Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972

290. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 27, 1972, 4:30–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Shevchenko (Interpreter)
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
• Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
• John Negroponte, NSC Staff Member

SUBJECT

• Vietnam

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to ask a question. Are you under the impression that perhaps we could make a joint statement on Vietnam?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We would prefer it that way.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you visualize it?

For. Min. Gromyko: I don’t have any idea yet. Today I spoke on the phone with the General Secretary and he said it would be very good if in the continuation of the talks with the President you could express any additional considerations. He said it would be very good to have something joint in the Communiqué and that we should express thoughts common to both sides. Well, if we don’t succeed in getting a joint statement in the Communiqué then certainly each side will have to make a unilateral statement on substance because we will have no other way out.

Well, could you perhaps clarify whether you could make something that would facilitate a political solution of the question, taking into account the complexities in light of the real situation on the ground in Vietnam? Do you have any possibilities to make political steps which might facilitate the situation? We have the impression, especially as a result of contacts with the Vietnamese, that the most acute question for them now is the political question, the question of power in South Vietnam. And we came to the conclusion that they agree now—at least it’s our conviction—that during a certain period there should be a coalition government. Secondly—as you are well aware—they also agree to the neutrality of South Vietnam as a result and after the settlement of the question of the withdrawal of American forces.

All these ideas are probably known to you, and I think they contain great potentialities.

Dr. Kissinger: Why?

For. Min. Gromyko: Well, I think it’s because it’s not a matter of indifference to you what the political and international status of South Vietnam will be—that is, whether it will be neutral or not. Of course, if you are indifferent then that is another matter, but it is my opinion that it should be of interest to you. But, of course, you know better.

Everything you are going to tell me, if you are prepared, I will report immediately to Comrade Brezhnev, because he said he would be most attentive to your considerations.

Dr. Kissinger: First, with respect to the last point, the neutrality of South Vietnam is in principle acceptable to us, and we have some ideas as to how it can be brought about. So that is not an issue between us and North Vietnam. That is a positive idea.

Secondly, with respect to the political problem, I believe your leaders are under a misapprehension about what North Vietnam has asked from us. Your leaders seem to be under the impression that it is only the matter of the personality of Thieu. That is not the case. What North Vietnam proposes is this. Thieu has to resign; what they call his machine of repression has to be dismantled and Vietnamization must stop, which means American economic and military aid must cease. In other words, the U.S. would side with North Vietnam in forming a three-segment government of peace, independence and neutrality. But only they know who meets these criteria. They won’t tell us. So the objective consequence of their proposal would first be that the government resigns, the political machinery is disbanded, outside support ceases. Under these conditions, the only organized political force in South Vietnam has to be the PRG. We interpret their proposal as a demand that we turn power over to them. I am being very candid.

The big problem is that the North Vietnamese are heroic people and personally very attractive people. On the other hand, they will not rely at all on the historical process. They want everything written down and today. In our relations between the Soviet Union and U.S. the most significant thing is that we started. We’ve signed some agreements. I think the evolution is even more important than the agreements. If North Vietnam were wise—I’m being candid—it would make an agreement with us now and not haggle about every detail, because one year after the agreement there would be a new condition, a new reality.

For example, last year, on May 31, 1971,² we proposed in a private meeting withdrawal of American troops over a nine-month period in exchange for a ceasefire and prisoners of war. They said, no, we must overthrow Thieu too. Suppose they had accepted our withdrawal then. Don’t you think they might be better off today? Do you believe we can go back in after U.S. forces are withdrawn?

So they never look at the political dimension created. They ask us what as a great power we cannot do. We cannot overthrow the people we have worked with over eight years. You wouldn’t do this. We won’t do it. We are prepared to start a political process, without a guaranteed outcome, but which has possible outcomes. Why should we invest all American foreign policy in one little corner of Asia, out of which we are withdrawing anyway?

When I saw Le Duc Tho on May 2,³ he had no new proposals, he had nothing at all. They brought upon themselves these consequences. We have no interest in defeating them. From a long-term historical view we have an interest similar to yours. We want a strong Southeast Asia strong enough to stand on its own feet and not a vacuum there. That is our interest. Therefore the major problem is to get the war ended without all the conditions written out in every last detail. This is my analysis of the situation.

If you analyze our political proposal of January 25th⁴—and I know what the North Vietnamese said—but it involves the U.S. withdrawal of American forces in a short period of time and President Thieu would withdraw one month before the election. He also said publicly on three occasions that once peace is achieved he would withdraw from public life altogether.

For. Min. Gromyko: Who said that?

Dr. Kissinger: President Thieu said it publicly. The last time was three weeks ago.

Mr. Korniyenko: But after a settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: After a settlement. But he would resign before the election. So it’s at least theoretically possible to put these two proposals together. Speaking aloud—this is not a formal idea—the primary thing now is to get the war ended so that will create a new political reality.

For. Min. Gromyko: So you have no new considerations?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t have anything very specific this evening to propose except to call to your attention some features of our old proposals on which we can build.

For example, the electoral commission would have all parties represented including the PRG. We are prepared to listen to new political proposals from the DRV except the one they have made, which is too one-sided.

For. Min. Gromyko: Well, I presume that so far today you have no new proposals which could be brought to the attention of the Vietnamese.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. I have no specific proposals.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The situation is rather strange, I should say. You would like, as the President and yourself said, to end the war and withdraw American troops, but on the other hand, you resolutely oppose a political solution under the conditions that the situation will be settled not under the presence of American troops but by the Vietnamese themselves. So you don’t want such a situation. Your idea on Thieu and the machinery under his control is to have them preserved for an indefinite period of time. You know our position on Thieu. I will not use strong language. The Vietnamese oppose a situation where this regime would be maintained through foreign assistance and foreign troops. If your position is to settle the situation, your military steps don’t correspond. I think there is a certain inconsistency on that point. If the President and the American government decide to leave Vietnam do you not have enough resolution to see that this is done? Why should every effort be made to preserve the Thieu regime? That is the question.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you finished?

For. Min. Gromyko: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The situation is even more curious because we do want to leave but the North Vietnamese are trying to keep us there to blackmail us into overthrowing the Saigon government. If the issue were only withdrawal of American forces, it could be settled very quickly. It is their position on political conditions that makes it difficult.

After we withdraw, a number of conditions exist. First of all, we would be prepared to limit military aid to South Vietnam after our withdrawal in proportion to the aid the North Vietnamese receive from their allies. Or if they are not prepared, we would be glad to agree directly with you about limiting aid to the area so North Vietnam does not have to put themselves on the same level as Saigon under the conditions of peace. I have difficulty understanding, if North Vietnam is so self-confident, why it insists that we overthrow the political structure of South Vietnam for them. Why must we do it?

For. Min. Gromyko: That is not quite correct, I think. You say they would like to make you overthrow the South Vietnamese government. But we believe their position is not like that. They would like you not to support the regime and not to take any steps for the artificial continuation of its acts, [a government]⁵ which has no popular support. That is our opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no sense in debating. I would point out that they have armed one million of their own people, and if there were no support at all this would be a very dangerous course.

For. Min. Gromyko: Well, I don’t think so and you have hardly convinced me that the Vietnamese wholeheartedly fight for Thieu. Why is Thieu so necessary for the U.S. that the U.S. is prepared to continue the war in order to preserve his regime? Of course, it is for not only a question of Thieu himself, but rather the regime he represents. Is it for his reason that you like to have the war continued, you keep troops in Vietnam to shed blood? Don’t think I’m talking you into something. We are seeking an objective analysis and conclusions from that analysis, and since we are now engaged in negotiations, it is advisable to share our views.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, the issue to us is not the preservation of any particular government. The issue is that we cannot cooperate with those whom we have fought for eight years to help them achieve their objective against people with whom we have cooperated. We are prepared to adopt a position of neutrality toward political life in South Vietnam. We are not prepared to move from a position of support for one side to, in effect, a position of support for the other side. This is the dilemma. We are willing to withdraw military forces; we are willing to stop military operations. And we are prepared to reduce aid if the war stops; we are prepared to reduce aid if our opponents are willing to reduce aid. This would then leave the struggle to the Vietnamese. If North Vietnam had accepted our proposal of last year they would objectively be in a much better position today.

For. Min. Gromyko: Could you tell in a nutshell your point of view? Your program? How do you see an end to the war, taking into account the present circumstances?

Dr. Kissinger: I can see two approaches. One, the overall approach we made in January, which I want to interpret to you from our point of view. It is this. We would agree to a ceasefire and withdrawal—

For. Min. Gromyko: Of your troops?

Dr. Kissinger: All our forces. Simultaneously, we would agree to certain principles of a political settlement—the neutrality of South Vietnam, abiding by whatever political process the Vietnamese themselves agree upon. While these details are being worked out, we would already start withdrawing our forces from the time of the agreement in principle. One month before the elections, Thieu would resign.

Now, North Vietnam says in this proposal we tried to separate military and political issues. We are trying to keep Saigon from having a veto on our withdrawals. We are prepared to support no candidate. We will abide by the outcome of the political process, and we are prepared to see a South Vietnam with a policy of neutrality.

That is that program. I personally believe if the DRV were creative it would have great possibilities.

But if they don’t want a political settlement on this basis, a comprehensive settlement, then let us agree on a ceasefire, let us agree to exchange prisoners of war, and we would withdraw all our forces, and let them work out a political solution with the South Vietnamese. We would then guarantee, except for economic and military aid, to keep our hands out of it; we would be neutral in the political process. We would be prepared to go either road. We are prepared to hear reasonable proposals from the other side.

If I could say a personal note, Mr. Minister, you have dealt with me for several years. I believe we are difficult negotiators, but we are honest and have always kept our word. We have never tricked you, or anyone else. We would not trick North Vietnam. If we would, then the fighting would start again. That is not in our interest.

All we ask is a degree of time so as to leave Vietnam for Americans in a better perspective. They want everything simultaneously. This is the dilemma that faces us. I believe they have worsened their situation as a result of their actions. We had no intention of increasing our forces; we had every intention of pulling out this year more and more. We had no intention of such massive operations. They are worse off now objectively in our view. Had they accepted terms last year, they could have had a good chance to prevail now.

Least of all do we wish to trick you. We have an interest in dealing honestly over a long period with you. We do not want to embarrass you.

For. Min. Gromyko: It is clear that the Paris talks have produced no results. We sympathize with success and would do everything necessary for it and are doing so now, but when you come to the political aspects you Americans tried to make everything possible to support and maintain the present regime. Well, suppose you are right. The Vietnamese don’t want such a government but prefer, as they say, a more progressive government, one which was left of center, which would ensure political neutrality for the country as far as foreign policy is concerned. But why should there be such a solution in the presence of U.S. forces and why should it involve the presence of the existing regime and even personally President Thieu. Last year, you hinted in Washington…

Dr. Kissinger: When we talked.

For. Min. Gromyko: that there could be a suitable solution and you expressed certain thoughts regarding Thieu and the transitory period…

Dr. Kissinger: [interrupting] that he would resign in a transitory period.

For. Min. Gromyko: Well, the term “resign” was not used. You admitted he wouldn’t be in power during a certain transitory period.

Mr. Korniyenko: There would be some kind of interim government, not just a commission.

Dr. Kissinger: I was thinking of our proposal that he resign one month before the election and an interim government takes his place. That was what I had in mind. For. Min. Gromyko: [continues interpretation from interruption.] But the way you put the question now I don’t think is acceptable to the Vietnamese. Is it worth, in order to achieve political aims, continuing the war, maintaining troops in Vietnam and destroying cities? Perhaps some plans could be advanced on your part. I don’t know. I think your side has ample political resources not put into operation yet. Maybe you know better. We don’t know if you are going to bring this into the open.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

For. Min. Gromyko: Our wish …if you have any ideas for political steps which could facilitate a political solution, that acute and serious matter. If there is anything for the USSR to do, at least you should not prevent us from making any positive steps to bring about an end to the war. If during your stay in Moscow there are any additional steps, any proposals at any time, I will transmit them to the General Secretary. I don’t know if President Nixon and the General Secretary will have an opportunity to discuss the matter again. If you have any ideas, I would be glad to meet you anytime.

Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you we are not interested in new military bases in South Vietnam or any particular government in South Vietnam. That is not our principal objective. We will honor whatever political change that comes about as a result of the South Vietnamese political process and not as a result of our direct actions.

We have therefore tried to get the North Vietnamese to understand they should work with us in developing a political process of this kind. We believe if we, together with them, declare that our common objective is a neutral South Vietnam, that the U.S. will remain completely neutral in the political contest in South Vietnam, that the U.S. accepts the outcome of any election, that the U.S. is prepared to limit its economic and military aid, and is prepared as part of an agreement to accept whatever political process emerges, we believe that this creates a new political reality in South Vietnam by the simple fact of these declarations.

I must tell you that their dealings with us are impossible. They have wasted 13 meetings with me. I am not sure all our ideas are the best ones. You remember our dealings on Berlin and we made efforts. They never do. Even this week on SALT, a much easier problem, we had many differences and advanced various solutions before a settlement. We never had serious negotiations with them. There are two problems. One is procedural, how to talk seriously, and the other is what we are trying to accomplish. We have two objectives: first, withdrawal; second to develop a political process which gives every political force a chance to express itself, and let the political process shape the future, whatever happens.

Now the North Vietnamese say this was done in 1954 and they were tricked. They are probably right. On the other hand, if you and we can guarantee a settlement… We are a different government and any possible [U.S.] government’s attitude would be different. We are not like Dulles. We are not looking for an excuse to go in. We are attempting to establish an important relationship with you. We are not looking to trick you. For what purpose? We are stuck now because the North Vietnamese are too unimaginative or inflexible to solve the political problem. That’s the dilemma. They cannot win by their present offensive. In the process the whole international atmosphere is being poisoned. If you and we are going to quarrel about something it shouldn’t be about our area where we are withdrawing anyway.

For. Min. Gromyko: Have you any contacts along any channel?

Dr. Kissinger: We told you we were ready to meet on the 21st. I don’t know if you got an answer. I think the best procedure is for Le Duc Tho and me to meet honestly for once, without any papers, and just talk about how to work out a program for settlement. I would work seriously and honestly with him. As long as there is progress in the private channel, then we can assemble plenaries again.

For. Min. Gromyko: Suppose we say … The first question I anticipate from the North Vietnamese is, if there is a private meeting, what is Mr. Kissinger going to tell us? Just what he already said in Paris? What should we [the Soviets] say? “Their [the U.S.] position is known. They will probably say one thing or another. We don’t know if they have something new to say.” It is not so easy for us just to convey this to the North Vietnamese. Of course, we may, but that is up to you …for example, if we could say we were told such and such things and there are better prospects.

Dr. Kissinger: If they would once be prepared to consider that I am not coming to these negotiations to maintain any particular government. Maybe we don’t have the right imagination. I come there to develop a fair political process. I am not saying our proposal is the fairest. It is a strange area for us. I know their proposal is very one-sided. The question is why can’t they be patient for awhile and let things develop a little more slowly. Their impatience to get everything at once has the objective consequence of getting nothing. Counting on our domestic collapse won’t happen. You met the President. He won’t yield to political pressure. Where will they be next year?

For. Min. Gromyko: If you met Le Duc Tho, what would happen?

Dr. Kissinger: I will make a serious effort to see if we can find a new approach. If they said to me, all right, we will try to find a political process for everybody, then there would be a chance for talking seriously, to look at various possibilities. Our proposal is not an ultimatum. If we talk, I will talk with them in a forthcoming spirit and with the attitude of finding a fair and rapid conclusion. That would be my intention. They are a great people and we have no interest in humiliating them.

For. Min. Gromyko: They may ask us, well, how about the official negotiations?

Dr. Kissinger: It is not in our mutual interest unless there is some understanding as to what will happen. We could go and make an announcement here. If after two or three meetings the plenaries break down, then we will be accused of having been tricked by you, and the situation would worsen. We see no sense in official meetings until there is a framework.

For. Min. Gromyko: Suppose there is an unofficial meeting. Will you tell them something new, or just what you told them before? Maybe it’s not right to ask; it’s just for our orientation.

Dr. Kissinger: The trouble is I would try to come up with some new approach to the same objective. The difficulty is that we have already made so many proposals with no response.

For. Min. Gromyko: There are no limits to good things.

Dr. Kissinger: If you sat opposite us and we said you had not been concrete because you had not accepted our eight points, there would be little discussion. Something must be put in by the other side for meaningful negotiations. For example, suppose we met last November or January about our eight points. If we went over our proposals point by point, there would have been many possibilities—in any negotiation you get a qualitative change by accumulating a series of nuances. It is not a good negotiating technique to demand a qualitative change as a first step. They keep making demands. Unilaterally, it is very hard to do anything enormous.

We will certainly look at your program with the attitude of seeing what could be done to bring about a rapid conclusion.

For. Min. Gromyko: The first question is if we can inform them that if they met with you what will you tell them? Or perhaps even a more modest question: would you have anything new at all or not? If we could say as far as we know there was nothing new, but we don’t exclude the possibility that there is grounds for talking. We think it would be best if we could say that we have grounds for believing that there is something new. Of course, we would not negotiate this, we would say this is to be discussed between you and the Americans.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me ask you this. Is it totally excluded that you could explain your negotiating experience with us to them? You must have formed some opinion about their attitude toward us and tactics. Is it totally excluded you could tell them that you have had this experience with the Americans? Why not try our system for awhile. It is a very un-Leninist approach to insist they must have everything right away. You had some difficulty in trusting me at first, which is natural.

For. Min. Gromyko: How would you formulate your thoughts which in your opinion we would convey to them with reference to our conversation?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me think about it overnight to be precise.

For. Min. Gromyko: Every word has a certain significance.

Dr. Kissinger: How did we settle the Berlin question? We decided among ourselves to try to settle within a certain time frame. Then we decided on this approach: You do something on access and we will do something on Federal presence. I have a difficult problem trying to tell you about precise proposals. Once the approach was settled, we could think concretely Le Duc Tho and I, if we follow this process, would have enough to talk about. We should make a work program. What do we have to have? What do they have to have? We have never done this. We gave them proposals and they gave us proposals.

For. Min. Gromyko: An exchange of speeches.

Dr. Kissinger: If they say here is something we must have, we would do all we could; it’s better than giving you proposals.

For. Min. Gromyko: You never analyzed the points with them in detail?

Dr. Kissinger: Not really in this way. Last summer we were close. I gave them some points, very abstract and always somewhat theoretical.

For. Min. Gromyko: May I ask you about Thieu? When are you ready to withdraw Thieu in relation to the withdrawal of your troops?

Dr. Kissinger: We have never said we are ready to secure his withdrawal from the political picture. He has said he would resign one month before the election. In addition, he has said publicly that once a peace settlement is attained, he would withdraw altogether. Whether these two positions could be put together in one realistic formula would remain to be seen. It’s at least theoretical.

For. Min. Gromyko: What about timing? There is a distance between now and complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. Somewhere in that time there is the removal of President Thieu. At what point will this happen in terms of your proposal?

Dr. Kissinger: In terms of the proposal we have made this could occur as early as five months after signature of a statement of principles, depending on how quickly they agree on a political process.

For. Min. Gromyko: The duration of the withdrawal of your troops?

Dr. Kissinger: It was six months. Now it is four months.

For. Min. Gromyko: That means Thieu would resign one month after your withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: Those were the terms of the January proposal; it was in their context of our comprehensive proposal, their agreeing to an election.

For. Min. Gromyko: Before the election.

Dr. Kissinger: He would withdraw.

For. Min. Gromyko: But what is the period between the election and his withdrawal?

Dr. Kissinger: Our proposal said one month before the election but that is negotiable.

For. Min. Gromyko: What about the composition of the government between his withdrawal and the election, in concrete terms, as far as this is possible?

Dr. Kissinger: Under our proposal, as the South Vietnamese constitution provides, the caretaker government would be headed by the President of the Senate.

For. Min. Gromyko: It would be a working government?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

For. Min. Gromyko: Formed by whom? There would still be the presence of Thieu. This is an important point.

For. Min. Gromyko: Who would prepare the elections?

Dr. Kissinger: An electoral commission in which the PRG, Saigon Administration, and other forces in the country would have equal representation. And the election commission is very close to a government of national concord proposed by the PRG. Therefore, one possibility is to give more power to the electoral commission and therefore give a de facto status in some areas to the national concord idea. It is a complex system but both sides have to adjust to existing realities.

For. Min. Gromyko: My impression sometimes from the President and Dr. Kissinger, the official position of the United States is that it is impossible to leave Vietnam to some kind of Communist or Socialist government. This by itself throws a shadow on statements. Is your main preoccupation the character of the government?

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good question when it is posed by reasonable people. What we mean is that we will not leave in such a way that a Communist victory is guaranteed. However, we are prepared to leave so that a Communist victory is not excluded, though not guaranteed. I don’t know if this distinction is meaningful to you.

For. Min. Gromyko: Until now our view is that your main preoccupation is to prevent the establishment of a regime you don’t like politically. Later maybe you could face this.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question that is true. Our position is we want a political solution which does not guarantee a Communist victory, but also, we emphasize, that does not exclude it.

For. Min. Gromyko: That is official?

Dr. Kissinger: You can communicate this to the North Vietnamese.

For. Min. Gromyko: On the basis of official American statements, the U.S. main preoccupation is to do all in order to preclude the possibility of a government not liked by the United States. That makes it more difficult.

Dr. Kissinger: It is an absurdity to pretend we would not prefer it if Communists would not win in South Vietnam.

For. Min. Gromyko: That is another matter.

Dr. Kissinger: But you have faced many situations in the world where Communist parties would not prevail and you put limits on your intervention. This is the issue we are talking about. In case of the solution of the war, the policy would be to encourage whatever political process is agreed upon but not to exclude North Vietnamese or a Communist or Socialist forces from having a measure of power.

For. Min. Gromyko: If you think there is anything new, let us talk again.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me think. We will meet again tomorrow anyway on the communiqué.

For. Min. Gromyko: If there is a need, probably we can discuss the Middle East and Vietnam. Anyway on the Middle East we would like to talk briefly.

Dr. Kissinger: Tomorrow.

For. Min. Gromyko: Tomorrow. On the Middle East we are, frankly speaking, discouraged.

[At this point Mr. Gromyko left the meeting for about five minutes to take a phone call.]

For. Min. Gromyko: You have already published the treaty and the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: I am very embarrassed. I will have to look into it.

For. Min. Gromyko: I just talked to Comrade Brezhnev. He asked my opinion. I said we would have to publish the treaty. I don’t know about the protocol. I’ll let you know.

Dr. Kissinger: We will let Mr. Korniyenko know, I am embarrassed. I didn’t know there was an agreement not to publish.

Mr. Korniyenko: You suggested that we publish everything at once all at the end, as an enclosure to the Communiqué.

Dr. Kissinger: We could still in any event publish them all together. There was a confusion. I don’t know how it happened.

For. Min. Gromyko: Tomorrow we will discuss the Middle East and Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: We will see if there is anything more concrete. You contact me and let me know when you are ready.

For. Min. Gromyko: Maybe we should set it now.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose we meet at 11:00 on the Middle East and Vietnam? What about Monday⁶—will there be a plenary?

For. Min. Gromyko: It depends on concluding the negotiation. There will be a plenary unless you wish to have a more narrow meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. I shall miss the Foreign Minister when we leave Moscow.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Mr. Kissinger’s Conversations in Moscow, May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace.
2. Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972.
3. See Document 183.
4. See footnote 2, Document 40.
5. All brackets in the source text.
6. May 29.