Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

67. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, December 30, 1965, 0945Z.

675. ROK Troops for Vietnam. Ref: Deptel 662.²

1. During call on Foreign Minister related to other matters, he volunteered that he had discussed with President our request for additional ROK troops for SVN. The President’s reaction was favorable. But there were many problems about which the President had consulted with the Deputy Minister and Foreign Minister, who were considering what advice to give him.

2. He then made three points:

(A) It has been less than two months since the first full ROK combat division arrived in SVN and less than six months since the matter had last been discussed in a divided Assembly. This was a very short time in which to present another such proposal to the Korean people.

(B) The issue of troops for SVN had been somewhat overshadowed in Assembly debate by emotion surrounding settlement with Japan. When it came before Assembly again it would stand out alone as an issue. The opposition, which is currently totally disorganized, is trying to make a comeback and regain the face which it lost in the struggle over the ratification of the Japan treaty. It was likely to seize upon the question of further troops as a major issue, since opposition members felt strongly that only way they can keep themselves together is to have an issue on which to fight the majority.

(C) Many Koreans felt that Korea had already made its full and proper contribution to South Vietnamese war. Every Korean felt that Korea’s contribution is vastly greater than that of any other free Asian country. Contributions of men from other Asian countries, even in small amounts, would be helpful and perhaps necessary.

3. The FonMin said he wanted it clear that President Pak’s policy was to support the US and that he and the FonMin felt that the war in SVN was theirs as much as ours. But the President had to deal with a practical domestic political problem. Questions of timing, presentation, etc., would be of paramount importance. Although the President’s mood was favorable, the Cabinet members who knew about it, plus Kim Chong-pil, who was also being consulted, were not united in their opinion. In response to a specific question as to Kim Chong-pil’s attitude, he declined to indicate who thought what.

4. I pointed out the importance of early decision, since the struggle was urgent and many physical preparations had to be made in SVN and elsewhere which depended on the number and character of the troops which would be available. Equipment had to be ordered, etc., all of which involved long lead time.

5. FonMin said he and DPM were considering this problem very seriously and he wanted to discuss it with me, but specifically asked that he be given a little time. “I assure you that I will get in touch with you. I have not disappointed you yet” he said.

6. I plan as our next move to suggest to Vice President Humphrey that he underline with President Pak the personal interest of President Johnson and sense of urgency about this matter. I understand Vice President is prepared to do this. I will follow up with a specific request to President, in Vice President’s presence, for negotiation action by ROKG.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and Saigon. This telegram and the referenced telegram (see footnote 2 below) were retyped and given to President Johnson as attachments to a December 30 memorandum from Bromley Smith. Smith’s memorandum indicates that Johnson read the telegrams. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III)
2. In telegram 662 to Seoul, December 29, the Department of State informed the Embassy of decisions made at a Cabinet meeting, including approval by the President of developmental loans to Korea in the amount of $29 million. The Department of State also reported that the President attached “the utmost importance” to obtaining additional South Korean troops for Vietnam. Brown was instructed “to exert maximum pressure to obtain these forces for a reasonable price.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S)