Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972

139. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 42/14.2–72

Washington, May 11, 1972.

THE TWO KOREAS

Conclusions

A. All four of the major powers concerned—the US, the USSR, Japan, and most recently China—have tacitly accepted the existence of “two Koreas”; in effect abandoning the idea of reunification, but they differ in their perceptions of the problem and hence on modalities. The Soviets appear to have concluded that, in the absence of any real hope for peaceful unification, the best course in Korea is a negotiated accommodation between North and South, but the USSR must move cautiously to avoid antagonizing Pyongyang. The Japanese seem quite ready to accept some form of gradual reconciliation of the two Koreas, provided it is orchestrated in a way that does not disrupt Tokyo’s overall efforts to achieve a modus vivendi with Peking. China, concerned to prevent the growth of Soviet influence in North Korea, is greatly interested in achieving some kind of explicit agreement, but must not get out ahead of Pyongyang, which still wants to unify Korea under its control. Thus, any negotiated arrangement formalizing the peninsula’s division is difficult to foresee.

B. Pyongyang and Seoul, in a prudent effort to prepare for whatever new international alignments emerge in East Asia, are presently talking to one another at several levels. Open negotiations in the Red Cross talks were initiated in the latter part of 1971, ostensibly to open the way for reuniting the many Korean families separated since 1945. There are also covert discussions, but these are mainly exploratory and meaningful progress toward a political settlement would seem to be some time away.

C. The rival Koreans are approaching one another with differing motivations and different scenarios in mind. The North has been more inclined toward expansion of the current Red Cross discussions,² hopeful that its new conciliatory tactics will complicate South Korea’s foreign relations and ultimately lead to dissension in the South which Pyongyang can exploit. This has been coupled with an imaginative diplomatic drive abroad seeking certain other intermediate objectives: the withdrawal of US troops from the South; limitation of Japanese influence there; and recognition of North Korea’s legitimacy by the international community. The South, on the other hand, is worried about the domestic effects of any amelioration in North-South relations and concerned as well over the possibility of a complete US military withdrawal. The Republic of Korea is acting cautiously. It wants to move only at a very deliberate pace and to keep the public talks limited.

D. The prospect is for the Red Cross talks to be prolonged. Although there is nervousness on both sides, domestic and international opinion, pressures from their allies, and the momentum generated by the talks themselves may lead to agreements on divided families, cultural exchanges, and even trade. Progress on these issues, in turn, could help reduce fears and suspicions on both sides and tone down the propaganda content of the negotiating atmosphere.

E. One issue likely to arise soon is the future UN position on Korea. Pyongyang wants an unconditional invitation to this fall’s UN Assembly debates and an end to the present UN involvement in Korea. Seoul is strongly opposed to inviting the North Koreans and wishes to postpone debate at least for another year.

F. If the North-South negotiations break down, or if political upsets occur in either Korea to arrest trends toward political accommodation, the rivals could return to the pre-1971 situation of political confrontation. This might bring about something of an upsurge in armed incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). At worst, Pyongyang might return to harsh tactics pursued in 1966–1969.

G. Another Korean War is not on the horizon, but incidents along the tense, heavily defended DMZ will occur and could at some point escalate to open hostilities. Northern responses in such circumstances would depend heavily on Pyongyang’s perception of both its own allies’ support and the US military commitment to the South. Ultimately, therefore, the question of war or peace in Korea would come to rest, as before, on the decisions of the US, the USSR, and China. If these powers continue to limit military supplies and generally to exert a restraining influence over their clients, war will continue to be unlikely.

[Omitted here is the “Discussion” section of the estimate.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the Atomic Energy Commission participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and the Department of Treasury who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. Another copy of this NIE is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates, Part 3.
2. See Documents 130 and 136.