–Dobrynin discussion of the EC–121 shootdown.
8. Operation Lunch was one of the operations for the secret bombing of Cambodia.
9. Not further identified.