Office of the Historian

160. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1

Seoul, February 7, 1968, 0945Z.

KRA 474. Further to my report on ROK attitudes by KRA 0452,2 following is gist of private meeting requested by Gen Chang, CS, ROK- AF with Gen Friedman. As expressed by Gen Chang he fears that speculation in press leading ROK people to demand punitive action against NK for recent transgressions. USG silence on actions and intentions causing unrest and loss of confidence on part of Korean people. ROK people harbor no anti-American sentiment; however, Chang fears that public pressures may cause “certain persons in high positions” to accede to popular demand. Chang concedes that punitive action taken unilaterally could spell military disaster for ROK. He told Friedman he has made this point with higher authorities on many occasions but was not sure that he could continue to hold the line too much longer. He fears he may be directed to direct airstrikes against NK unilaterally. He urgently requested Friedman make known his concern with view to urging USG to clearly establish its position versus further NK Armistice violations and thereby relieve unrest. Friedman commended Chang on position taken and assured his concern would be voiced through proper channels.

Comment: Above appears to be sincere expression Gen Chang’s views but should be read in overall context of some ROKG stage-managing of incitement of ROK “public opinion.” However there is some danger that original impetus from ROKG will to a degree get out of hand just as did the election-rigging before National Assembly elections last year.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who forwarded it to Rostow, Rusk, and to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
  2. In telegram KRA 0452, February 6, Bonesteel warned against keeping Korean officials, other than Pak, unaware of U.S. intentions toward the crises in Korea. He also reported having obliquely reminded the South Koreans that the U.S. was not obligated to defend the ROK, should the latter deliberately provoke war. Bonesteel described the atmosphere in South Korea as an “orgy of emotionalism,” in part deliberately incited by the government. He noted that a situation was rapidly developing “which NK commies could exploit with explosive results. If they should make one or two big raids with some success, it is highly probable ROKs would retaliate instantly and that would really put the fat in the fire.” (Ibid.)↩