Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

85. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–9–65

Washington, May 5, 1965.

COMMUNIST CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY

The Problem

To analyze the principles and forces which shape the formulation and conduct of Communist China’s foreign policy and to estimate the probable course of that policy over the next two or three years.

Conclusions

A. We believe that the principal aims of Chinese Communist foreign policy over the next few years will be as follows: (a) to eject the West, especially the US, from Asia and to diminish US and Western influence throughout the world; (b) to increase the influence of Communist China in Asia; (c) to increase the influence of Communist China throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world; and (d) to supplant the influence of the USSR in the world at large, especially in the presently disunited Communist movement. (Para. 1)

B. These objectives, and the method and style with which they are pursued, are shaped by ideology, by Chinese tradition, by the apparatus of power which the present Chinese Communist leaders can bring to bear to achieve their ends, and by the personalities and experience of these leaders. As a result, their foreign policy in some ways resembles an international guerrilla struggle which attempts to wear down the enemy’s strength by attacking the weak points. (Paras. 2–16)

C. For both ideological and nationalistic reasons, China regards the US as its primary enemy. Peiping’s immediate security interest and the short reach of its military power lead it to concentrate its main foreign policy efforts on undermining the US position in the Far East, though in other parts of the world the Chinese Communists are also using such means as they have to weaken the US. Among other “capitalistic” nations, which Peiping sees as in some sense victims of US exploitation, Peiping tries simultaneously to build up recognition of China as a major power and to weaken the US position of leadership. (Paras. 17–20)

D. The USSR has come increasingly to rival the US as a dominant problem for Chinese foreign policy. China recognizes the USSR as a pioneer Communist nation and as the most powerful member of the Communist camp. Yet nationalistic and ideological factors join to create a strong enmity. The Chinese leaders will continue to seek the overthrow of the present Soviet leadership, but without great hope of seeing the emergence of new men who would follow the Peiping line. Elsewhere in the Communist world, Peiping will seek to dilute or supplant Soviet influence and to win over or split Communist parties and front movements. (Paras. 21–24)

E. Peiping has chosen the underdeveloped, ex-colonial world as its most advantageous arena of conflict. In this “Third World,” the Chinese not only aim to erode US strength but to displace Soviet influence; they seek to establish themselves as the champions and mentors of the underdeveloped nations. The greatest impact of Peiping’s policy is felt in Southeast Asia. The theater of primary interest is Indochina, where Pei-ping is seeking a decisive and humiliating defeat of the US. To date, the Chinese leaders have not made risky countermoves to the limited US attacks in North Vietnam, and they almost certainly seek to avoid a wider war. Nevertheless, they have been making preparations for at least limited engagement, and we believe that they would be prepared to risk a major military conflict with the US should they feel China’s vital security interests threatened by US actions. (Paras. 25–28)

F. In the rest of Southeast Asia, unless the situation alters sharply, Peiping is likely to support policies designed to maintain and increase pressure against the US. Peiping seems to look on Africa as a second great area of opportunity and is likely to increase both its overt and subversive efforts on that continent. (Paras. 29–33)

G. As long as the present group of leaders remains in control, which is likely to be well beyond the period of this estimate, Peiping’s dynamic and aggressive attitudes will persist. Moreover, though we have little information concerning the next generation of leaders, there are many reasons to believe that China’s foreign policy will be assertive and uncompromising for a long time to come. (Para. 39)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 13–9–65. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on May 5, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.