252. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- Cambodia
Bill Bundyʼs Monday meeting with the Vietnam Group was devoted exclusively to Cambodia yesterday.2 The purpose of the meeting was to establish a factual base for any decisions which might be necessary in connection with Communist use of Cambodian territory.
It quickly became evident that there is no consensus on the extent, the significance to the Communist cause, or the physical routes used in channeling Communist supplies through Cambodia. Bill Bundy was visibly upset at the disarray, and what he viewed as a failure of the intelligence community to pursue this problem with sufficient vigor and purpose.
Bill is reconvening the intelligence working group on Cambodia for the precise purpose for coming up with a sound intelligence base against which to consider decisions on military action.
For your information, Bill Depuy described Gen. Abramsʼ point of view as follows: There has been a basic shift in the Communist logistics system from Laos to Cambodia. Because of bombings, floods, etc., only about 15 trucks a day are getting through the Laotian route. Thus there has been some withdrawal from the north and a low level of activity on the B–3 front and a shift to the internal Cambodian route for supplies.
According to Depuy, DIA has no new substantiating evidence but will target photo reconnaissance flights in an attempt to develop proof.
CIAʼs position is diametrically opposed to that of Abrams. The Agency says that the fall-off in truck movement is seasonal, and is a smaller decline than in past years. The enemy this year is moving about 2–1/2 times the tonnage moved last year. The Agency believes that it can document truck travel over the Ho Chi Minh Trail all the way to the Parrots Peak. Thus, the Laotian route is supplying all Communist forces in South Vietnam except those in the southern part of the IV Corps area, in other words, all but a negligible part of the logistics flow into South Vietnam.
The Agency was very unconvincing in arguing for its point of view. Bundy told them he could not see the basis for their view and tasked CIA to write up the evidence for its conclusion.
[Page 554]The kernel of the argument revolves around where the supplies for III Corps troops come from. As of now there is no answer which one can defend with confidence.
I will keep you posted as this thing develops.