150. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
868. I met alone with Souvanna this afternoon and carried out full sense of my instructions.2 Souvanna’s reaction was excellent and he is prepared cooperate in full measure with our proposals. As anticipated the only complication arose in my request for his concurrence in the introduction of more candor into our public statements concerning air operations in Laos.
He fully supports the US program of pressures against North Vietnam and believes they should be carried out with deliberate “sang-froid”. He reviewed his familiar contention that actions speak louder than words and believes we should in this instance let the actions speak for themselves.
In discussing proposed armed reconnaissance against infiltration routes he specifically requested that we employ US aircraft over Routes 7, 8 and 12. He demonstrated full comprehension of meaning of “armed reconnaissance” by stipulating that if we “see anything moving on the road, either day or night, attack it.” He asked that our air attaché coordinate the proposed US actions with General Ma and assured me full cooperation of RLAF.
With respect contemplated air strike against Ban Ken Bridge, he recognized significance this action and did not blanch when I told him it might involve a considerable number of aircraft. He himself expressed hope we would eliminate anti-aircraft batteries before attacking bridge structure. It was in discussion of this particular action and the real possibility that we might lose some aircraft in the process that I stressed need for more frank admission by US authorities concerning nature of actions in which our aircraft would be engaged. On this point Souvanna became quite adamant. He cited North Vietnamese attitude of bland, unembarrassed denial of military presence in Laos even when four of their soldiers have been captured and presented to the public. He said that open admission by the US of military action on Laotian soil in direct violation of 1962 agreements would not only open us to extensive Communist propaganda attack but would face him with intolerable international and domestic pressures. He proposed that we stick to line that US aircraft [Page 307] conducting photographic reconnaissance at RLG request and that, if unhappily one should be shot down, we leave the impression it was consequence of reconnaissance mission. He even recommended we refuse to acknowledge that aircraft were armed.
I explained to him necessity for candor in maintaining US public support for Southeast Asian policy and desire US officials maintain public confidence by avoiding misleading statements. I said I was not sure his response would constitute satisfactory formula for Washington but would report his views faithfully.
He said he was leaving tomorrow for visit with King and subsequent travels Sayaboury Province. Returning Vientiane December 15. I told him we might wish begin some operations prior to that date. He took that fully in stride, saying “we are ready today” and only asked that I let him know the results of our operations.
In making my presentation I stressed need for maximum discretion, advising him that only limited number US officials and senior representatives specified allies were being informed of our intentions. He indicated complete understanding need for maximum security.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. William H. Sullivan was appointed Ambassador to Laos on November 25, 1964.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Also during this meeting, Sullivan gave Souvanna an oral message from President Johnson stating appreciation for his “patience, courage and perseverance” and expressing confidence that Souvanna would continue with the same “tenacity.” (Telegram 510 to Vientiane, December 9; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) During their discussion Sullivan noted that Souvanna gave “no inkling” that he was thinking of retiring, as had been feared. (Telegram 872 from Vientiane, December 10; ibid.)↩