Office of the Historian

110. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM-825–65
Washington, November 16, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • GRC Proposal for Landings on Mainland China
1.
Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–26555/65, dated 13 October 1965, subject as above, which requested the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to a proposed concept for Government of the Republic of China (GRC) landings on mainland China which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense by GRC Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo on 22 September 1965.2
2.
The proposed concept depends for its success on massive US naval, air, and logistic support and large-scale popular uprisings and [Page 225] defections once a landing has been accomplished. The use of US air and naval forces, as proposed, in a cover role only, without air and naval strikes on mainland targets, is unrealistic. The GRC has only a limited capability to strike airfields in south China. A concept which commits US forces to protecting the invasion force against Chinese Communist air and naval attacks without being permitted to strike the supporting bases is militarily unsound. Further, available intelligence provides no evidence that the mainland population would support a GRC invasion. Therefore, there appears to be no possibility of successfully executing the concept as proposed.
3.
The timing and the circumstances of the proposal by the GRC Minister of Defense and the fact that it was submitted as a matter for discussion and not as an operational proposal mark it as a vehicle for increasing the scope and volume of US–GRC consultations. However, US involvement in a comprehensive bilateral study of a GRC offensive concept requiring US logistic, air, and naval support would imply a degree of US interest and encouragement to the project greater than warranted by the facts.
4.
On the other hand, there are features of the concept which lead to discussion and consultation without implying US commitment. These include:
a.
Concepts and strategies for dealing with the Communist threat in Southeast Asia.
b.
Intelligence assessments of the mainland China situation, with particular reference to the prospects for popular uprisings and defections.
c.
Critique of GRC unilateral plans, with emphasis upon factors required for success which lie outside GRC resources and control.
5.
Although various aspects of the proposed concept can profitably be discussed with the GRC, existing restrictions against joint planning should be maintained. Joint planning conceivably could be considered under conditions of expanded hostilities in Asia. However, the circumstances presently pertaining in Asia and those which attend consideration of the concept at hand do not now justify joint planning for operations against the mainland.
6.
Consultations concerning the proposed concept and related matters should do much to satisfy President Chiang Kai-shek that his views and experience are being given due consideration by the United States. Such consultations should serve to maintain the GRC as a fully cooperating partner rather than as a course of potential disruption to our policies and objectives in Asia. If discussions were limited to those aspects of the concept indicated above, the existing US–GRC “Blue Lion” Committee would appear to be the most appropriate forum for carrying [Page 226] on these consultations, as well as conducting critiques of GRC unilateral plans.
7.
In summary, it is the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that:
a.
There is no apparent possibility of successfully executing the concept as proposed.
b.
The United States should not engage in a comprehensive bilateral study of the proposed concept for GRC landings on the mainland of China.
c.
The United States should, by means of the “Blue Lion” Committee:
(1)
Examine with the GRC the concepts and strategies for dealing with the Communist threat in Southeast Asia.
(2)
Endeavor to arrive at agreed intelligence assessments of the mainland China situation, with particular reference to the prospects for popular uprisings and defections.
(3)
Conduct critiques of GRC unilateral plans, with emphasis upon factors required for success which lie outside GRC resources and control.
d.
These consultations should be conducted without committing the United States to involvement in planning for, encouragement of, or support for the proposed GRC landing on the mainland.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A.H. Manhart
Major General, USA
Vice Director, Joint Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 381 China, Rep of. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a December 20 letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alvin Friedman to Fearey.↩
  2. Chiang’s proposal and the ISA memorandum are cited in footnote 2, Document 104.↩