Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

242. Report on Meeting of the Advisory Group¹

Washington, January 29, 1968.

ADVISORS PRESENT

• Messrs. George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell D. Taylor

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Joseph Sisco, Samuel Berger, Director Richard Helms, W.W. Rostow, and Bromley Smith

Having been fully briefed by the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday, Sunday, January 28 (except for Mr. McGeorge Bundy),² the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up to date with the latest word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko’s reaction to Sec. Rusk’s message.

It was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken and possible action under paragraph 11, until we could form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful.

The first substantive issue addressed was whether and at what stage the President might offer arbitration via the World Court, or some other “suitable international tribunal” after the men and the ship were returned. After examining the problems posed by the World Court formula (implicit recognition of North Korea as a state) and the precedent represented by the RB–47 in 1960, it was agreed that some such offer might well be made if the Panmunjom exercise doesn’t work or is bottlenecked.

The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action.³

1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. In the light of Tommy Thompson’s cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson.⁴ In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape.

2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, Black Shield, rather than Drone, photography was recommended.

3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station.⁵ When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U.S. would wish to assert its rights in international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel—perhaps a destroyer—rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS Banner.

4. Action to recover crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery of the crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.

5. Mine Wonsan Harbor. The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might be impeded. Air combat over the area would be likely; and the risk of escalation would increase if mining were maintained over a protracted period.

6. Seize North Korean vessels. Although our intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship—or even the ship alone—not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans had violated the rules governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to international waters. It was agreed to explore this suggestion with further staff work directed to establish what North Korean vessels might be accessible to seizure on the high seas.

7. Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U.S.; it would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew.

8. Raid across the DMZ. As with respect to 7, above, such punitive operations were judged to be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with respect to the return of the Pueblo and its crew.

9. Naval blockade of Wonsan. The military and economic effects would be limited; the risks of escalation would be high; once undertaken, we would be committed for an indefinite period to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations.

10. Free World economic pressures on North Korea. The Free World’s trade with North Korea is limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would, therefore, be small. With respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, we would certainly meet important opposition from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany. Taken together, the small scale of the inconvenience involved and the political and diplomatic difficulties within the Free World make this line of action unattractive, on present evidence.

11. U.S. bombing practice in South Korea. This suggestion, from a member of the group, was examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the U.S. military build up in the area. Although it was thought that, in general, our present build up offered a satisfactory background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should be staffed out and we would take a further look at it.

At lunch today (January 29, 1968) with the President, the group examined with the President certain lines of action that might be taken up with Congress at a future time. In particular:

• —Provision to the President of the right to extend the period of enlistment;
• —The maintenance in the area of forces sufficient to give the South Koreans a sense of security and provision of sufficient additional military aid so that they go forward with their plan to provide an extra division to the struggle in South Vietnam.
• —It was the universal judgment of the group that we should keep our eye on the major objectives in this crisis:
• —Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself returned;
• —Keep the confidence of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment of force in South Vietnam;
• —Avoid a second front in Asia.

W. W. Rostow ⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Material re: Vietnam and Pueblo, January–February 1968. Top Secret. Prepared on February 1.
2. Katzenbach submitted a brief memorandum to the President on the briefing, informing him that all members agreed that the course currently being followed held a possibility for success. They also felt it unwise to take “highly visible and provocative action” or to implement military operations in North Korea at this time. (Ibid., Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B [through January])
3. A brief analysis of each option prepared by the Korean Working Group is ibid., Files of Walt W. Rostow, Pueblo and Vietnam, January–February 1968. Katzenbach also provided the President with a copy of the papers. (Memorandum from Katzenbach to the President, January 29; ibid., Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ia, Part B [through January]) Intelligence assessments of potential North Korean responses to various U.S. actions were completed as well. (CIA/DIA/State memorandum, January 28; ibid., Vol. I, Part B [through January]; INR memorandum, undated; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NK Seizure of USS Pueblo, INR/OD, January 1968)
4. Not further identified.
5. A telegram from CINCPAC to the JCS, January 28, cautioned that the proposal to station the Banner off the North Korean coast “could be considered by North Korea as threatening in nature and at a minimum, provocative.” Accordingly, CINCPAC advised postponing the operation until military reinforcements ordered to South Korea and the Sea of Japan were in place, even though deploying the Banner would be delayed until or later than February 2. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part A [through January])
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.