Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

256. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Nitze)¹

CM–3802–68

Washington, December 3, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Daniel Boone Operations (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM 689–68, dated 22 November 1968, subject: “Daniel Boone Zone Charlie (S).”²

b. JCSM 588–68, dated 4 October 1968, subject: “Daniel Boone Operations Authorities (S).”³

2. (TS) Daniel Boone operations currently constitute COMUSMACVʼs primary on-the-ground means of determining location and size of enemy organizations in sanctuary in Cambodia. As such, these operations are extremely important to the security of US/ARVN forces, particularly in prime threat areas such as northern Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces, and in areas in which COMUSMACV has undertaken economy of force measures such as western Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. Reference 1a was recently forwarded, recommending that a Daniel Boone Zone Charlie be designated, the effect of which would be to give COMUSMACV greater authority in the scheduling of Daniel Boone operations opposite northern Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces.

3. (TS) As experience has been gained in the Daniel Boone Program, COMUSMACV has been able to employ the reconnaissance teams into areas of increased risk without a corresponding increase in losses. As indicated in reference 1b, however, teams have made contact with the enemy in over 80 percent of the missions undertaken, and emergency extraction has been required in over half of the operations. Furthermore, VC/NVA forces in Cambodia are adapting their defenses to these reconnaissance operations. Thus, despite precautions taken and experience gained by Daniel Boone teams, there is a growing probability that a team may be confronted by a major enemy force without the capability to defend itself by its own means.

4. (TS) Procedures have been developed and used many times for supporting emergency extractions of Daniel Boone teams under fire by the use of helicopter gunships. It is probable, however, that situations will arise in which gunship support will be inadequate to suppress enemy pressure on reconnaissance teams sufficiently to permit successful extraction. In many locations, US artillery is in position in SVN to fire immediately on VC/NVA forces firing on reconnaissance teams in Cambodia; however, artillery units are not at present permitted to furnish such assistance. Likewise, use of tactical air could spell the difference to Daniel Boone team extractions in an emergency. The greater possibility of compromise of tactical aircraft employment in Cambodia is recognized, due to its visibility from the ground; however, its employment in an emergency in the sparsely populated northeast part of Cambodia appears feasible without undue risk of compromise.

5. (TS) Present authorities permit use of tactical air and artillery fire to strike hostile artillery firing from Cambodia on friendly forces in SVN. The use of the same measures to protect our teams in Cambodia, who are taking added risks, seems appropriate. I consider that to avoid loss of life, all available support should be provided to assist in emergency extractions of reconnaissance teams from Cambodia.

6. (TS) Accordingly, it is requested that authority be granted to employ artillery and tactical air in Zone Alpha to support emergency extractions of Daniel Boone teams from Cambodia.

Earle G. Wheeler ⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (3), 11/68–1/69, Cambodia. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 D 1499, Cambodia 000.1, 1968 (381 Cambodia)) According to a covering memorandum from Warnke to Wheeler, December 18, the Department of State concurred in the authority requested in JCSM–689–68.
3. Not printed. (Ibid.)
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.