Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

122. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 18, 1964.

SUBJECT

• T–28/Helicopter incident in Laos

At 3 AM today Cy Vance informed me that a T–28 with a Thai pilot was down in eastern Laos. The pilot had been seen to parachute, and air cover for a rescue operation was requested. Vance and I agreed that in the light of your judgment last week, this should be authorized, and a limited four-plane cover was approved for the remaining daylight hours (up to about 7 or 8 this morning, our time.)

Meanwhile, Ambassador Unger, on his own initiative, authorized a T–28 napalm strike in support of the rescue, with civilian American pilots aboard for control and management.²

In executing the attempted rescue, a U.S. helicopter with an American pilot was shot down. Fortunately the pilot and crew of this helicopter were rescued by another helicopter. One of the fighter pilots covering the operation flamed out over Thailand, but the pilot ejected and has been rescued in good condition.

Finally, one of the T–28s covering the attempted rescue appears to have hit heavy weather in quite another sector of Laos. The plane is down but the pilot is believed to have parachuted safely. (The nationality of this pilot is Thai.)

Meanwhile, it is believed that the two Thais in the original T–28 have escaped into the brush and may be in the hands of friendly Mao [Meo]tribesmen.

The net of this somewhat messy operation is that no Americans are lost, as far as we know, although the one helicopter pilot has been severely wounded.

Vance and I agree that T–28 operations and attendant contingency rescue planning need intense and immediate review, and that review is beginning. A particular problem is that Ambassador Unger authorized American civilian pilots in the T–28s against explicit Washington orders to the contrary. He was acting in an emergency situation, and it may well be that we have held him on too tight a guideline here, but a direct issue of action without authority does exist. Dean Rusk and I will try to bring you a more complete report on this aspect at lunch Wednesday.³

McG. B.

(1) There is now some doubt whether napalm was in fact used.

(2) Both Unger and Washington will try to keep this whole episode under maximum security, because of the unusually high degree of U.S. involvement.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VI. Top Secret. The source text indicates that the President saw it.
2. As reported in telegram 314 from Vientiane, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) In telegram 171 to Vientiane, August 18, Rusk informed Unger that use of American pilots in T–28’s or other combat roles had to be authorized by Washington. Turn-around time of Flash messages could accomplish the process quickly. (Ibid.)
3. August 19. President Johnson met with Rusk, Ball, Vance, and McGeorge Bundy at 1:33 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.