Office of the Historian

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)1

Vientiane, November 8, 1965, 0600Z.

080600Z. Ref Embtel 051045Z.2

1.
RLAF General Ma came to Vientiane Sunday afternoon to meet with Air Attaché and me concerning operations in Panhandle. As result of meeting, I believe we have basis for satisfactory cooperative U.S.-RLG air effort against infiltration routes. However, in order implement fully, we will need hold trilateral Vientiane-RLG-Saigon reps meeting which I have proposed in other messages.
2.
Substance of our preliminary understandings is that U.S. aircraft will be able, subject to detailed arrangements to be worked out in aforesaid trilateral meetings:
A.
Fly night armed recce over currently restricted Steel Tiger routes south of Route 9;
B.
Share daytime recce over same route structure with RLAF on basis system to be worked out at meeting;
C.
Share low-level, eyeball recce and FAC functions with RLAF in 0–1 type aircraft. For this purpose General Ma would like to accept MACV’s previous offer of ten 0–1 type aircraft;
D.
Use Bango missions against any targets developed by actions cited above.
3.
We also skirted into question of operations in Shining Brass area, but in absence MACV concurrence, I was unable reveal to him fact that we were currently penetrating Lao territory in this area. General Ma was somewhat cautious in reacting to this (perhaps because he knew I wasn’t leveling with him). He indicated his intention fly certain missions in that general area himself. Therefore, unless we get this straightened out soon, run risk of having some entanglement there. This needs personal attention of Generals Westmoreland and Dupuy.
4.
General Ma also said he wished move his T–28 operational and staging base closer to trail complex. For this purpose he needed some improvements to Saravane Airfield over and above that work which we currently have in progress there. This would not be costly, but might involve a bureaucratic funding problem. I will look into it, but may end up asking PACAF to divert certain service funds for this worthy cause. I suspect it will be less than $100,000. You will note that he ran 45 T–28 sorties November 6 on Route 92 and estimates 200, mostly road workers, KIA as result his strikes. These were staged from Pakse. He says he could double sorties if he staged from Saravane.
5.
Finally, he offered help with some air infiltration of native agents whom he had recruited into territory along Route 92. He required supplies and communications support for this effort. I will work out something on this with CAS.
6.
In general, I think we have progress here and will need your closest cooperation bring this into being. Please remember that the secret word is “collaboration”. If Ma thinks we’re trying to take over his territory, he freezes. If he’s permitted to play first string on the first team, he’s all American.
Sullivan
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 466, which is the source text, and to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, DOD, and JCS.↩
  2. In telegram 051045Z to COMUSMACV, November 5, repeated to the Department of State as telegram 462, Sullivan reported that he shared Westmoreland’s view that the North Vietnamese were increasing their infiltration in South Vietnam through the Laos Panhandle. Sullivan agreed that, after proper liaison, there should be a stepped up program of attacks on the infiltration routes. (Ibid.)↩