Office of the Historian

317. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1

Bangkok, July 7, 1966.

229. Eyes Only—Ambassador Martin/FE.

1.
Steadman completed visit2 today thoroughly convinced of dangerous insurgency threat confronting Thailand, completely sold on requirement for improved rotary airlift and for concentration Thai efforts on CI.
2.
At same time these conclusions appear to have served largely to reinforce earlier preconceptions that Thai simply are not doing enough with what they already have in terms of men and equipment; that their approach to insurgency problem is so cumbersome and unwieldy situation likely to get much worse before it gets better; and that missionʼs assistance to RTG in some activities was hampered by what he interpreted as lack of coordination and singleness of purpose or policy.
3.
These views were reflected earlier in informal discussions and reemphasized during exhaustive review of 67 MAP level. While his reactions to MACTHAI arguments for $68 million program largely inconclusive, several specifics were clarified for him and some outright errors rectified. As result Steadman will be making some revisions of proposed DOD position. In virtually every case, however, he referred to need for reassessment of priorities within the proposed $44.4 million ceiling and conveyed impression that whatever changes he might be required to make in line items, dollar level not likely to move up appreciably if at all.
4.
Throughout MAP level discussions he stressed need for Thai to improve utilization of what they already have, need to have evidence of RTA getting out into the field and of RTN using its ships. He was categoric in assuring responsiveness to requests which were clearly CI, but did not give this broad application or precise definition.
5.
He accepted complete personal responsibility for $44.4 million level proposed, saying that despite coincidence with FY 66 level he had not been directed to stay under any figure. Recommendation based on “objective” evaluation of priorities in view tightness of MAP funds. He displayed ignorance of essential facts regarding some items which he had deleted from program; but, in almost every case when rationale was provided and he seemed persuaded that item belonged in program, he [Page 689] tended in effect to contradict his guidance of not being bound to a fixed dollar figure by referring to need examine priorities within proposed ceiling.
6.
While generally non-committal on most items he came out clearly negative on following.
A.
POL—Without addressing question of consumables policy he said we would be “unlikely get increase in ceiling to accommodate POL”. Inference remained that we could get waiver on policy but would have to fund within whatever level we get.
B.
M–16ʼs—He said SecDef decision on 4,600 rifles was one-shot matter based on “morale factor”, desire to see Thai “get out into field”. Believe Thai have capability required now, and do not need M–16ʼs. Besides, reequipping RTA is a “$25 million decision”, not to mention implications for entire MAP program. Priority of Thai not high compared to some others.
C.
Units in Being—Believes Thai need to improve usability of equipment they already have. Deliberate decision made (recognized as departure from past MAP practice) that TO&E not to exceed actual manning percentage. (It was not clear whether this was being directed solely against Thai; usually 80 percent manning would permit 100 percent equippage.)
D.
Naval Items—(Except possibly for PF modifications regarding which he was uninformed.) He is against all these until RTN does more with what it already has and against “deep water” ships in any case. Said Washington does not know what RTN is doing [illegible].
E.
F–5ʼs—Too large an item for funds available, hence proposed stretch out. Didnʼt know why decision taken to speed up delivery. Has requested Blouin in personal message to get details on F–5 program for his return Monday, July 11.
7.
Full presentation of our position on FY 67 program being pouched Friday, July 8.3
Fluker 4
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 THAI–US. Secret; No Distribution Outside Department. No time of transmission appears on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 9:06 a.m. on July 7.↩
  2. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Richard C. Steadman, was in Thailand to assess Thai military assistance needs.↩
  3. Not further identified.↩
  4. Robert J. Fluker, Supervisory Economic Officer, Embassy Thailand.↩