Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 12, 1968, 2029Z.

113833. TOVAN 19.

1. We assume that major North Korean purposes in stepping up DMZ incidents, infiltration and sabotage, and staging Blue House raid were to unnerve South Koreans, get them to return their forces, or some of them, from Viet-Nam or inhibit them from sending additional forces.

2. If these assumptions correct, North Koreans would crow with victory if South Koreans fell into this trap. North Koreans would propa gandize that rising popular dissension in South Korea forced the Pak government to give up plans to send more troops to Viet-Nam and even forced them to bring back South Korean forces to put down a popular uprising.

3. It follows from this thread of argument that when things settle down in South Korea, Pak could win a moral and psychological victory over Kim Il-Sung, show his contempt for Kim, and confidence in himself and his country, if he could announce that additional forces will be sent to Viet-Nam. If Pak stands firm in Viet-Nam, and avoids precipitate action in Korea all that North Koreans will have achieved will be greatly heightened worldwide understanding of North Korean harassment of ROK, large increase in US military assistance to ROK with resultant strengthening of ROK military and anti-infiltration forces, and augmentation of US deterrent forces in South Korea.

4. A second purpose of Kim Il-Sung in stepping up violence against North [South] Korea was to interrupt its social and economic progress. Since South Korean people support Park and are active in informing police and military of presence of strangers, the North Koreans have no chance of successfully establishing guerrilla units in the south. Raiders are nasty business, but no real threat to the stability of South Korea, since most of them are killed or captured.

5. The temptation to strike back in reprisal is understandable,² but it will produce no decisive outcome. The danger in retaliatory or punitive air attacks against North Korea is that they could invite air attacks against the South. If Pyongyang or other NK site is hit, what is to prevent an attack against Seoul or some other site? Action and counter-action could lead to resumed fighting along the DMZ, but both sides are too strong to move successfully against each other in this area. The end result would be to call off the reprisal policy, after physical damage had been done to both sides and a period of fighting in the DMZ with no decisive result (it would not end infiltration), or move to full scale war. None of these outcomes is in the South Korean or our interest.

6. We may in the end be forced to take reprisal actions, but they should be deliberate not hasty, and South Korea’s defenses and cities should be prepared for the possible consequences.

7. South Korea has made magnificent economic, social and political progress in these last years. All this would be interrupted and endangered by an escalation of violence due to reprisals or limited war. Private American investors are already hesitating to move into South Korea until the situation clarifies. Is not the best course, therefore, to return to the uneasy situation that existed prior to the seizure of the Pueblo and the Blue House raid, strengthen further the ROK capacity to deal with raiders, and make it even more costly to the North, strengthen the military arm of the ROK, keep a stronger US force in the area if tension persists as an additional warning and deterrent, send the new Korean forces into Viet-Nam, and continue with South Korea’s economic and social progress.

8. Assume you are thinking along the same lines, but we pass them to you for your consideration.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Berger, cleared by Read and Steadman, and approved by Katzenbach.
2. During a February 12 meeting the Prime Minister told Vance that “the real issue is to determine what lies behind these two North Korean actions” and raised the question of “whether the ROKG should delay making an appropriate response or whether it should ‘strike now at the source of the problem.’” (Telegram 4170 from Seoul, February 12; ibid.) Similarly, the Foreign Minister stated that the two incidents were of such seriousness as to be “tantamount to invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty.’” (Telegram 4171 from Seoul, February 12; ibid.) Vance made no direct response to those comments.