69. Summary Record of Meeting1
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume I, pages 428–433.]
General Milton2 reported on “Military Action to Strengthen the Situation in Laos. Reequipping of Kong Le’s forces; Farmgate in Laos; US/SEATO forces in Thailand.” Annex H.3 He said the objectives are (1) Hold the Mekong Valley. (2) Hold Sayorboury province. (3) Keep Souvanna in [Page 126] the saddle. (4) Get control of the external influences on the war in SVN while prosecuting the war in SVN. (5) Hold the confidence and support of Thailand.
He recommended (1), that we continue high and low-level recce in Laos, with armed escort with authority to return fire. The purpose is to get a better feel for the situation in Laos. (2) Continue to build up T–28 strike capability and use Lao and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Thai pilots. (3) Build up Thai “paru” operations in Laos. (4) Build up offensive guerrilla (Hardnose) operations. (5) Priority effort on GVN border patrols. (6) Cross-border operations from GVN into Laos (continued air recce, commence ground recce, raids and offensive guerrilla operations, psyops to get at least passive support of tribal groups and villages). (7) Hot pursuit into Laos. (8) Air lift and air resupply of ground recce.4 (9) Plan with RVN for retaliatory air strikes on selected targets in NVN. (10) Naval presence off VN. (11) Low-level foto recce over NVN by Farmgate (USAF and USN). (12) Improve air defense of RVN and Thailand. (13) Retaliatory air strikes on selected targets in NVN and aerial mining of NVN ports. (14) Simultaneously, move ground units into Laos to secure (presumably at invitation of Souvanna) Thakhek, Vientiane, Paksane, and Savannakhet/Seno (2–3 brigades or 10,000 troops). Mission to hold those key points as “trip wires”. If attacked, reenforced. (15) Start airborne and amphibious raids on NVN. (16) Start harassment of NVN maritime shipping. (17) Step up air strikes. (18) Selective quarantine of NVN. (19) Be prepared to defend SEA against Chicom/NVN reaction, which might be invasion.5
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]
[?] asked if anything into Thailand. (No.) And if any SEATO contribution. Martin said keep them doing what they are: UK building a field near Savannakhet; Australia has aircraft at Ubon. Felt said that troops into Mekong towns will not all be US (but UK and Australia feel that their ground forces are tied up in Borneo; might provide air).
Martin said the Australians might provide token forces to help themselves psychologically at home.
Taylor said there must be more US forces in Thailand if put US into Lao towns. SecDef said it would require substantial deployments to Thailand. Further, any action against NVN would have to precede by substantial US deployments. Felt said it would be enough to be ready to send such US troops; the communists are “yellow” and will back down if [Page 127] the brigades are deployed to the Mekong towns. Taylor said this gets us to Hanoi by the Laotian route, which is not thought to be desirable.
General Clay6 discussed “Punitive air strikes in support of the Laotian situation.” He said there are four fixed targets in the north, and 3 in the Panhandle (only good ones, Ban Ban and Khang Khay in the PDJ). CIA identified 17 bridges. Also 5 sod-type airfields, as potential targets if air resupply used. So very few attractive fixed targets. Armed reconnaissance, though, might provide something to attack (those who shoot at you).
SecDef pointed out that nothing mentioned so far will stop flow into SVN (e.g., 6 people a day, and equipment moving at night). It has psychological effect and is an escalating move but little physical impact. SecState said the same pertained to China targets during Korea, which led to conclusion that Chinese will would be affected only by striking Chinese cities! Felt distinguished the VN case, where no massive invasion. You can throttle down the flow of stuff (not stop it). Lodge said must distinguish supplies to Delta and to High Plateau. Taylor said that it would provide action for us, where we really can’t retake the PDJ. Felt thinks a package of actions might cause Lao to be more active. SecDef asked whether we wouldn’t have to increase US presence in Laos first (White Star teams, MAAG, etc.) to guard against PL moves. Bundy didn’t think anything like that we did would make much difference on short term. Felt said PL are encadred by Viet Minh; we might encadre the FAR. Have done it to some extent with Thai. Lao don’t like it. Chadbourn concurred, but said Lao might accept it.
SecDef said he would oppose putting US troops into Mekong without some US military stiffening of Lao (White Star and encadrement) and way of knowing what goes on.
Taylor asked about a Laos Farmgate. Milton said they had no enthusiasm for it.
Taylor asked re reequipping of Kong Le. Felt said it is being done. He objected, but Unger said it is needed, so did it. Don’t need tanks replaced. Issue was trucks and 105s. They are “on the way”.
SecState asked whether Souvanna would go to Paris if shooting began. Chadbourn said probably yes.
Taylor asked if Felt is happy with present recce. Felt said (1) want armed recce and (2) want to look at North Laos (near China).
SecState doubted value of recce. (They will hide and travel at night).
SecDef asked what if Souvanna left. Chadbourn said he might stick around. He has said he would not preside over a war. He has not asked for strikes in Laos, or even for US pilots. He thinks strikes against NVN [Page 128] are right and would put an end to the trouble. Souvanna, if he left, would probably be succeeded by Phoui Souvanikone.
SecDef said that if we moved into Mekong towns, Thais would be with us. SecState said that a VC-type operation from Laos into Thailand would be very difficult to handle. Felt said occupation of the towns would go with pressures elsewhere on NVN.
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 72 A 3470, Southeast Asian Strategy. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. President Johnson’s major advisers met in Honolulu, June 1–2, primarily to discuss Vietnam.↩
- Major General Theodore R. Milton, Commander of the 13th Air Force and then CINCPAC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.↩
- Not found.↩
- That above are in ascending order; that air strikes in Laos so far by Laos and Vietnamese; that guerrilla-type operations by tribal groups are probably encadred with US. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- (1) Easy to talk of, hard to effect partition. But can make Red life in Panhandle miserable. (2) Not practical for US to retake PDJ. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay, Jr., Director, J–3, Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩