Office of the Historian

353. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Steadman)1

Washington, March 30, 1968.

Dear Dick:

The Department of State concurs in the JCS proposal to authorize CINCPAC to establish intelligence nets in the authorized Prairie Fire area.2 We understand that in accordance with the established Prairie Fire coordination procedures, all such recruitment missions pursuant to this authorization will as usual be cleared with Embassy Vientiane prior to launch, and we have amended the authorizing message accordingly.

Ambassador Sullivan and MACSOG have agreed that this program is to be implemented as follows:

a.
All recruiting will be conducted by indigenous Prairie Fire personnel; recruits (later agents) will have no contact with U.S. Prairie Fire personnel.
b.
Training in RVN will take place in sanitized setting with minimum contact with U.S. personnel. Airlift of recruits and agents to and from RVN will be by VNAF copters.
c.
Intelligence net, when fully operational, will not exceed a total of sixty agent personnel. Ten principal agents are to be recruited and trained during six-month period. After training, each principal agent will in turn attempt to recruit five sub-agents or informers.

State’s concurrence in the program is based on this agreement.

I am returning the copy of JCSM–171–68, dated March 21, 1968 and the two appendices enclosed with your letter of March 26.3 State concurs in the JCS message, as amended at Appendix B.4

Sincerely yours,

Philip C. Habib 5
  1. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz.↩
  2. In JCSM–171–68, March 21, in which the JCS stated that intelligence operations in the Prairie Fire area of the Laos Panhandle had been hampered by a lack of intelligence gathering capacity. The U.S. decision to conform as closely as possible to the Geneva Accords limited operations to reconnaissance, exploitative missions, and CIA road watch teams. The JCS proposed using the tribal groups which inhabit the area as an intelligence net. Past experience with Montagnards in South Vietnam demonstrated that these groups would respond to U.S. influence and could be developed into intelligence assets. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968)↩
  3. Not printed. (Ibid.)↩
  4. The draft JCS message as approved with revisions is ibid.↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩