Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

310. Report From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the Special Group (Counter Insurgency)¹

Washington, February 28, 1966.

THAI SECURITY SITUATION

Introductory Note

The following observations and recommendations are based on a brief (3 day) visit to Bangkok in early February. I had an opportunity for extended discussions with Ambassador Martin, General Stilwell, and with members of the Embassy staff, AID [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I also participated in sessions between the Vice President and members of the Thai cabinet at which the matter of security and insurgency were discussed. And I had some private sessions with Governor Harriman. But I did not have an opportunity to visit the Northeast, nor did I have time to talk with certain experts (such as the ARPA group) who might have shed further light on some of the problems that concern us. Finally, I should add that what follows attempts to supplement rather than repeat or substitute for the views and recommendations (with which I concur) sent from Bangkok by Vice President Humphrey and Governor Harriman.

General Observations

Much has been written about the deteriorating security situation in the Northeast, the South, and certain other sections of Thailand. I have little to add to these general reports except to say that the extent and seriousness of insecurity was worse than I had been led to expect from my reading of reports from all sources except CAS. On the other hand, the Government of Thailand appeared to be more aware of and more determined to cope with the situation than I had believed.

This leads to a more general, more philosophical point. In the last analysis, the insurgency will have to be dealt with by the Thais themselves. Obvious as this is, we tend to lose sight of it in the day-to-day development and implementation of our policies. But here, as in Vietnam and in Laos, we are dependent on the wisdom, energy, effectiveness and honesty of the Thai Government for success. We can supply the substance and the advice and even much of the manpower. But we can only marginally affect the situation unless the Thais press forward with the substance rather than merely the forms of a counter-insurgency program. And here is one of the keys to the current situation: The Thai Government (unlike the Lao or even the Vietnamese) is too well-established, proud and institutionalized to push around or ignore; on the other hand, it is too ineffectual, relaxed and centralized to tackle the problem of counter-insurgency on its own—at least at the pace we would like to see. We have to rely on the arts of persuasion and diplomacy to get the Thais to move faster, or to shift priorities, or to undertake programs that make sense to us, but not necessarily to them. Our actual leverage is limited; we need the Thais at least as much as the Thais need us (or think they need us—which is the same thing). For example, our air bases in Thailand are there under the loosest and most informal type of arrangement—an arrangement that the Thais might choose to modify at any time. And their cooperation in regional programs, both economic and military, has been of great value to American objectives in the area. In short, the Thais regard themselves as an ally, not a vassal, of the U.S.

Having said this is not to suggest that we should adopt a passive or permissive stance in our relations with the Thai Government—nor is it to suggest that this is our present stance. However, there are two general areas where I think a bit more starch could be injected into our relationship: In providing military assistance we should implicitly, perhaps explicitly, condition the continued granting of the kind of equipment the generals want, but which we think is marginal, to the effective and energetic use of the less exotic materiel which we provide for the counter-insurgency program. Secondly, we should be somewhat less entranced with the present Thai budgetary policy which devotes about 75% of current income to economic and social projects. While this is most commendable, the Thais should be induced to stretch out some of their own Great Society planning (as we have had to do) in favor of some less-exalted, but presently critical programs such as the police effort.

The Police Program

It is the police program, and, in particular, the Provincial police program, which I believe is the weakest element in the Thai counter-insurgency effort. A detailed examination of the policy situation has been made by the RAND team last summer (RM 4744).² I assume that its findings and recommendations have been looked into by relevant agencies in Washington and Bangkok. There is reason for concern in that this program, which we know from our experience in Vietnam and elsewhere is essential to the success of other Government efforts, is still lagging in recruitment, training and overall implementation. There are a few specific points that are worth mention.

The assignment of police at the village levels has been intolerably slow. And yet the provision of day-in, day-out (and more importantly, night-in, night-out) security and Government presence is fundamental to maintaining Government control in threatened rural areas. The two reasons given for the failure to move ahead on this program are the lack of village police stations and the general shortage of personnel. But a local police station is a modest enterprise and one wonders why the building program, now months old, should take so long to get under way. More shocking is the fact that some villages on their own initiative have built police stations hoping thereby to get full-time police protection, but to no avail.

The shortage of personnel is obviously an inhibiting factor. However, I was impressed, or rather depressed, by the apparent lack of an aggressive recruitment program. Surely, there is a large pool of young men who have served their time in the Army and who thus have been exposed to discipline, weapons training and the concept of national serv-ice. While this pool might be a prime target for police recruitment, my meetings in Bangkok led me to believe that it is not.

More important than gross manpower considerations is the absolute necessity (if our experience in Vietnam is valid) of recruiting men for service in their own communities. The Provincial Police Program is basically a national service. While, by design or accident, there is some correlation between a manʼs home province and his Provincial Police headquarters, it is clear that the Thai authorities have insufficient understanding of the need and the advantages of “home” service.

This raises yet another point: The concept of Provincial Police serv-ice seems to be based on fairly traditional ideas of patrolling out from a central barracks for the purpose of routine population control or crime suppression. This is probably an appropriate mission for Provincial Police per se. But local, “live-in” police require a different kind of training, a different motivation, and a different mission. Thus a local policeman is not simply a Provincial cop who happens to be posted to a small outlying community. He is the personification of the Government in all its facets.

Nothing that I have said should reflect on AIDʼs Public Safety Officer in Bangkok. He is an able, experienced and energetic man. I believe, however, that the administration and supervision of the local police effort (as opposed to the National Program) should be under an officer familiar with the special problems of local security/political requirements in areas which are targets of anti-Government activity. In particular, I would recommend that a special deputy be appointed to AIDʼs Public Safety Officer to develop and supervise this aspect of the police program. This man should be seconded from CIA, and should have had recent experience in the Vietnam police and political action team programs. [1 line of source text not declassified]

Further Thoughts

Aside from the police program, there are two other, but related, suggestions which may be worth further exploration. First, there should be a conscious and systematic cross-fertilization of our experience in Vietnam with the problems in Thailand. While there is danger in over-stressing the analogy of the problems in each area, there must be many lessons and ideas that can be transferred—not only from Vietnam to Thailand, but in the other direction as well. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Secondly, we should relate the problems of Thailand (and of Laos, too) more directly to those of Vietnam in our planning and programming at the Washington level. Proposals for more effective Washington policy and program management of our non-military effort in Vietnam are now being considered. It may be worthwhile to broaden this concept to include counter-insurgency programs for Thailand, as well. Indeed, the idea, recently implemented, of having a senior officer in Saigon specifically and exclusively responsible for “pacification” might be worth exploring for Bangkok, too.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Condition the granting of further conventional military equipment desired by the Thais, but regarded as marginal by us, to the effective high priority use of counter-insurgency materiel.

2. Persuade the Thais to reduce their expenditure on “Great Society programs” for the purpose of expanding and improving the critical police effort.

3. The Thais, with our help, should move ahead more rapidly to make the Provincial Police Program more effective and more relevant to the problems the Government confronts in the insecure areas. In particular, the village police program should be re-examined to assure that recruitment, training and missions are relevant to local as opposed to Provincial situations.

4. A special deputy for the local police program should be provided AIDʼs Public Safety Officer. This deputy should be seconded from CIA, and should have experience with police and political action programs in Vietnam.

5. A greater effort should be made to exchange ideas and U.S. personnel between Vietnam and Thailand.

6. Counter-insurgency programs for Thailand should be given the same treatment at the Washington level as is being contemplated in the new approach for the management of Vietnam pacification policy and programs.

7. A counter-insurgency or pacification czar be designated in Bangkok (a la Ambassador Porter in Saigon).

C

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Thailand 091.3 MAP. Top Secret. Komer sent this report to Harriman, Vance, Bell, Wheeler, Raborn, and Leonard Marks of the Special Group, CI. In an attached covering note, Komer noted that McGeorge Bundy sent Cooper and him to Bangkok “to have a close look.” Komer stated that Cooper was “an old hand at this game and his report is first class.”
2. Not found.