Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

134. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, November 25, 1967, 0528Z.

2576. For Secretary and Bundy from Ambassador. Subject: Additional ROK Troop Contribution to Vietnam.²

1. Recent developments indicate ROK domestic political situation may soon be restored to something approaching normalcy. This raises question of when and how we approach Pak on additional troop dispatch for Vietnam. We have been deferring any real pressure on him in recognition of his domestic political problem. However, time is approaching when this should no longer be overriding consideration. Before proceeding with Pak, believe we should reevaluate prospects for and consequences of additional troop dispatch in light of recent developments and present conditions.

2. Situation with respect to further ROK contributions is not the same as it was for earlier dispatches or even last spring and summer. Since Vice President’s visit and Clifford/Taylor mission, the picture here has changed sufficiently to warrant examining the desirability of a further ROK contribution, particularly in light future disadvantages and difficulties it may create for US in our total relationships with ROK.

A. Recent statements by US officials on better prospects in Vietnam, including prospects for troop withdrawal and lessening need for additional US troops have been noted here and may lead Pak and his advisers, and Korean public as well, to question need for additional dispatch in light of pressures along Korean DMZ and perhaps other areas of country next spring. General Beach’s talk with Pak this week, for example, clearly reflected optimistic view on military outlook in Vietnam which Beach had received in Saigon.

B. Increased NK activity during past year along DMZ and interior has disturbed ROK Govt and the Korean people. They now anticipate greater North Korean efforts at infiltration, subversion and sabotage next year and are exhibiting considerable concern over security in ROK. In past, ROKG was prepared send troops to Vietnam if this did not impair ability handle threat from the North. In light of anticipated increase NK activity, important sectors of opinion are already saying that troops cannot be spared and any dispatch would spur North to increase pressure against ROK.

C. ROKs not likely to be in position to act on any new troop dispatch until early next year since National Assembly action would be required nor could troops be deployed until well into year due to planning and implementation lead time required. In meantime, announcements of increase by Thailand, New Zealand and Australia will have become past history and if you decide that I should maintain pressure, it may look as though ROK alone is being subjected to pressure from US.

D. There has been growing feeling in ROKG and Korean public that ROK troop dispatch to Vietnam has strengthened “special relationship” between US and ROK which justifies having their desires, whether in political, economic or defense area, being given special and unique consideration by USG. They display considerable assuredness in presenting this theme and complete insensitivity to problems that granting special treatment would create for US domestically and internationally. They are uninhibited in expressing their demands or their disappointment when they do not meet with specific encouragement. In short, they see the 50,000 ROK troops in Vietnam as their “Alladin’s Lamp” to make all their dreams come true.

E. Pak will have domestic political problems particularly in the National Assembly if he seeks to send additional troops. Though he and other government spokesmen have carefully hedged their statements on dispatch of troops, they continue to give opposition and public grounds to believe ROKG has strongly implied if not pledged that it will not send additional troops. Opposition will seek to take issue with any troop dispatch proposal in effort to embarrass Pak and ROKG. Opposition will find greater public acceptance of their arguments because of pressures mentioned above.

F. On size of any possible dispatch, we are not as optimistic now as when we were considering matter earlier. We are inclined to believe that Pak is currently thinking more in terms of another brigade and supporting elements. These likely to be combined with Marine brigade to form composite division in Vietnam, permitting Korea to claim that it has three divisions in Vietnam. Before more troops are committed, however, Pak’s problems will undoubtedly cause him to raise ante considerably. His requirements will be expensive, varied and complicated in line with what he judges necessary to overcome opposition to dispatch.³

3. We are not in position here to judge real need for additional ROK troops in Vietnam nor to assess political impact, at home or internationally, of an additional ROK contribution. In this connection, we have in mind fact that the impact of large scale ROK participation has long since been made and further participation will undoubtedly involve us in an exercise with rapidly diminishing returns.⁴

4. On balance, we still believe troops can be obtained and would be ready to begin process as soon as substantial numbers of opposition move into Assembly. At least we would expect to ascertain price and commence bargaining process in line with your views as to required size of contingent, need and resources available.

5. Bonesteel has seen this message. I suggest you talk it over with him before giving me your comments. He is also aware of my feeling that until Pak makes clear to us his intentions with respect to additional troop dispatch, we should continue along our present line of support for ROK programs, including those submitted or being developed to support ROK civilian and military effort in counter-infiltration area, without making additional adjustments in their favor, either in matters of principle (i.e., force levels) or material support. They are being generously treated, I believe, for their current contribution and I would not expect to recommend approval of KLSC or other items without substantial augmentation of ROK effort.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. The contents of this telegram were summarized in a November 28 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson as background to the Tuesday lunch meeting on that date. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5D(3) Allies: Troop Commitments, Other Aid, 1967 to 1968)
3. In telegram 2660 from Seoul, November 30, although he had received no further information from Pak or other officials, Porter outlined the proposals Korea was likely to present in exchange for additional troops based on public and private statements made by Korean officials over the past months. Porter submitted a substantial list of proposed items and expected that the Korean “package” would not contain all of the recommendations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S)
4. In his reply Bundy stated that the United States still wanted “maximum additional ROK troop contribution,” while avoiding “the ‘diminishing returns’ and ‘Aladdin’s Lamp’ pitfalls” Porter discussed. (Telegram 76010 to Seoul, November 29; ibid.)