Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

253. Message From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Gayler), the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Weyand), and the Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Vogt)¹

Washington, January 6, 1973, 1630Z.

6357. Subj: Cease-fire Planning/Security. Deliver during waking hours.

1. Until a cease-fire agreement is actually signed great care must be exercised that we do not give the wrong Quote signal Unquote to Hanoi. We must guard against planning action that if known to Hanoi would lead the NVN leadership to conclude that the U.S. has decided on a cease-fire regardless of the cost, and has no other alternative.

2. The above will require a fine sense of judgment on your part. Obviously, planning must continue between Washington and the field, and between Washington agencies. On the other hand, we will have to temporarily forego actions which give the wrong signals. Advance parties or leading elements of USSAG/7AF to Thailand, JCRC advance party and similar actions must be held in abeyance. Similarly, any planning actions with third countries must be handled in such a way that the wrong conclusions will not be drawn if these planning actions become known to NVN leadership.

3. Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Records of Thomas Moorer, Box 69, JCS Out General Service Messages, January 1973. Secret; Specat; Exclusive. A handwritten note on the message directs that an information copy be sent to Meyer.