282. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
1052. 1. Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo called on me Oct 11 at his request. His principal theme was that thorough USG-GRC exchange of views on mainland situation particularly necessary now because of recent changes there.
2. After brief analysis current ChiCom attempts to restore order, CCK stated that Mao may regain control for short period but this would not last. Minister said he anticipated long term struggle. He believed Communist regime now in greater difficulty than ever in past. He said ROC should look problem squarely in eye and try to see how enemy could be weakened.
3. Minister said he felt US and ROC should have even closer contact and share each other’s thinking more completely. Specifically he said ChiComs are greatest enemy and greatest threat to both US and ROC. This gives both countries a basic common interest. He stressed that ROC believes political action against mainland is most important, as President Chiang made clear in his Double Ten speech. He termed this speech as significant statement of current GRC policy and thinking. CCK said that within framework of not taking military action, US and ROC should see how best to stir up changes on mainland and unrest in Communist armed forces which might accelerate collapse of regime. Minister said he [Page 600] felt political warfare and other possible steps “not so much military as political actions and in fact primarily political actions” were required. He said he had no specific proposals to offer now, but we both should look into it. CCK added that if we allow things to remain as they are, Mao will have short periods of stability and will be able to increase his power. CCK then reiterated hope both sides could look into possibilities offered by political warfare. Later CCK added once again, that in undertaking any political warfare actions against mainland, ROC principle was to assume responsibility and not involve US in the political struggle against the Chinese Communists.
4. CCK said GRC not satisfied with its current inadequate information on mainland events. ROC realizes there many more significant changes occurring than those of which it aware. ROC must secure more information before being able to obtain complete understanding of conditions on mainland. Therefore, CCK said, ROC wishes to pay great attention to improved cooperation with us in the intelligence sphere so that we can unite and make effective our efforts. He recognized that additional efforts were called for on ROC’s part. He said ROC had not undertaken any major intelligence operations on the mainland and it wishes to consult with us before it takes any such operations. CCK reiterated his hope that we could continue our efforts to obtain more information.
5. CCK told me that ROC hoped to join up with some anti-Maoist elements on mainland to increase ROC’s effectiveness. He noted that Chinese were traditionally anti-Soviet but that Chinese people in general were favorably disposed to us and that this factor should be exploited and use made of it with anti-Maoist elements which were also anti-Russian.
6. I concurred that both our countries should pay even closer attention to mainland developments. Said I would report Minister’s conversation and suggested another meeting be held when Washington’s reply received. I put in caveat that while I felt joint US–GRC analysis of political situation on mainland extremely important, USG position was that any actions which would needlessly be provocative towards Communist China should be avoided. US wanted to prevent escalation war in Vietnam. Therefore avoidance provocation towards ChiComs was important factor in US policy considerations. On other hand if war in Vietnam were to expand through direct ChiCom intervention then new situation would be created which would require full assessment. But as long as Communist China did not intervene massively and overtly, USG position and attitude of US people would not agree to any action on mainland which looked like adventurism.
7. Minister replied that he fully understood this position and this was why he had stressed avoidance of any US military actions and he [Page 601] said GRC guiding principle was not to contradict US policy. He added that his statements were of course only preliminary at this stage.
8. Embassy comments on Chiang Ching-kuo’s statements being forwarded by septel.2 Memcon will be forwarded by air pouch.3