Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

404. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, August 20, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Presidential Clearance for Covert Operation in Thailand: For Luncheon Action

As I told you this morning, the 303 Committee last week reviewed the long-standing commitment we made in 1965 to give covert financial support to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the Thai elections.

This commitment was originally made in 1965 on the express authority of the President, and was renewed on the same basis when Unger went out a year ago. The only new element is that the money would now go to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and this worried us briefly in the sense that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be cut out. However, after careful consideration, all hands have concluded that the essence of the commitment remains valid and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has assured us that if necessary [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be brought in—and that in any event he would not have any significant adverse reaction. This leaves us still with the risk of disclosure, but the Thai are at least as concerned about this as we, and Unger rightly points out that their record of security in such matters is excellent.

The matter does require decision today. Walt Rostow, Dick Helms, Paul Nitze, and I have all gone over it with care and recommend final approval. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tells me that there will be a need for an allocation from the Bureau of the Budget, and this is another reason for getting express Presidential reaffirmation at this time. However, he anticipates no difficulty, but would be prepared to speak to this point.

Walt Rostow recommends that you be prepared to bring this up at the close of the luncheon today,² with Dick and Walt available as needed. I am alerting Clark Clifford.

For any further detail, I attach, as Tab A,³ Ungerʼs recommendation, and as Tab B the proposed action message—which might be tinkered with, but which contains all the essentials.

Attachment B⁴

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR UNGER

You are authorized inform [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that we are prepared to assist financially in development his political party. One half of funds would be available prior September 10, with remainder available by November 10. You may indicate that we assume funds would be used in manner to maintain cohesion within the governing group and help develop an effective political mechanism that can discharge its responsibilities under the new constitution. This has always been our thought and was the basis on which original commitment made, and we recognize the skill with which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have pursued these objectives.

We recognize difficulty of requesting detailed accounting for funds. We do not press this point but believe we are justified in being kept informed along lines outlined para 8 your message August 15.⁵

Re increments set forth above, you may if you wish point out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that we are obliged to know in general terms use to which U.S. funds are placed and that availability second tranche will depend upon some indication that the first tranche used within the framework of our basic commitment.

Hope foregoing is not too restrictive and we do not believe you need follow it to the letter, particularly as to size or dates of payments. We have, however, set forth certain guidelines and would hope that they can be used as you deem appropriate to establish our objectives which continue to be (a) unity and balance within group; (b) effective use of funds; (c) security of operation.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Lotus File, 1968–69. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. According to a memorandum for the record by Godley, April 20, Rusk discussed the issue with the President at the luncheon meeting and obtained Johnsonʼs approval for the action. Bundy and Godley checked the draft of the attached message which was then sent to Unger. [text not declassified] also was informed of the Presidentʼs decision. (Ibid., Thailand 1968) On September 4 Bundy prepared a memorandum for the record that corrected Godleyʼs memorandum. Rusk did not raise the issue with the President at lunch. Bundy saw Rusk at 4 p.m. that day and obtained his “firm and clear approval.” Bundy also called Rostow who decided that since the President had approved the action in 1965 and reaffirmed it in 1967, and since there were no real changes, the issue did not require another Presidential decision. (Ibid.)
3. Dated August 15. (Ibid.)
4. Top Secret; Lotus.
5. In paragraph 8 of this message, Unger stated that once he informed [text not declassified] of U.S. support, they would work to an understanding about the type of activities to be supported. Unger suggested that the United States could not only learn about but perhaps influence the course of the campaign and the elections themselves. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand 1968)