Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, May 10, 1965, 9:13 p.m.

982. With prospective Cambodia conference pretty well out of the window, we are giving thought once again to possibility of Laos conference. Although British have not yet mentioned this to us, we suspect they will soon be reviving idea. We recognize of course that ChiComs, and perhaps DRV, may be as interested in sabotaging a conference on Laos as one on Cambodia. (Of course DRV did favor Laos conference in communiqué with Soviets, but even adverse attitudes would not be completely negative factor.)

There is still a need from our point of view to keep some sort of diplomatic track open in Southeast Asia. Laos conference would be an attractive vehicle in some ways for doing this. We would be on a much better wicket substantively than in the Cambodian conference and should be able to press effectively for full implementation of the 1962 Accords by the Communists. A second advantage would be that Souvanna Phouma’s expected firmness regarding the composition of the RLG delegation at such a conference might make it more difficult for Commies to press for representation of NFLSVN. In any case RLG as principal interested party would certainly itself oppose Front representation.

At same time we sense from Souvanna’s ready agreement to Cambodian conference and from Laotian situation and his attitude generally that Laotian conference would be manageable for him domestically. Specific condition of neutralizing PDJ might well not be necessary now in view consolidated RLG hold on compensating areas—though of course RLG and we could point to Communist aggression in PDJ as one matter requiring redress.

Similarly for GVN and RTG, it would appear from reactions to Cambodian conference that US interest in Laos conference would not in present circumstances be taken as sign of weakness.

In short it would appear that we have good deal to gain and little or nothing to lose by encouraging conference on Laos at this time, either through Article 19 route or otherwise. If Communists block meeting, we have scored significant propaganda point. If meeting takes place, we are in sound position to push for implementation of 1962 Accords and to profit by any Communist interest in corridor talks on Vietnam which might develop.

Would appreciate thoughts of addressees on the above.²

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 ASIA SE. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared in draft by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, Hong Kong, and Moscow.
2. The Embassy in Bangkok vigorously opposed a Laos conference. The Embassy in Vientiane and the Consulate in Hong Kong were not enthusiastic about the idea, suggesting that the Cambodian conference was not yet dead. (Telegram 1773 from Bangkok, May 12; telegram 1845 from Vientiane, May 12; and telegram 1732 from Hong Kong, May 13; ibid., POL 8 LAOS and POL 27 ASIA SE) The Embassy in Vietnam favored the idea, see footnote 3, Document 182.