Office of the Historian

130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, September 9, 1964, 8:17 p.m.

229. Joint State/Defense message. Refs: Vientiane 296 and 305 to Bangkok.2 Saigon 67 to Vientiane, repeated Dept 778.3

Meeting today4 approved in principle early initiation air and limited ground operations in Laos corridor as soon as politically and militarily feasible. Therefore believe meeting this week as proposed by [Page 267] Saigon would be useful way to clarify scope and timing possible operations.5 Following questions appear crucial:

1.
Air operations
a.
Best targeting division as between GVN and RLAF, and what targets would be recommended for US suppressive strikes.
b.
Latest reading political acceptability GVN strikes and US suppressive strikes and whether we should inform Souvanna before undertaking, or go ahead without informing him. Related question is whether to publicize.
2.
Ground operations
a.
Review of latest plans and possible timing of action especially for limited bridgehead along lines indicated Saigon 485.6
b.
Requirement for US advisors and support. These not covered by today’s decisions and might require another review when plans developed.
c.
Same political questions as to Souvanna and publicity.
3.
In light of answers to above what should be GVN, RLG, and US public stance re operations?

Believe it would be desirable for Bangkok be represented at meeting, in view possible Thai involvement in some operations.

Ambassador Taylor concurs.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McNaughton, and approved by William Bundy.↩
  2. Vientiane telegram repeated to Bangkok as 296, was sent to Saigon as telegram 220 and repeated to State as 424, September 7. Vientiane telegram repeated to Bangkok as 305, was sent to State as telegram 432, September 9. Both dealt with the preliminary details for the meeting among MACV and representatives of the U.S. Embassies in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam on September 11. (Both ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 67 from Saigon to Vientiane, September 8, the Embassy in Vietnam suggested that there was a consensus on corridor operations: shallow 20 kilometer GVN ground operations with minimal air support, and RLAF T–28 attacks against infiltration targets. It also believed the September 11 meeting in Saigon should proceed. (Ibid.)↩
  4. The meeting in Washington was called primarily to discuss Vietnam; an account is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 749–755. One of the recommendations for approval at the meeting was: “Limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos should be undertaken in the near future, together with Lao air strikes as soon as we can get Souvanna’s permission. These operations will have limited effect, however.” (Ibid., p. 748) This recommendation to the President was approved at the meeting.↩
  5. The Laos Embassy’s account and comments on the September 11 meeting are in Document 131. The Vietnam Embassy’s summary of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 761–763.↩
  6. Document 123.↩