Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

146. Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Seoul, January 24, 1968, 1240Z.

241240Z/UK 50245. Specat Limdis for Admiral Sharp and Gen Wheeler. Subject: North Korean Posture (U).

1. (S) This is an attempt by me to draw some conclusions regarding North Korean posture from events of last few days.

2. (S) First conclusion is that these events, the strident outpourings of propaganda from Pyongyang echoed from Moscow, and North Korean statements at today’s Armistice Commission meeting all tend to confirm previous reports from this headquarters that North Koreans intend to wage in earnest an advanced version of “porous warfare” combining unconventional warfare, continuously reiterated propaganda themes, psychological warfare and subversion and sabotage. The pattern seems clearly to indicate that Kim Il-Sung is a determined practitioner of the concepts advanced by Che Guevara in his article on “Many Vietnams” published 12 August 1967 in the Tricontinental, a publication of the Havana-based “Afro-Asia-Latin American People’s Solidarity Organization.” There are also additional evidences that he still suffers from belief that U.S. military effort so extended in support of Vietnam that U.S. unable adequately assist ROKs, except perhaps by nuclear weapons which he seems to believe would not be used in current context of dissidence and antiwar feeling in U.S.

3. (S) The Blue House raid on night of 20–21 January confirmed in accurate detail the previous intelligence reported from here that North Koreans had trained and developed “30 man suicide teams.” Information obtained from the one agent captured indicates 2400 men in special units had been under arduous training for two years and that later raids may be undertaken by teams of company size. Credibility this sole captive not corroborated from other sources established but he has provided much information and retraced on the ground the infiltration route of his team with confirmatory external evidence.

4. (S) Current propaganda blasts adhere strictly to same basic themes reported from here over past year. Essentially the two themes are: (a) U.S. imperialists with Park Chung Hee puppets are aggressors vying to provoke new Korean War and (b) subversive and guerrilla raids south of DMZ are manifestations of revolutionary South Korean patriots and not conducted by North Koreans.

5. (S) Continuing evidence crop up in both North Korean actions and statements that Kim Il-Sung may be suffering from serious miscalculation as to U.S. capacity to react in Korea at same time war continues in Vietnam. This contains seeds of real danger if credibility of U.S. deterrent against overt action remains in doubt.

6. (S) Our estimate of North Korean capabilities and effectiveness of their “porous war” tactics is undergoing continuing reevaluation and we attribute even high capabilities now than previously given them. I am considering at the moment employing another battalion plus from the 7th U.S. division to reinforce local defense capabilities of Nike/Herc sites and special weapons storage areas. There have been today numerous fire fights and sightings of smaller agent groups in I Corp area north of Seoul, probably remnants of the original Blue House raiding team. A number of casualties have been suffered by both sides. We anticipate increasing team infiltrations in near future to include agent boat landings. In this connection, in my discussion with ROK MND this morning I found him seriously concerned at what he called his “underestimation” of numbers and effectiveness of well-trained North Korean teams. He wishes to present to UNC/USFK in near future plan for rotating mobilizations within rear area security divisions to provide 16,000 men for coast watching and associated counter-landing operations. Will report later on this when concept clearer.

7. (S) In summary, I believe North Korean pattern of operations is proceeding along lines previously predicted in numerous messages from here and as briefed in Washington at army commander’s conference, USIB, etc. My concern, however, is that while some of our predictions have seemed “far out” the North Korean actions have exceeded them and at higher tempo.

8. (S) The original North Korean objectives of: (a) diverting efforts from Vietnam, (b) harassing ROK economic development, and (c) the underlying theme regularly stated by Kim Il-Sung of encouraging South Korean revolutionaries and achieving unification—on Communist terms—before or in early 70’s seem to be making headway, at least with respect to the first two objectives.

9. (S) In light of above, recommend expeditious decision regarding some augmentation U.S. Eighth Army, particularly for local security reinforcements. We are also reviewing sea infiltration threat and may soon recommend that to extent feasible ROK Navy and Air Force resources involved be further supported by additional U.S. Navy sea surveillance flights and possibly assistance of two U.S. destroyers.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Events Leading up to; … . Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Specat; Exclusive. Also sent to CINCPAC.