Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

103. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–565–64

Washington, June 27, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Operations in Laos (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed Laos offensive as reported by the Army Attaché, Vientiane (ARMA Vientiane CX 291, DTG 231350Z),² to clear out the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh (PL/VM) along Route 13 from Vang Vieng to Sala Phou Khoun and to relieve the pressure on Muong Soui. Recognizing that there are certain risks involved when operations in Laos are concerned, they consider the operation desirable in the circumstances.

2. Insofar as support operations are concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined:

a. The additional airlift aircraft (three C–123 and three Caribou), estimated by the Ambassador to be required (Vientiane to State 1694, 25 June 1964),³ can be made available from PACOM resources with no appreciable effect on the air effort in South Vietnam. When the requirement has been firmly established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct CINCPAC to lend these aircraft to Air America at Udorn and to support them as required.

b. Necessary logistic support for ground and air operations is available in the WESTPAC area.

c. Fifteen T–28s have been made available from resources in the Republic of Vietnam. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Should the operation be approved, Air America pilots should be authorized to fly T–28 aircraft as necessary to exploit available aircraft and assist in maximizing the effectiveness of the air effort.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that Ambassador Unger has been given authority to use napalm in the defense of Muong Soui. They further recommend that Lao pilots be authorized to employ this munition when it is considered optimum for the attack of military targets.

4. One of the most important measures to strengthen coordinated air-ground operations and increase the effectiveness of the air effort in Laos would be establishment of an effective air control system. The Air Attaché has reported (AIRA Laos CX–300, DTG 242001Z)⁴ that due to factional difficulties there are major problems in establishing such a system using either FAR or Neutralist ground force components. CINCPAC’s views have been requested; subsequent to their receipt, the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be submitted to you.

5. Associated with both the defense of Muong Soui and the proposed Laos offensive are requirements for reconnaissance flights over Routes 7 and 13. These are being handled separately and should be supported on a timely basis.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the possibility that the attack envisaged by the plan could result in (1) a complete failure caused by the collapse of the FAR/Neutralist forces with subsequent PL/VM attacks toward the Mekong, or (2) an increase in the support of the PL/VM forces in Laos to include possible active intervention by regular North Vietnamese forces. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the PL/VM forces in Laos could attack toward the Mekong in any event. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, as concomitant actions to the Laos offensive, preparations be made for actions in the priority listed below:

a. US air strikes against appropriate PL/VM targets in Laos.

b. Defense of the key cities along the Mekong utilizing Thai forces and such US forces as may be necessary in accordance with CINCPAC OPLAN 32–64, Phase II—Laos.⁵

c. Air attacks against targets in North Vietnam to destroy the DRV will and capabilities as necessary to compel the DRV to cease support of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos (Appendix).⁶

7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The United States support the plan for relieving pressure on and providing for the defense of Muong Soui, by

(1) Providing three additional C–123 and three additional Caribou aircraft, subsequent to further validation of the requirement for such aircraft;

(2) Providing necessary logistic support for the planned air and ground operations;

(3) Authorizing Air America pilots to fly T–28 aircraft in support of the operation as required;

(4) Authorizing the use of napalm against appropriate military targets; and

(5) Providing reconnaissance support, as requested by Vientiane, on a timely basis.

b. The United States prepare the necessary forces for contingency operations in Southeast Asia in the following priority:

(1) Air strikes by US aircraft against appropriate PL/VM targets in Laos.

(2) Defense of the Mekong cities, using appropriate US forces in conjunction with Thai forces.

(3) Low-level reconnaissance and air strikes by US aircraft against appropriate targets in North Vietnam.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the above views, and those expressed in the Appendix hereto be given due consideration in the current State-Defense discussions.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

J.W. Davis⁷

Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Laos 000.1—Sensitive, (092 Laos), 1964. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. See footnote 2, Document 101.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
4. Not found.
5. Not found.
6. Attached, but not printed.
7. Printed from a copy that indicates Admiral Davis signed the original.