Office of the Historian

371. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM–374–68
Washington, June 17, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Air Support in Laos (S)
1.
(U) Reference is made to:
a.
American Embassy Vientiane message to State 4585/200755Z February 1968, JCS IN 23300.2
b.
CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 212025Z March 1968, JCS IN 86582.3
c.
CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 070103Z April 1968, JCS IN 29163.3
d.
American Embassy Vientiane message to CINCPAC 6924/300847Z May 1968, JCS IN 45045.4
e.
CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 010011Z June 1968, JCS IN 47661.3
2.
(S) The American Embassy, Vientiane, has stated continuing requirements for tactical air support of Royal Laotian Government (RLG) counterinsurgency operations (references 1a and 1d) beyond that which CINCPAC can provide with current and programmed forces (references 1b and 1e).
3.
(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider effective RLG counterinsurgency operations to be essential to the accomplishment of US objectives in Southeast Asia. They are concerned about the threat posed by Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Army forces which, by the close of the 1968 dry season offensive, had taken Nam Bac, Tha Thom, and Muong Phalane; threatened Saravane, Attopeu, and Luang Prabang; and largely controlled Military Region III. The Joint Chiefs of Staff share CINCPAC’s view that additional supporting tactical air would have a positive influence on the actions of the RLG Armed Forces (reference 1c).
4.
(TS) It is recognized that, if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped completely, additional forces may become available, in which case some could be used to satisfy the RLG requirement. In view of the current status of the Paris talks and the situation is South Vietnam, it appears unlikely that the requirement for bombing in North Vietnam will be reduced. On the other hand, there is a distinct possibility that a resumption and expansion of the air and naval campaigns in North Vietnam may be required.
5.
(TS) The US Air Force can provide the additional resources which CINCPAC has stated will be needed to meet American Embassy Vientiane requirements (references 1b and 1e), within the time phasing indicated below, by:
a.
Temporary addition of two A–1 squadrons to the force structure of the US Air Force. First A–1 squadron (18 UE) by September 1968, increase to 25 UE by February 1969. Second A–1 squadron (18 UE) by November 1968, increase to 25 UE by February 1969.
b.
Increasing the UE of the 609th Air Commando Squadron from 12 to 16 A–26s.
c.
Increasing the C–123 UE of the 606th Air Commando Squadron from 6 to 10.
d.
Deleting all T–28s (12 UE) from the 606th Air Commando Squadron.
6.
(S) These forces would be deployed to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. Additional aircraft parking area and facilities will be required at Nakhon Phanom for increased aircrew and support personnel and support equipment. Construction costs utilizing troop construction are estimated at $2.866 million. The present in-country troop construction capability is insufficient to accomplish this construction without deferring other work. Civilian contract construction, if necessary, would approximately double the cost.
7.
(S) An increase of 914 military manpower spaces in Thailand will be required. This manpower ceiling increase takes into account the 139 military spaces which would be gained by deleting T–28s from the 606th Air Commando Squadron. No other spaces are available for tradeoff against this requirement.
8.
(S) The support of these increased forces at Nakhon Phanom and of expanded operations from Nakhon Phanom will place an additional burden on the US Army logistical support system in Thailand. Present support capabilities may be insufficient for the support of both the increased forces at Nakhon Phanom and increased B–52 operations from U–Tapao (JCSM–333–68, dated 29 May 1968, subject: “B–52 Sortie Rate (U)”).5 Requirements for additional personnel, equipment, construction, and funds, as necessary, will be determined and submitted at a later date.
9.
(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that increased tactical air support should be provided to RLG counterinsurgency operations but not at the expense of support to friendly forces in South Vietnam and other higher priority missions. Accordingly, they recommend that the additional US Air Force forces, as shown in the Appendix,6 be approved as an addition to Thai-based forces authorized by Program 6.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Warnke saw this memorandum.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 332.↩
  3. Not found, but described in the text below.↩
  4. Document 369.↩
  5. Not found.↩
  6. Attached, but not printed.↩