Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 20, 1964, 7 p.m.

338. Joint Embassy/AIRA/ARMA message. Deptel 174.² I do not see much prospect of reducing calls on US planes and personnel for SAR operations if we hope to exploit the advantages of our T–28 strike force in present military situation. SAR is a crucial factor in maintaining morale of pilots and there is no prospect at this juncture of establishing effective SAR procedures without use of both civilian (Air America) and US military personnel. See Embtel 337.³ But we might be able to justify before US and international public use of military aircraft in attempt rescue downed American military fliers (e.g. Yankee team) while withholding use jet fliers for rescue RLAF or Thai pilots. I am convinced, however, that such distinction would seriously cripple morale of Thais, who have borne far greatest brunt of air operations in PDJ area, and of AA pilots, who regularly expose themselves to great risks.

Even if Muong Soui area is stabilized and no counter-attacks in PL occur there, or elsewhere, we still foresee need maintain military pressure against PL, e.g., Route 7, Thatom and panhandle, in which T–28s must play important role. Moreover we must maintain strength which continued T–28 operations provide for Souvanna Phouma in current negotiations. Risks involved in all air operations over Laos are considerable, including little publicized regular civilian and military supply operations. Since Jan 1 there have been more than 40 ground fire attacks (much small calibre) against transport, passenger and helicopter aircraft.

Many operations such as straight-line dive at targets using the [?] make T–28 aircraft particularly vulnerable. With its many limitations, T–28 cannot employ less hazardous attack patterns of more modern aircraft.

Recent losses of T–28s—three in past few days—as well as helicopter and US jet point up enemy capabilities. Nevertheless, recent losses might be regarded as law of averages catching up after extended period of low loss rate. Since May 17, when T–28 activities expanded, RLAF had flown 1543 combat sorties, many against heavily-defended targets, e.g. Ban Khan bridge, Phou Kout area, PDJ. Yet during this period only four T–28s lost to enemy ground fire and one lost to weather. Lost rate .0032 percent very low.

As reftel points out T–28s have proved be decisive factor in recent military operations. They have carried out air operations to destroy PL bases, interdict supply lines, provide close support for ground operations and provide visual and photo recce. They have also played important role SAR operations. In many respects amount and effectiveness hostile fire here is much greater than in South Viet-Nam. Present enemy antiaircraft capabilities include 37mm towed; twin-mount 14.5mm mg’s in open-topped armored cars; vehicle- and tripod-mounted 12.7 machine guns; and 7.62mm machine guns at all echelons. All these weapons are mobile and are present in areas of key importance such as eastern area adjacent Phou Kout, Xieng Khouang ville, Muong Panh. We believe on basis attack patterns that 57mm may also be present in some areas.

We are deeply preoccupied with problem of control of military operations in this very difficult political and military situation and constantly attempt keep risks at minimum consistent with objectives which we have set for ourselves in Laos.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC to pass to Defense.
2. See footnote 4, Document 124.
3. See footnote 3, Document 124.