Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

42. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington, April 29, 1964.

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on Laos April 29²

This meeting is expected to cover two separate developments which have come to light in recent days. Each item will be opened by CIA briefing:

1. Military Action Northeast and Southeast of the PDJ.

It is not yet clear whether this is a more or less routine action to clear Meo units from an area where they have been able to harass Route 7 or whether there is also a push to extend PL control westward along Route 7 at the expense of the Kong Le forces. The latter would be a serious development and the NSC should review various US courses of action which might be followed if the situation develops in this way. For example, movements by the 7th Fleet, introduction of ground forces into Thailand, etc. Souvanna has already protested to the Co-Chairmen and the ICC and the Co-Chairmen’s representatives had planned to go to Khang Khay today.

Under this item, we should also be prepared to review for the President the current political situation.

2. Evidence of Greatly Increased Use of Route 12-a from Southern NVN to Muong Phine Area near Tchepone.

Although it is not yet absolutely clear, there is a very strong suggestion from photographic evidence that there has been a massive increase in the use of this route for infiltration into SVN. It is essential that we obtain further information as promptly as possible, both in order to ascertain how much is going in and out, so as to take counter-measures, and in order to provide additional evidence for a possible further Jorden report in case we decide on stronger measures at some point. The crucial issue is whether the now much clearer need for better intelligence outweighs the possible adverse effects of activity in Laos on a political situation that seems likely to remain precarious at best for a considerable period. On balance, my own conclusion is that the President should be asked to authorize the following this afternoon, subject to more precise refinement by a working group following the meeting:

(a) Use of agents in Laos. No political problem but equally not likely to be really effective.

(b) Patrols. This is a tough one. Unger, prior to the coup, had expressed grave reservations about units up to battalion size. At that time, Souvanna was even opposed to “hot pursuit” (a fiction in any case), but the odds are that the tough Peking statements of recent days have overcome any illusion Souvanna may have had over having any better deal in Peking or Hanoi. In any case, I believe we should abandon the idea of units as large as a battalion but authorize patrols subject to the following conditions:

(1) Units of 50–100 men.

(2) Not in GVN or other uniforms, but plausibly deniable Montagnard or local groups.

(3) Aimed at intelligence, with any military action confined to self-defense.

(4) Patrols to stay out of populated areas and not to proceed far to the west. A flat mileage limit does not appear wise, but supply and timing considerations alone would probably prevent patrols from going further than 30–50 miles.

(5) Aerial resupply to be permitted, but by Vietnamese aircraft, unmarked.

(6) No US advisers, at least at the outset.

(7) Operations to start in the northern area near Route 9, and to be expanded thereafter to the south as results and indications warrant.

Except for the size of units, these are approximately the same conditions proposed to Unger on April 7, to which he demurred at that time.³

(c) Limited low-level reconnaissance to assess results. The photographic people say that this can produce far greater sharpness but only if undertaken at really low levels. It would help us ascertain what the installations are and whether organized units may be starting to come down. The authorization should not be open-ended, but should provide for perhaps two trial missions to be conducted along Route 9 and Route 12-a staying away from Tchepone and installations which have anti-aircraft.

For the longer term the NSC may wish to consider various measures which would improve our posture, such as:

1. Expansion of Hardnose.⁴ This will require expansion of secret base [less than 1 line of text not declassified]where personnel are trained.

2. Encadrement of BV–33⁵ at Lao Bao with Vietnamese. An effective BV–33 would be very useful in harassing any VC activity pinpointed by the patrolling referred to above.

3. Positioning of some additional T–28’s in Thailand. These could be useful in the event of further major Communist drives in Laos.

4. Pushing ahead with Mu Ban Samaki (Lao version of the strategic hamlet).

5. Developing independent logistic channel to Kong Le.

6. Investigating possibilities of bringing new blood into Laotian leadership.

An INR memorandum analyzing the latest developments is attached.⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Memos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret.
2. See Documents 41 and 43.
3. See Document 43 and footnote 4 thereto.
4. Operation Hardnose was a program in which the United States organized, trained, equipped, paid, and operated armed intelligence/reconnaissance teams of various sizes behind Pathet Lao lines. In central areas of Laos the teams were largely comprised of Lao, while in southern Laos they were predominately Kha tribal minorities. The teams were ostensibly designated as FAR commando or guerrilla units and were paid through FAR.
5. BV–33 was an elite Volunteer Battalion of the Lao National Army.
6. Apparent reference to an April 29 memorandum from Richard T. Ewing of INR/RFE to Trueheart that concluded that Communist activities in the Plain of Jars and the Tchepone areas were related to two separate objectives: (1) strengthening the Pathet Lao position in the Plain, and (2) North Vietnamese support for Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. INR suggested that the attacks in the Plain were consistent with routine clearing operations and concluded that there was no evidence of serious danger to the non-Communist position there. INR suggested the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese were following a wait and see approach. Because of its control and use for infiltration of the Tchepone-Muong Phine area, North Vietnam was unlikely to under take an offensive there for fear of encouraging FAR attack or South Vietnamese border operations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–7 LAOS)