Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

270. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, December 2, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Expansion of Shining Brass Operations in Laos

Proposal

1. The Department of Defense is seeking our approval of an expansion of the Shining Brass Operations which COMUSMACV has proposed and CINCPAC and the JCS have supported. This calls for a permanent enlargement of the zone of operations in Laos, consisting of a 20-kilometer wide strip on the Lao side of the Laos/Vietnam border from approximately the seventeenth parallel on the north to 165 15’N on the south. (See attached maps, Tab A.)²

Background

2. Shining Brass operations on the Lao side of the Laos/South Vietnam border were approved on September 20, 1965 and inaugurated on October 17. These limited, covert operations were confined initially to penetrations by small, 10-man (later 11-man) teams including not more than 3 US personnel to a maximum depth of 20 kilometers west of the border for intelligence/reconnaissance patrols in the southern Laos panhandle, a rugged, sparsely settled area. (This is the “Permanent Zone”—see Tab A.) The teams were to conduct their operations so that they would be undetectable, i.e., avoid contact with the enemy and/or villagers and not engage in sabotage or harassment. Their roles were to collect intelligence on enemy locations and to call in air strikes at likely targets.

a. No Consultation with RLG—The Prime Minister of Laos has on various occasions specifically told senior US officials, including Ambassador Sullivan, that he could not and would not approve of U.S. ground operations in Laos. In view of this stance, no attempt has been made to inform him of Shining Brass and to obtain his concurrence. These armed incursions, unauthorized by the Lao Government, are thus territorial violations of the sovereignty of Laos, and, of course, violations of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. The involvement of U.S. personnel is the element in this program which creates greatest difficulty for us.

Shining Brass operations, therefore, from the beginning were to be conducted in such a fashion that the possibility of exposure, both to the Lao Government and/or to public attention, was minimized, that is:

(1) penetration limited to a maximum of 20 kilometers from the border in the southern sparsely-settled panhandle.

(2) 11-man teams, including not more than 2, later 3, Americans.

(3) no sabotage or harassment.

(4) avoidance of contact with enemy and/or civilians in Laos.

(5) infiltration by foot.

These operations were considered to be fairly safe from detection. Given their limited character and the remoteness of the area it was also thought that even if detected they would not have to be acknowledged.

b. Expansion—During the past year, the essential cover from detection and public identification has suffered steady erosion because of expansions which we have accepted on the basis of strong pleas of military necessity. Infiltration by foot was modified to permit infiltration by helicopter up to a depth of 5 kilometers and, in September 1966, up to 12 kilometers. Although introduced as an option, when operationally necessary, helicopter infiltration has been employed systematically. Although the original ground rules prescribed avoidance of contact with the enemy, as well as sabotage and harassment tactics, the reconnaissance teams by June 1966 were burning isolated huts and small villages and destroying livestock and food caches. They had by that time captured five prisoners and killed 11 enemy. There have been an increasing number of instances in which the reconnaissance teams have revealed their presence and position by initiating fire against suspected enemy personnel, presumably in exercise of team leaders’ responsibility to defend their units.

On June 20, 1966, the possibility of exposure was further increased by approval for the inauguration of follow-up exploitation forces to strike at enemy targets in Laos discovered by the reconnaissance teams. Ground exploitation, however, was restricted to platoon-size (40-man) strike forces with no more than 3 US advisors and limited to a penetration depth of 10 kilometers and a duration of approximately five days.

On July 21, the area of operations for Shining Brass teams was temporarily extended northward from the northern limits of the permanent zone to the southern edge of the DMZ to a depth of 5 kilometers west of the border (see Tab A), exclusive of the enclave at Route 9 where a friendly Lao battalion (BV–33) is located. The area, although rugged, is much more accessible, more heavily populated and militarily most active. On September 24, 1966, a further temporary extension north of Route 9 and west from the border was approved in order to permit reconnaissance in support of III MAF operations just south of the DMZ in South Vietnam, scheduled from September 17 to October 15. Of the seven targets proposed for this extended area, two were disapproved by us because they were located too far from the border and exposure of these missions would have made it virtually impossible to avoid acknowledgment.

3. While the present memo is addressed to the proposal mentioned in para 1 above, you should be aware that the Joint Staff (SACSA) has also informally submitted to us a proposed Memorandum of Agreement for Shining Brass. In addition to advocating a greater delegation of control to CINCPAC and Ambassador Sullivan than I believe we can accept, the Draft would further extend the scope of operations by increasing the size of forces, the US involvement, and the use of helicopters and aircraft. These are matters we have not yet discussed with DOD and for which we lack supporting justification. (The Draft further relates to the proposed extension of Shining Brass-type operations to the DMZ and North Vietnam, a proposal on which a separate memorandum is being prepared.) Therefore, I recommend that you consider the Draft Memorandum of Agreement to be for information only—it indicates clearly the direction in which the military planners desire to move. I will plan to consider it further with DOD in the light of the decision on the question posed in paragraph 1 above.

Discussion

4. The present DOD proposal would make permanent the temporary (northern) extensions mentioned above and would go further to the north and west. Such a substantial expansion of the Shining Brass operational zone would bring into sharp relief the fundamental problem of exposure. Significantly deeper penetrations into this populated and militarily active area cannot remain concealed. Already, in the permanent zone and in the temporary area, the frequency of enemy contact and the rate of casualties are increasing. There is possibility that four US casualties, lost in the northern area, may have survived as captives. The enemy appears to be aware of most penetrations within a relatively short time of the actual infiltration and has been taking increasingly sophisticated countermeasures. During the month of October, eight of the nine Shining Brass reconnaissance teams required emergency exfiltration because of enemy attacks. The helicopters used for both infiltration and exfiltration often encounter enemy ground-fire. In at least one case, the enemy apparently spotted the choppers during infiltration and laid an ambush at the Landing Zone for the exfiltration run, including spiked stakes in the Zone itself. The team suffered casualties and the helicopters were damaged during the emergency exfiltration. In addition to the mounting casualties and risk of additional losses of US personnel, it would appear, at this tempo of operations, to be only a matter of time before a helicopter is downed by enemy action inside Laos. While this may be explainable at 4 kilometers from the frontier, it is probably not so at 18, or adjacent to North Vietnam.

5. We have agreed to these operations in an effort to meet DOD requests based on statements of military need, believing that only on the basis of experience could the degree of risk be determined. The experience has been that even in the permanent zone the risk is greater than we anticipated and that with each expansion of the area or in the scope and pace of operations the risk intensifies. Because the area for which approval is now requested is known to be heavily infested and of major importance to the enemy, we believe the risk of exposure too high to be acceptable.

6. With the operations as they are presently conducted, i.e., even without the expansion proposed by DOD, P is deeply concerned about how to avoid acknowledging them should they come to public attention. Under present circumstances it would plan to use the guidance at Tab B. However, this line might not be usable in all circumstances and would rapidly lose credibility for operations under the proposed expansion.

7. US military authorities are, of course, deeply concerned over infiltration through Laos. They consider the Shining Brass program successful and its continuation, including the proposed extension, essential for both intelligence collection and harassment purposes. Their concern has been deepened whenever it appeared that enemy forces might in fact be deploying on Lao territory for an attack against US–GVN positions in northern South Vietnam. The arguments bearing on these points are attached at Tab C. In support of the extension to a 20-kilometer depth in the northern sector, Joint Staff representatives have referred to evidence that a PAVN division-level structure may be located in the area and that it cannot be expected to be within the narrow 5-kilometer belt.

Commenting on the military argument, Ambassador Sullivan in September 1966 believed that “the record of Shining Brass to date has not given much substance to the military justification.” The Ambassador has repeatedly recommended that Shining Brass-type operations would be more useful if they were conducted near or in the DMZ, or even in North Vietnam, rather than in Laos. We have reviewed in detail the reports of Shining Brass operations in Laos from inception to the present and believe that the Ambassador’s assessment of achievements there is generally accurate even though we fully appreciate the basis for the concern of the US military. It appears clear, for example, that these operations have not led to any significant interruption of the infiltration efforts, although they have confirmed the presence of enemy troops in this area, and may have given warning about movements into Vietnam. Thus we accept the judgment that Shining Brass operations have been militarily useful. Intelligence developed by the teams unquestionably adds to MACV’s total picture of the infiltration pattern, and air strikes associated with their missions have undoubtedly added some harassment. The question is, does the value to the military justify the high risk of serious damage to US credibility and to our objectives in Laos? Unless such an extension of Shining Brass is essential to the safety of US forces in Vietnam or to their conduct of the conflict there, which we doubt, we believe the answer must be negative.

8. One way to resolve the present difficulty might be to obtain Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s agreement to public acknowledgment. However, he has told Ambassador Sullivan that he could not take the international pressure that would accompany the entry of US ground forces into Laos. As a consequence, the Ambassador has determined that he could not raise the proposition with Souvanna, who has, in effect, told him in advance that the answer would be no. The Ambassador believes that the chances of getting Souvanna’s approval are “absolutely zero.”

9. A second possible course might be to extend these operations without Souvanna’s knowledge and approval. However, as noted above, exposure is already a great risk and would, we believe, become a virtual certainty if this proposal is approved. The discredit and embarrassment to the US Government stemming from public knowledge of these unauthorized operations, in violation of Lao sovereignty and the Geneva Agreements, would be intense. An immediate consequence of exposure would be the loss of Ambassador Sullivan’s credibility with Souvanna. Moreover, exposure would contrast sharply with recent assurance given Souvanna by both the President and the Secretary personally that the US Government firmly supports him and his policies. The Prime Minister’s position, in fact, might become untenable. He would certainly be criticized by the Soviets (whose continued support of the 1962 settlement he and we consider essential) and by non-communist friends of Laos. He is already under pressure (for other reasons) from Lao conservatives, and in the face of such a compromise of his neutralist commitments and convictions might resign.

10. There are alternatives to the proposed expansion of the operating areas under present arrangements which we would be willing to support but in which the Joint Staff (SACSA) has not expressed interest thus far:

a. Further extension of the growing CAS program of roadwatch and guerrilla teams (Hardnose and Kha) already operating within Laos. By the end of 1966, CAS expects to have 40 such teams operating in the eastern panhandle area along the infiltration routes. Use of CAS teams is politically attractive because

1) there are no U.S. advisors with the teams on their missions; and

2) the teams are based in Laos, not South Vietnam, and are made up of personnel whose presence raises no political questions.

Since 1963, when I first approved the CAS operation, we have viewed it as an attractive alternative (even though less satisfactory from a military point of view) to U.S. military involvement on the ground in Laos, and subsequent expansion of the CAS operation has been endorsed by Ambassador Sullivan.

b. The organization of Shining Brass-type teams composed, however, entirely of personnel of the Indo-Chinese area. Provided the depth of US-piloted helicopter penetration were not extended beyond the present 5-kilometer limit, the operation of such teams would not involve substantial risk of exposing US activities, which is the root of our concern.

There is a third alternative, in which the Department of Defense has expressed some interest:

c. Use of Shining Brass reconnaissance teams only (i.e. no follow-up) within the proposed extended area provided

1) we return to the original Shining Brass operating rules, with no sabotage or harassment and with strict avoidance of contact with enemy and/or civilians in Laos;

2) use of helicopters confined to the present 5-kilometer depth; and

3) air strikes are authorized only after exfiltration of teams.

This would give us great difficulty and would continuously present us with a high risk of exposure. Therefore we do not recommend it, although individual cases might be considered if the military situation demands.

Recommendations:³

11. I recommend that:

a. State not concur in the proposal to expand the permanent zone of operations for Shining Brass.

b. The 5-kilometer strip from the northern edge of the present permanent zone to the southern edge of the DMZ (exclusive of the BV–33 enclave at Route 9) continue to be considered a temporarily approved zone within which Shining Brass reconnaissance team operations only may continue, provided proposed missions (new or repeated) are reported to State in advance in periodic schedules or by individual message.

c. We indicate to Defense our desire to accord MACV the greatest flexibility consistent with Souvanna’s position and our posture in Laos, saying that State would be prepared to support alternatives (a) and (b) in paragraph 10 if Defense desires.

d. Finally we should state that the arrangements outlined in paragraph 10 (c) could be carried out in case of grave need, on a case-by-case basis with prior Defense and State approval.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz, Hamilton, and Unger; cleared by Hamilton, Oscar V. Armstrong, Public Affairs Officer in EAP, and Harold Kaplan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. As of November 1 the names of the Assistant Secretary and the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs was changed to East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
2. None of the Tabs was attached.
3. For the decision to extend the scope of Shining Brass as reported to the Embassy, see Document 277.