Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, June 29, 1964, 7:52 p.m.

1270. Joint State/Defense message. Deptel 1267 to Vientiane (NOTAL),² Deptel 8632 to London.³

1. After careful consideration field comments, decision has been taken⁴ to provide added US military assistance in support RLG operation in accordance with concept outlined Deptel 1267. Vientiane should so inform Souvanna.

2. Additional US support requested by Vientiane has been authorized and implementing action is being taken by DOD. Specifically:

a) 3 C–123’s and 3 Caribous being turned over to Air America.

b) 15 additional T–28’s are being moved to Udorn.

c) Medium-level recce in operation area and night reconnaissance east of Muong Soui will be provided urgently.

d) Actions are in progress to provide additional Attaché personnel per para A(7) Vientiane’s 1726.⁵ Separate DOD message will give details.⁶

3. Bangkok’s 2244⁷ appears to cover all requirements for Thai personnel and Bangkok should proceed urgently to arrange for their movement to Laos in close coordination with Embassy Vientiane. RTG should be informed USG deeply grateful for prompt and forthcoming response. Authorizations re 105’s [howitzers] and L–19’s [light observation aircraft] requested para 3 Bangkok’s 2244 being transmitted by DOD. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. Clearly one weakness proposed operation is inability move artillery forward after opening phases. Are there measures we could take to help on this, such as additional jeeps to carry ammunition?

5. We continue to attach great importance to linking this operation to defense of Neutralist forces now at Muong Soui. Souvanna’s statements helpful in this regard and we here stressing to press that threat serious and imminent. Importance this rationale should be stressed to Souvanna, and we believe he should follow up by immediate call for PL to pull back and—unless you feel this would uncover Thai activity—for ICC mobile teams to go to Muong Soui area (Deptel 1265).⁸

6. In light Moscow’s 3934,⁹ appears particularly vital get across defensive rationale to Soviets. Believe this can best be done by Vientiane stressing to Soviet Charge reality of threat to Muong Soui and, at appropriate time, adding that movement GM-16 directly related defense Muong Soui. Although we assume Soviets in Vientiane aware of operation, Moscow reaction may be somewhat tempered by such explanation and by continued effort, both in Vientiane and Moscow, stress defensive nature and also limited scale of operation if and when it starts.

7. As suggested Delhi’s 3921,¹⁰ Vientiane should also fill-in Indian Ambassador on operation, stressing its relation to defense Muong Soui. Delhi may in its discretion brief Desai.

8. We also concerned statements by generals or others may play up offensive aspect and hurt basic defensive rationale. We must also get them to downplay US role and preferably not discuss at all. (Phoumi particularly has given Time¹¹ long expose of US role generally.) Recognize morale factors tending offensive direction, but Vientiane should do all possible to play down.

9. We shall be briefing British and Canadians here fully on operation on above lines and plan also to give somewhat less complete fill-in to French. In no case will role of Thais be disclosed.

10. Assume you will advise final timetable including timing GM–16 airlift and coordinated attack.

11. For Bangkok. You should draw fully on Deptel 1267 to Vientiane in explaining our position to Thai. We particularly concerned they not misjudge feasibility holding Muong Soui if PL make determined attack, or limits our counteraction both in this case and if RLG forces actually disorganized and dispersed by such attack. Hope Thai have no illusions we now ready move across Mekong except in response major Communist push toward Mekong.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy; cleared in draft with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by William Bundy.
2. Document 104.
3. See footnote 10, Document 105.
4. See Document 106.
5. In paragraph A (7) of telegram 1726 from Vientiane, the Embassy suggested that three teams of Thai liaison personnel and five artillery company grade officers should be available. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
6. Not further identified.
7. Dated June 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
8. Dated June 26. (Ibid.)
9. See footnote 11, Document 105.
10. Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
11. Apparently reflected in articles in Time, June 19 and June 26, pp. 22–23 and 24–28 respectively.