120. Editorial Note
On August 10, 1964, Chester L. Cooper, who was detailed to the National Security Council Staff, sent a memorandum to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, outlining the results of the analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency of certain contingencies and the implications for U.S. foreign policy and national security. Cooper stated that he had asked the Agency to examine certain contingencies likely to occur in the near future. Included in the list of developments having “at least an even chance of occurring in the next few months” was the following:
“b. Sharp Deterioration in Laos. The situation is so fragile that it could crumble in any of many ways. Two good possibilities are a strong PL/VM counteroffensive in response to Operation Triangle and/or a Rightist coup. However, a general Communist offensive in Laos (such as a sweep to the Mekong) is deemed unlikely in this period. (A Communist counteroffensive in the Muong Sui area would face the US with an immediate demand for greater US military involvement in Laos. A Rightist coup would send present US policy back to Square One.)”
Bundy wrote “needs strong attention” next to this paragraph. At the end of the memorandum, he noted that Cooper’s memorandum “might be sent around, to a limited circle.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Cooper Memos)