318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1

201378. Ref: A. Taipei 3513.2 B. Taipei 3554.3 C. Taipei 3592 and 3594.4

1.
We have considered carefully your suggestion Ref B for some statement which would be responsive to President Chiang’s request as outlined Ref A. As you made clear to Chiang, we continue to believe it would not be useful for Department to take issue with such speculative articles as Anderson series or editorials taking various positions on China policy. At time Anderson articles appeared, Department spokesman set forth our position as clearly as possible (State 133316 and 135413).5 We believe it would be unwise and misleading to amplify that position in any way which suggests we regard GRC position on offshores in same light as its position on Taiwan. Further, to raise such issue at this time or to go beyond Secretary’s June 21 statement with respect to our overtures toward Communist China would risk making Offshore Islands and China policy issues subject of partisan controversy with consequences that might be even more disturbing to GRC than events which have prompted Chiang’s current concern.
2.
We concur with general thrust your response to Chiang and particularly appreciate your entirely appropriate rebuttal of Chiang’s unwarranted remarks concerning our posture toward North Vietnam and Communist China. Although we unable comply with Chiang’s request, we wish encourage him to engage in frank discussions with you, since it may provide opportunity to exercise some leavening influence on his views and reactions to current developments bearing on US–GRC relations. For that purpose, you requested convey orally following message from Secretary to President Chiang.
3.
Begin message. Ambassador McConaughy has reported in detail the observations which you were good enough to make to him on June 25. I appreciate, as always, a frank exposition of your views and I have given them the most careful thought and attention. I hope that you will continue to meet with our Ambassador from time to time for such frank discussions on matters of mutual interest and concern.
4.
I have noted your anxiety concerning certain speculative articles and editorials concerning U.S. policy and wish to share with you my own thoughts on the questions you raised about their significance and impact. The Department of State has for many years indicated that the position of the United States Government concerning the offshore islands is that expressed specifically and solely in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and the Joint Congressional Resolution of 1955. That remains our position. With respect to the limited conversations which we have had with the authorities of Mainland China, we have repeatedly made clear that such conversations in no way imply any change in our commitments to or any diminution of our concern for the Republic of China and Taiwan.
5.
The speculative articles and editorials which you brought to the Ambassador’s attention in no way qualify the position of the United States Government. They attracted no significant attention in the United States and I have seen no public discussion here arising from them. I do not believe, therefore, that any useful purpose would be served by taking public issue with such press comments, beyond that which has already occurred. Quite frankly, it would not be in the interest of either of our countries to contribute to a controversial discussion on a matter which is not being actively debated at the present time.
6.
I also have noted your concern that such speculation may encourage Chinese Communists to launch an attack on offshores and your estimate that such an attack may be imminent. We are of course alert to possibility that Chinese Communists may attempt to renew tensions in Taiwan Strait, and we are especially appreciative of GRC care to avoid provoking such action. We have no indications from other sources, however, that Chinese Communists intend provoke incident in Strait or are planning such moves. We will continue to keep this matter under closest scrutiny and would appreciate any intelligence information GRC may develop.
7.
Since we are very anxious that you always feel free to be frank with us, I hope that you will understand frankness on our part as well. I found it difficult to understand your assessment of the reaction of people in Asia to U.S. policies in Vietnam and toward Communist China. The American people have accepted almost 300,000 casualties since the end of World War II in trying to assist our friends in maintaining their independence against aggression. In this very year of 1968, more than 9,000 of our young men have been killed and more than 60,000 have been wounded. If these sacrifices cannot assure our friends and allies as to both our attitude and our determination, I do not see how the achievement of a sense of assurance is possible. Certainly between such close allies as the United States and the Republic of China there should be no doubt on this score. The expression of such doubts, in the face of the [Page 692] extraordinary sacrifices we are being called upon to make, would not be received well by the American people and would give a powerful stimulation to those voices among us who are urging isolation and withdrawal from our responsibilities in other parts of the world. End message.
8.
Please express to the President the Secretary’s highest esteem and personal regards.
9.
If you think desirable, you may leave the above text with President Chiang as an oral memorandum.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Shoesmith; cleared by Brown and Walt Rostow, and in draft by Donald, Kreisberg, Armstrong, Walt Rostow, Steadman, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Robert J. McCloskey; and approved and initialed by Rusk.
  2. Document 315.
  3. See footnote 5, Document 315.
  4. See footnote 6, Document 317 and footnote 5, Document 315.
  5. Telegrams 133316 and 135413 to Taipei, March 20 and 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)