266. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
2457. 1. RLG has had a little difficulty pulling itself together this morning after disruptive events of yesterday and last night. We kept them fully posted during the night as our T–28 chickens were being coaxed to roost in Thailand, but they blacked out the city and otherwise lost sleep over the events.
2. Cabinet and military officers met this morning at 10 am. Meeting heard formal report from General Bounphone concerning events in south and sent messages to King and Souvanna reporting that all has been resolved. Lao Ministry of Information, which has functioned surprisingly well throughout, put out radio broadcast reassuring public and restoring calm. City is now fully returned to normal.
3. During this morning’s meetings, Kouprasith made vigorous plea to demand extradition of Ma and Bounleut from Thai authorities. Due to Ambassador Martin’s expeditious handling of matters with Thai Government and as result triangular telephone conversations he and I had last night through General Bond in Udorn, we were able get word to Leuam in advance that Thai would preserve their time-honored tradition of refuge for these latest Lao immigrants.
4. Nevertheless, there occurred the usual Vientiane contretemps when Boun Oum was erroneously informed that I had arranged with [Page 526] the Thai to extradite Ma and Bounleut. Boun Oum had impression he was double-crossed and was even most unhappy with congratulatory message he received from the King. I think I have straightened him out, although I haven’t been able to see him yet because I have been intermittently busy giving away bride at a wedding this morning.
5. I have, however, talked at length with Leuam and have discussed how best to proceed from here. He agrees that we must make best effort brush all this rapidly under carpet, avoid recriminations, and reconstitute the air force. He, naturally, wishes to defer decisions until Souvanna returns tomorrow, but he and I have agreed on common line to present to Prime Minister.
6. Above and beyond this, I have some views about Ma. As I have reported earlier, he is a very sick man. At the same time he has done as much in the past for the US as any individual in Laos. Therefore, I have no desire to toss him out like a twisted lemon. He is a far different case from Phoumi and merits some proper consideration from us.
7. Therefore, I intend to propose to Souvanna that we go ahead with our commitment to give him hospital treatment, quietly in a US facility. (Among other things, this will remove him from possible contamination by Phoumi.) After that, I would like to see if we can arrange a job for him with Air America, or other friendly organization, as a civilian pilot in Vietnam or Taiwan. He has no personal means and has a family to support.
8. As for Bounleut, I have no plans and feel he is basically the provocateur who led Ma astray. He will doubtless drift into the Phoumi retinue and that ought to serve him right. I only feel sorry to wish him on the Thai.
9. Our next immediate task here is to reconstitute the air force. Happily, our strategy succeeded in preserving all our T–28’s from damage and safely in either US, Thai, or Lao hands. We will have no problem reassembling them into a strike force. We have at least 28 and perhaps more than 30 qualified T–28 pilots. We have no basic differences with General Staff about organization plans (we constantly did with Ma). The only thing we will lack will be the fighting spirit that Ma certainly had. Sourith is no tiger and showed definite traces of a yellow streak in yesterday’s events. But, since he’s the best we have to work with, we’ll start over again with him first thing Monday morning.
10. On balance, this was a big week for Kouprasith. Not only did Ma hang himself by yesterday’s actions, but Kong Le, by his obvious involvement in this affair, finished himself off as well. All military regions, plus the Neutralists, check in on side of General Staff. There is practically no dissident left, unless one counts Phasouk and Vang Pao. However, both of them have played their hands fairly smoothly and we will continue to urge Vang Pao towards reconstruction.
[Page 527]11. The repercussions of all this turmoil on the political scene are a little difficult to gauge until all the smoke clears. However, Leuam has clearly lost prestige and Kouprasith has gained. Whether Kouprasith will add his new gains to Souvanna’s political fortunes or preserve them for some game of his own may turn out to be the most interesting question in town over the next few weeks.
12. All these fascinating digressions should add special embellishment to the annual North Vietnamese dry season offensive, which our intelligence reports indicate we can expect to begin within the next few days.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, repeated to Manila, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI, DIA, and DEPCMDR 7/13th AF Udorn. Passed to the White House,CIA, USIA, and NSA.↩