Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

145. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, November 30, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Route 9 Project

On October 15 you asked me to look into the possibility of a highway project being undertaken on Route 9 in Laos as a basis for an operation to seal the Lao corridor against infiltration into South Vietnam.² This suggestion has been reviewed thoroughly in FE, S/VN and S/P³ and has also been the subject of discussion among representatives of Embassies Bangkok, Saigon and Vientiane. The latter two have submitted preliminary comments.

Our general conclusions at this stage are as follows:

1. Because of its location, Route 9 should be considered as a possible element in any measures to block, limit or detect infiltration into South Vietnam.

2. This route should logically be improved eventually in the course of the long range peace-time development of the region as a component of a regional highway system, as an adjunct to a Mekong Valley development program and as an access to land-locked Laos.

3. Route 9 runs through territory held by the Pathet Lao and used by North Vietnam in support of its campaign in the south. These facts make it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which control or access to critical portions would be yielded to any non-communist authorities for any purpose without a struggle which would require introduction of foreign troops.

4. Introduction of foreign military forces is prohibited by the 1962 Geneva Agreement without exception. Therefore, any operations in the PL-held portion of the road would entail either a basic United States policy change to permit open violation of the Agreement, or elaborate diplomatic preparation to reconcile the action with the Agreement and establish an acceptable non-military rationale.

5. The problems involved in any Route 9 activity are such that further consideration should be related to and subordinated to decisions on basic courses of action in South Vietnam and Laos.

We can bring our present thinking on this concept into better focus if we organize it around various alternative assumptions as to possible future policy, of which there are three which seem most relevant to any actions we might decide to undertake in the corridor. First, we may determine that, in connection with continuing the pacification struggle in South Vietnam, it is essential that infiltration through Laos be checked at once. Second, we may decide that immediate action against the infiltration routes is unnecessary, or that the costs (including effects on our Lao policy) are too high, but that achievement of our Vietnam objectives requires eventual curtailment of corridor infiltration. Finally, we may wish at some time to seek a political settlement in South Vietnam involving controls to assure against renewal of North Vietnam aggression through Laos.

Under the first assumption we would probably have to think exclusively in terms of military actions justified on the actual grounds of military necessity and DRV violations of the 1962 Geneva Accords. This course would require deliberate abandonment of our present policy of supporting the Geneva Accords. Time would probably not permit development of a plausible economic development rationale or other arrangements to gain international acceptance. Furthermore, the scale of military force required to meet predictably heavy PL and North Vietnam resistance would quickly break down any non-military cover. It would then be a purely military decision as to whether Route 9 offered the most effective basis for our action in the corridor.

Under the second assumption, a longer range action program could be considered. We might think in terms of a phased operation beginning with efforts to create an appropriate international political atmosphere, probably using various economic development arguments. The initial phase might also include improving portions of the road in Vietnam and Laos which are now in non-communist hands (i.e., in Laos between Savannakhet and Muong Phalane). The second phase could include clearing and improving the PL-held portion of the road using limited force, initially Lao only, for protection of construction workers. After completion of the road, which might take two years of actual construction at a cost in the neighborhood of $275 million (Embassy Saigon estimate), a permanent guard force might be established. This could be either a force strong enough to completely block north/south movement, or a light, mobile police-type force having the limited objective of acting as a “burglar alarm” against DRV aggression. Under the latter approach, the ultimate sanction in defense against such aggression would have to be directed against the DRV itself.

The difficulties to be encountered in planning such a long-range course of action would be enormous, possibly insurmountable. The basic obstacle would be the unwillingness of the PL and North Vietnamese under any pretext to surrender, without massive resistance, control of this important strategic area that they now hold and use. Therefore, whatever advance preparations we might make to create international acceptance of the highway project as a pretext, we would probably still have to face ultimately the necessity of introducing foreign military forces in defiance of the Geneva Agreements and in contravention of our own present policy in Laos. It would be folly to commence any long-term program relating to Route 9 without appreciation of this fact.

Further, a logical objection may be raised to a long-term approach such as that outlined above on the ground that, if corridor infiltration is of sufficient importance to justify elaborate international arrangements and heavy financial commitments, both for the road and for the related economic development projects, then it must be important enough to justify a course of action with more immediate effect on infiltration. This point would be particularly telling if, as we believe, we would be likely even at the end of our long term program to have to introduce substantial military force.

Although consideration of Route 9 has up to now been related only to the pacification struggle in South Vietnam, we should not exclude the possibility that the general concept might be applied under the third of our suggested policy assumptions (i.e., a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam). In such a settlement, we might seek some kind of internationally guaranteed status for South Vietnam with arrangements for preventing and detecting subsequent DRV infiltration. In the enforcement arrangements, a place might well be found for Route 9. As an established “beat” for patrolling by the supervisory agency, it could greatly facilitate detection of infiltration on both sides of the border in the critical region of the demarcation line. Improvements in the road necessary for peace-keeping purposes could, of course, be related also to other considerations such as Mekong development, regional highway planning, etc.

Recommendation:

In light of the above it does not seem to us that we can fruitfully proceed further in studying the Route 9 concept until basic decisions have been made on our Viet-Nam policy and until we can see more clearly the nature of our requirements in the Laos corridor. However, the various possible formulations of the concept should be kept in mind as alternatives to be explored in detail after such decisions have been made. We will in the meanwhile forward the views expressed in this memorandum to Embassies Saigon, Vientiane and Bangkok for their comments.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Dexter and cleared in draft by Corcoran and Robert Johnson.
2. As described in an October 15 memorandum from William Bundy to Green, Forrestal, and Dexter. (Ibid.)
3. In memoranda from Dexter to William Bundy, October 15; Forrestal to William Bundy, Green, and Dexter, October 15; and Robert Johnson to Forrestal, October 26. (All ibid., POL 27 VIET S)