On June 23 the Government of Laos asked for extensive US support for
a military operation in the area north of Vientiane and west of the
Plain of Jars. In subsequent exchanges with Ambassador Unger, it is clear that our response
to this request involves serious issues affecting our relationship
to Souvanna Phouma, possible
Communist reactions to the proposed operation, and indeed the whole
trend of our military actions in Laos.
- A.
-
Proposed Operation.
The operation would be a three-pronged attack designed to
secure control of Route 13, which runs between Vientiane and
Luang Prabang, and of that part of Route 7 which runs from
Route 13 east to the present position of the Neutralist
forces at Muong Soui. The initial troop movement would be
made about July 1 with the operation itself to commence
about July 7–8. Ten government battalions would be involved,
including one substantial force to be airlifted from its
present position in southern Laos. The opposition in the
area is currently estimated at three Pathet Lao
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battalions. The
operation as proposed by the Lao called for US participation
in the following respects:
- a.
- Some prior US reconnaissance activity in the
area.
- b.
- Extensive Air America airlift support using US
civilian pilots and aircraft currently within Laos,
supplemented by three additional C–123’s and three
Caribou which could be supplied with Air America
markings.
- c.
- US civilian pilots in Lao T–28’s in combat operations. In examining
the proposal, we have already concluded that the use
of US civilian pilots in T–28’s (c. above) is not necessary
provided that—[1 line of source
text not declassified]. However, we must
recognize that use of US pilots in airlift support
of combat operations (b. above), even though they
would be civilians flying unarmed aircraft,
represents a degree of open US involvement going
beyond anything we have hitherto done and laying the
US open to charges of direct violation of Article 4
of the Geneva Accords6 in the sense that the pilots
would in effect be performing military operations.
This new US involvement differs only in degree from
what we have done to date but does have this
additional element. The Lao would of course also use
their own fairly extensive airlift
capability.
A military analysis of the operation has been prepared by the
DOD and is separately
submitted at Tab A. The JCS
favor the operation. Ambassador Unger, with the advice of his highly
competent attaché staff, believes that the operation has a
reasonable chance to succeed.
- B.
-
Threat to Neutralist Forces in Muong
Soui.
This is the major element in the current military situation,
and the operation is designed to relieve pressure on Muong
Soui and to provide a consolidated government-held area into
which the forces in Muong Soui could retreat if defeated.
The current judgment in Vientiane is that the Communist
forces are massing for a possible early attack on Muong
Soui, and the RLG has been
dramatizing the threat. A Washington intelligence judgment
by CIA is at Tab B; it
concludes that an attack on Muong Soui is a little better
than 50/50 today, and will become probable, as a normal
response, if Souvanna’s operation is carried out.
The Neutralist forces in Muong Soui number approximately 3300
and, although apparently in a reasonably good state of
organization and morale, have several deficiencies, notably
in respect to artillery crews. The current judgment is that,
if the Communists attack in full force using tanks and
artillery, Muong Soui could not be held for more than 3–4
days, even if the present Lao T–28’s were augmented by additional
American-piloted T–28’s as
well as extensive US reconnaissance/strike operations.
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Defeat of the Neutralist forces at Muong Soui could have
extremely serious consequences in military and above all in
political terms. The Neutralist forces would probably be
dispersed, though a great many would find their way down
toward Vientiane and link up with other government forces.
The Meo would also be exposed. Above all, the cumulative
effect of this defeat, coming on top of the May defeats,
could well discourage Souvanna completely and possibly
result in drastic and unwise action by Neutralist and
Rightist generals either in the form of military action for
its own sake or in the form of some political upheaval in
Vientiane that could damage or even destroy Souvanna’s
position. Although we have not hitherto regarded a Communist
attack on Muong Soui as in the same category as Communist
offensives against the Mekong areas or Luang Prabang,
Ambassador Unger has
now stressed that it has assumed a much greater
psychological importance than we had hitherto realized.
In relation to the threat to Muong Soui, the proposed
operation can be argued both ways. On the one hand, it might
trigger a Communist attack that would not otherwise have
taken place. On the other hand, particularly if there were
some identifiable Communist action against Muong Soui, the
US would be in a very serious position if it had refused to
support an operation designed to relieve Muong Soui. Even if
the operation did not achieve its objectives and if Muong
Soui fell, it would be far better for the US-Lao
relationship to have made the effort and to have failed than
to have held the Lao back from what they regarded as a
promising attempt to help.
- C.
-
Domestic Political Factors in
Laos.
Souvanna Phouma has
joined with both Neutralist and FAR generals in planning the proposed operation
and has indeed prodded them into the present plan. Both he
and they believe that the May defeats were about all they
could take and must be countered by some offensive action on
the Government’s side. In addition, Souvanna and his
generals, Ambassador Unger reports, have noted the various
statements and evidences of our own determinations to hold
in Southeast Asia (attaching special weight to the Taylor appointment7 as an indicator of possible
stronger action) and have come to believe that the US is
prepared to go far in breaching the Geneva Accords in
support of government military operations. It is Unger’s judgment that
failure on our part to support the proposed operation would
make it very difficult to maintain the confidence of
Souvanna and the generals in our ultimate willingness to
take strong action to defend Laos and with it Southeast
Asia. (Souvanna is also urging maintenance of a major
reconnaissance program within Laos
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and the use of reconnaissance flights
for strike operations to cut Route 7 east of the Plain of
Jars.)
- D.
-
International Factors
The future diplomatic track concerning Laos is still
uncertain. The Poles have discussed a modified proposal with
the British, involving initial meetings of the three Lao
factions, with the participation (apparently on something of
a sideline basis) of the co-chairmen (the British and the
Soviets) and the ICC members
(Canada, India, Poland), with the co-chairmen then to
determine whether conditions warrant a full-scale Geneva
Conference. This is an entirely acceptable variant from the
original Polish proposal, and we have told the British we
would endorse their accepting it. However, they and the
Poles have not yet agreed on a form of invitation, and it is
possible that the Poles and the Soviets are weighing their
actions very carefully. There is also a serious question
whether the Pathet Lao would accept even this modification,
and the Poles are apparently dealing directly with them to
work this out. In sum, there is a good chance that the
proposal will surface in the next few days, and it remains
by far the best bet we have to keep negotiations on Laos
moving without weakening on our insistence on withdrawal.
(During the week we have examined alternatives if the Polish
proposal does not get off the ground, and none of these
alternatives, including resort to the UN, seems to have real promise of buying time
and making some progress on issues other than
withdrawal.)
If renewed hostilities in Laos appeared to be initiated by
the Government, with US support, and not in response to
Communist action, this could have a serious disruptive
effect on our negotiating track. Even though we might reduce
direct US involvement, almost all the countries concerned
with the diplomatic negotiations would probably assume that
the operation had US blessing and was part of a broad US
plan to maintain and increase pressure in Laos. The French
would naturally resume their pressure for an immediate
Geneva Conference, but, most important, the Indians and
Soviets might well believe that the US was moving
drastically further and that the only way out was to get an
immediate Geneva Conference. Even the British and Canadians
might well weaken under these circumstances, and the total
result would be serious danger to the possibility of the
Polish proposals doing what we hope they can do.
Our second international problem would be the reaction of the
ICC. Unless the
Communists had started to move against Muong Soui, the
Indians and Poles would probably regard the operation as a
breach of the cease-fire and would be particularly sensitive
to the degree of direct US involvement in violation of the
Geneva Accords. Although Souvanna and we could argue that
the action was entirely justified in response to far more
serious Communist aggressions of May—which it certainly is—
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it would be
difficult to head off ICC
investigation, and the Indians in particular might be very
difficult indeed. In relation to the negotiating track,
offensive action by the government would tend to obscure the
blame that now rests on the Communists for their May actions
and would tend to support a “plague on both your houses”
position by key nations that would greatly weaken our
pressure to bring about Communist withdrawal.
Obviously, these adverse international reactions would be
sharply changed to the degree that the operation could be
represented as being a relief of Muong Soui. Vientiane’s
present estimate that attack on Muong Soui may be imminent,
coupled with the timetable proposed for the operation, may
make it possible to justify the operation completely on this
basis. But we cannot now be sure of this.
Similarly, adverse international reaction would be reduced to
the extent the US was not directly involved. In a broad
sense, the operation does not represent a major change from
what we have been doing in our reconnaissance operations.
However, we have had a strong justification for the latter,
and have hitherto refrained from direct military involvement
in combat operations within Laos.
- E.
-
Possible Communist Reactions
The Communists almost certainly already know of the proposed
operation, since it has been prepared by a wide circle of
military planners in Vientiane. They thus have ample time
both to prepare their defenses and to consider action in
other parts of Laos in response.
Within the area actually affected by the operations, the
Communists would have difficulty in any major reinforcement.
The nearest Viet Minh units are believed to be several days’
march away, on the eastern edge of the Plain of Jars, and
would have to come through rough country to reach the area.
We would probably get some information on any such
movement.
On the other hand, the Communists could easily react by an
extensive attack on Muong Soui.8
Moreover, the Communists have the option of attacking in
other parts of Laos. Unger thinks this is unlikely, on the ground
that they already have this option and have not exercised
it, and that they must know that action in other areas would
be in effect a move toward the Mekong. Washington
intelligence judgment shares this view, although there is
some concern that the Communists might move in the Attopeu
area of southern Laos, from which the additional forces
required for the
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operation would be drawn. Even though some compensating
reinforcement of Attopeu is planned, the town is now
dangerously encircled by Pathet Lao forces. The same is true
of many other points along the boundary between the
government forces and the Pathet Lao, and it remains true
(and Unger agrees)
that the Communists have the capability of taking government
positions just about any place they choose.
In terms of its signal effect on Hanoi and Peking, US
involvement in the operation would have some initial value,
but the real impact would probably depend on what we did if
the Communists reacted by attacking Muong Soui or elsewhere.
If we failed to react very strongly to such action, the
Communists might well conclude that we were trying to do
things in Laos on the cheap.
In the light of all these factors, the Secretaries of State and
Defense yesterday agreed to a tentative position set forth in the
outgoing State/Defense message, 1267 to Vientiane, attached hereto.
The reply from Vientiane (Vientiane 1726)9 concurs generally in the proposed
position and is also attached. No reply has been received from
Bangkok, but Ambassador Martin had previously urged that we approve and
support the operation.
With respect to the diplomatic repercussions, we queried London,
Paris, Moscow, New Delhi, and Ottawa last night (State 8632 to
London attached).10
The replies received to date are as follows:
The Soviet reaction may be a serious factor requiring further
consideration. The British and Canadian reactions make it clear that
we should consult with them and this we should certainly plan to do
if we adhere to the tentative position stated in last night’s
outgoing message.
