Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 7, 1965, 1 p.m.

2073. During course SEACOORD meeting² participants considered means improve effectiveness US air operations in Laos. General assessment was that operations to date had achieved measured success, especially with respect to Laos-Thai morale, enhancement US pilot proficiency in area, and deterrence to vehicular borne infiltration over main routes into Laos. Moreover, these flights, combined with Lao T–28 operations, have caused Viet Minh-Pathet Lao to dismantle and disperse installations in many target areas. Presumably these installations have been re-established under jungle cover. Presumably also, due to random interdiction of roads, Viet Minh have moved into more expensive and less satisfactory methods of human portage, utilizing conscripted coolie labor which in itself is becoming scarce item due to peasant fear of air attack. However, we concur Deptel 1397³ that these operations have been run in such a manner that Hanoi and Peiping are probably not able identify them as increments of pressure which are designed to have an influence upon North Vietnamese will to continue aggressive actions.

Group developed several recommendations designed improve efficiency of US air operations within parameters of authority already accorded from Washington to Embassies and Commands represented at SEACOORD. A summary of these measures plus a general assessment of effectiveness US air operations Laos will be included in general reporting message from SEACOORD meeting.⁴ Message will also provide group’s [garble—view?] re Pathet Lao, Hanoi and Peiping reactions to US air operations. Beyond these recommendations, however, group strongly believes that certain additional Washington authority is required to obtain maximum efficiency US assets committed to this program without markedly increasing visibility these air actions. Essentially, authorization consists of following:

A. Single pre-planned air strike against bridge at Ban Ken (UG 6066). Success of this action would relieve to some degree potential pressures against ground forces in northern sector of Laos, provide choke point with additional targets, and create additional obstacles to rapid support or reinforcement of enemy forces west of the bridge. It would probably also reduce requirements for some of risky armed and photo reconnaissance missions of type now flown by US aircraft along Route 7.

B. Because of dispersal concentrations in panhandle area and camouflage targets as noted above, there is need for intensive new low level Yankee Team oblique photography along Routes 12, 8, 23 and 9 in Laos corridor. Airmen present at meeting were unanimous in view that such flights, if flown on random schedule and with appropriate armed escort, would not involve significant risk of pilot and plane loss. They were equally unanimous in view that current pattern of flights which places Yankee Team planes above anti-aircraft range is of limited value from tactical and intelligence viewpoint.

C. In contemplating future pattern “Barrel Roll” operations, group recommends that configuration of missions be concentrated on two types of operations: (1) night armed reconnaissance missions flown along Laotian corridor routes and Route 7; (2) daytime operations with priority given to “secondary targets” and armed reconnaissance feature becoming subsidiary. In instance no. 1 above, ordnance load, if not expended on target of opportunity, would be returned to base or jettisoned into the sea. In instance no. 2 above, targets designated would be those (i.e. bridges and A.A. installations, etc.) mutually agreed between RLAF and AIRA Vientiane as more satisfactory for US than RLAF operations.

Ambassadors Taylor, Martin and Sullivan concur in foregoing. If Washington also concurs, CINCPAC is prepared to submit operational plans for all three general categories outlined above, drawing upon MACV and Embassy Vientiane resources and recommendations.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to the Department of Defense and White House; repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC; and passed to CIA. The source text is incorrectly dated January 7, 1964.
2. The meeting of the SEA Coordinating Committee (representatives from the Country Teams in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos and MACV) took place on January 7 in Saigon.
3. Dated January 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. A general review of the meeting is in telegram 2086 from Saigon, January 8. In this telegram the Embassy stated that the conferees felt it was doubtful “whether Hanoi had identified Barrel Roll operations as a separate and distinct U.S. act of minor escalation,” the reason being that it had been so overshadowed by the far more numerous Lao Air Force T–28 and U.S. Yankee Team sorties. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)