68. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Mac—
ChiRep Thoughts. The real problem we face on ChiCom policy is far less one of substance than of tactics.
Most people agree that, after 15 years of sustaining a rigid policy against Peking (and rather successfully at that), the erosion of our position is forcing us to take a different tack. Even the general nature of this tack is not really at issue—we want to retreat gracefully from an increasingly isolated position toward a stance which puts the onus for continued friction more on Peiping and less on us. In effect, we want to make our ChiCom policy more like that toward the USSR—tough where they push us but flexible where there’s something to be gained, if only in terms of willingness to talk.
So the real question is no longer whether to disengage from the more rigid aspects of our China policy but how and when. On this essentially tactical question, the two extremes are either to take the initiative ourselves in order to minimize the loss and maximize our control over the consequences, or to let ourselves be pushed reluctantly by the pressures of the international community. By and large, however, it is simply unrealistic to expect us to say boldly we were wrong about our China policy. This isn’t good domestic politics, and great nations don’t win kudos abroad by admitting mistakes and saying mea culpa. So our posture must be one of saying that, although we haven’t changed our views on the ChiCom threat, we reluctantly accept the verdict of the international community that China should be admitted to the club. Even so, we’re still confronted with the question of how long to hold out before confessing, and what terms, if any, we can exact in return. Our decision on this when and how should take into account a whole series of factors, including those discussed below.
- A.
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How much domestic backlash? I’m one of those who feel that the China question has tended to become de-politicized with time. It’s hard to tell how much residual emotion it can yet arouse, or how much the Republicans could exploit it. Not only does the President’s new mandate [Page 131] itself give him some room to maneuver, but this mandate was partly a vote for cautious responsibility in a nuclear world. So what the President does under the “peace” rubric generally nets out at a big plus. In this sense Peiping’s nuclear test actually serves as a reason why we should enter into a dialogue with Peiping on such issues as arms control.
Peiping’s test also dramatically underlines that Red China is here to stay. It destroys what’s left of the Gimo’s thesis that the civil war is still on (he knows it, too, poor man). Even Time has read this lesson. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet split (which will continue even if in muted form) provides further public justification for dealing with both Communist centers, not only one.
Despite all this, however, there’s no blinking the fact that a shift in our policy will look like a defeat—whenever it occurs. This is the price we have to pay for having successfully maintained a fixed position for so long. Peiping is wholly unlikely to change its spots sufficiently to justify our shift on these grounds. To the contrary, one of the best arguments for shifting our policy is to pin the onus for its own intransigence more squarely on Peiping.
- B.
- So the real issue is when and how to shift our China policy in a way which will minimize our losses—both domestically and abroad. And the real argument against doing so is that we can’t afford it when we face a crunch with Peiping over Vietnam. To me, this was the central point in LBJ’s 18 November talk with Rusk and Stevenson. Rusk’s argument was that easing up on ChiRep now would make us appear to “falter” in the Pacific at just the wrong time.
- C.
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Thus our decision on ChiRep, etc. turns largely on how we play Vietnam. If we appear to cut and run or to be losing, it will be domestically and internationally impossible to “make concessions” on ChiRep too. Nor would it be possible if we were “negotiating” (except theoretically as additional frosting on a negotiated settlement). But isn’t the corollary also true? If we take a tougher stance in VN, if there is widespread fear abroad of US escalation—it can hardly be taken as a sign of undue weakness to be flexible on ChiRep. In fact, we could use this counterpoint as a justification for our VN policy; it would demonstrate that while we were determined to resist Communist aggression, we were simultaneously prepared to deal with the ChiComs wherever there was some peaceful purpose to be served.
In effect, I see increased pressure in VN as permitting greater flexibility on ChiRep—as supporting our contention that we don’t seek a US/ChiCom war, and even that we are “escalating to negotiate.” Paradoxical as it might seem, we could walk both sides of the street, thus helping to protect ourselves both from accusations we’re seeking to do in Peiping and from complaints we’re faltering in the face of the enemy.
- D.
- How does the Article 19 Fight fit in? If we succeed in facing down Moscow on this issue (which means stemming panic among the neutralists), we will have started off the 19th GA with a crashing victory. To a degree at least, this too would provide a shield behind which we could be more flexible on ChiRep without seeming to falter. Indeed, the bigger our Article 19 victory, the more the neutralist majority will want to demonstrate non-alignment by voting against us on something else. Let’s not ask too much.
- E.
- How do we best preserve the position of Taiwan? To be coldly realistic, Taiwan is our ultimate card in any eventual modus vivendi with Peiping, and by the same token the bargaining counter to be preserved at all costs. But we can no longer tell ourselves with any conviction that trying to ostracize Red China is the best way to protect Taiwan. To the contrary, the longer we insist on an “either-or” choice, the more we will force the wrong choice from our point of view. What we need to do is to stem the rapid erosion of Taiwan’s international position by getting it internationally recognized that China is a divided country (like Germany, Korea, and Vietnam). To do this we have to pay the price. I’m not suggesting we opt for “Two Chinas” yet;2 what we want to do is to get others on a “Two China” kick as the tacit price for our ostensible willingness to let Peiping into the UN. It’s the only real counter to an Albanian-type resolution.
Peiping has recently made clear again that it won’t come in unless Taiwan goes out. Fine—this will buy us another few years of maneuvering room if only Taipei will play it smart and not withdraw. I’m not optimistic, however, as the Gimo (at his advanced age) is more interested in face than in practical politics. So appealing to Chiang’s finer sensibilities would get us exactly nowhere. Ergo, once we decided to move, I’d put it hard and cold to the Gimo—if he pulled out of the GA, we’d regard ourselves as relieved of our commitment to veto ChiCom admission to the SC.
The above doesn’t really get to the tactics of when and how to alter our China policy. It merely gives my slant on some of the key variables. I have some thoughts on tactics and timing but I’ll not overload the circuit for the moment. My main point is that our ability to be flexible on ChiRep may well turn largely on our decisions re Vietnam. Since the latter will almost certainly be upon us first, time enough for the latter later.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. II. Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum from Komer to Bundy, also dated November 23, noting that for reasons of space he had not discussed the Quemoy/Matsu problem but that “This little time bomb is still there ticking away, and none of us know how to defuse it.” He concluded, “In short, a close look at Quemoy/Matsu bidding better be on our agenda too.”↩
- The word “yet” is a handwritten insertion on the source text.↩