Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, March 14, 1965, 3:17 p.m.

780. Believe we have reached stage in development Barrel Roll program where it would be useful review situation and obtain your assessment impact BR has had and likely have on Lao political and military scene and clarification your views on program itself. We in general agreement with basic position outlined in Embtels 1393² and 1416³ that program requires reshaping into more systematic operation built around two general features of (1) chokepoints and (2) armed reconnaissance of key routes with latter including secondary targets of fixed installations, having in mind difficulties involved in shifting targets without adequate preparation.

We also share your view that this reshaping should not involve increase in scale and only partly increase in frequency. These considerations important of course, as pointed out Embtel 1416, connection continued acceptability of entire program to RLG and specifically Souvanna. From Embtel 1393 we gather that you consider schedule of four chokepoint-reseeding operations per week plus three (to four) armed reconnaissance operations per week or a total of seven operations per week as about right for systematic non-spectacular program.

However pressures are developing to shape program into more than this by increasing not only frequency of operations significantly but their scale as well. Up until now we have been holding firm on four strike aircraft for day armed reconnaissance missions and two to four strike aircraft for night missions. In case of chokepoint or other special missions strike aircraft have been kept to maximum of sixteen and flak suppression aircraft to maximum of twelve (with exception reseeding missions which are no more than twelve and twelve). Moreover there has been 48-hour sterile period between day missions and 36 hours between day and night missions, with special exception made in case of chokepoint missions which exempt from sterile period injunction.

In recent JCS message (JCS 6570 DTG 061703Z),⁴ which requested program for BR 42–55 and which was not cleared with us since it declared “planning” message, seven day and seven night missions were proposed for two-week period with no limitation placed on maximum number of strike aircraft per mission and with 48-hour sterile period between standard armed recce missions reduced to 24 hours. If these new terms of reference are accepted it seems to us that scale and frequency of Barrel Roll operations will be in excess of non-spectacular program envisaged Embtel 1393. Proposed chokepoint operations in Sam Neua (approved by Vientiane) calling for four BR operations on consecutive days (one of which will have target 3 nm from Sam Neua town) is another example of trend toward increase in scale and frequency of BR operations. These proposed chokepoint operations, whether conducted on same day as CINCPAC recommends or on consecutive days as you prefer, would be significant departure from pattern and scale of BR program to date. With one armed recce BR per day and one chokepoint reseeding BR mission per day (given total eight chokepoints) likely we could have two Barrel Roll missions any given day.

Would appreciate your comments. In general you should also keep in mind that our ability hold the line here depends to considerable extent on our being able cite your arguments and recommendations in support position for non-spectacular, carefully controlled program. For example, we are being pressed on BR 29⁵ and 31 by JCS but have held line based on your reasoned nonconcurrence. In this regard we will be sending you septel by regular channels requesting your views on BR 29 and 31 and to which request you reply by regular channels.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Barbis and approved by Unger.
2. Document 171.
3. Dated March 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. Dated March 6. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 1394 from Vientiane, March 3, Sullivan did not concur in Barrel Roll 29 because he believed that there was no compelling reason to execute a strike against Ban Keng Khan Kao military area. Sullivan was opposed to new special Barrel Roll missions in addition to those special and routine missions already programmed. (Ibid.)