Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia¹

Washington, March 24, 1967, 10:27 a.m.

161744. 1. Please deliver following personal message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Hasluck at earliest possible opportunity:

“Dear Paul: I very much hope that Prime Minister Holt, during his forthcoming visit to Phnom Penh, will have the opportunity to discuss with Cambodian leaders including Prince Sihanouk the possibilities for an improvement in U.S.-Cambodian relations. We are concerned, as I am sure you are too, at the increasing seriousness of military problems resulting from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory and support received from Cambodia. The number of recent incidents that have arisen as a result of Operation Junction City² testify to the seriousness of this situation, which we fear will only lead to a further deterioration in relations with Cambodia unless some way is found to reduce the problem and deal with it more effectively than at the present time.

Communist Vietnamese forces have been using Cambodia as an infiltration route, sanctuary and source of supplies since the early 1960s. With the escalation of hostilities in the past few years, Communist utilization of Cambodia has steadily increased. There is every reason to believe, moreover, that during the coming year, as allied forces successfully clear enemy base areas in South Vietnam, pressure upon North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to expand their use of the sanctuary existing in Cambodia will further increase.

The psychological and military advantages of a privileged sanctuary have hindered the effective conduct of military operations against the enemy throughout Vietnam because of the necessity to divert troops to areas near the Cambodian border. Furthermore, in the immediate border area allied forces have sustained casualties from Vietnamese Communist forces which have taken sanctuary on Cambodian soil and under conditions in which they were permitted only limited countermeasures in self-defense. Under such circumstances, border incidents that involve Cambodian lives and property, unfortunately, are almost inevitable despite the care and restraint exercised by allied forces to avoid them.

The United States has on many occasions expressed to the Cambodian Government its concern over the problems arising from Vietnamese Communist activity in the border areas and its readiness to support any proposal which offers a reasonable prospect of assuring that Cambodiaʼs neutrality is respected by all concerned. It supported the Cambodian proposal to make the International Control Commission in Phnom Penh more effective and it has declared its willingness to discuss with the Cambodian Government directly any other ways of dealing with this problem. Evidence of enemy use of Cambodian territory has been offered to the Cambodian Government in an attempt to inform it of the extent of the enemy presence. The most recent approach to the Cambodian Government, which covered the aforementioned points, was made through Australian Ambassador Deschamps in Phnom Penh on January 20 of this year. To date the Cambodian Government has neither accepted the offer of evidence, nor the suggestion of discussions to resolve the problem.

The United States has been and still is willing to accept as sincere Cambodiaʼs declared desire to maintain a neutral status, despite the fact that over the past two years Cambodia has regularly protested alleged violations of its territory by U.S. and allied forces but has not, to our knowledge, protested or made any official acknowledgment of violations of its territory by Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces. Enemy use of Cambodia has increased during that period, and the problem has grown progressively more serious. The United States has not charged the Cambodian Government with supporting or assisting the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces but, on the contrary, has repeatedly taken pains to describe enemy use of Cambodia as a problem for Cambodia as much as for U.S. and allied forces in South Vietnam.

There have been recent signs that Cambodia is attempting to control its frontiers more effectively. Even given Cambodiaʼs physical inability to control by itself its long frontier with South Vietnam, however, it has not been clear that these Cambodian efforts are being applied uniformly or with particular energy against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces entering Cambodia. There is as yet no evidence, for example, of such forces being interned or of systematic efforts being taken forcibly to prevent them from entering Cambodia. Continued failure by Cambodian authorities to deal with this problem effectively or even to acknowledge its existence can only bring into question the genuineness of Cambodiaʼs claim to neutral status.

In discussing with Cambodian officials the seriousness with which the United States Government views the present situation and our desire to find a way to bring about an improvement in it, I would appreciate if Prime Minister Holt would again reassure them that the United States has no hostile intent or design toward Cambodia. We recognize and respect Cambodiaʼs independence and territorial integrity and its desire to remain neutral. It remains our wish that Cambodia should have the opportunity to develop in peace and security and that our differences may be resolved peacefully and on a basis mutually beneficial to both countries. (For the Prime Ministerʼs background information, the United States prior to the time relations with Cambodia were broken had given evidence of support for Cambodia through economic and military assist-ance totaling $342.5 million.)

The United States accepted, regretfully, the Cambodian Governmentʼs decision to break relations in May, 1965. Since that time, we have on a number of occasions stated our readiness to consider a restoration of relations on a mutually acceptable basis and without any preconditions. We continue to be prepared at any time to enter into discussions with the Cambodians of our mutual problems, in particular to consider ways in which to reduce the dangerous situation now existing in the border areas and provide a sound basis for the improvement of U.S.-Cambodian relations. It is a development which we would very much like to see take place. In this respect, we were disappointed last fall at the postponement of the proposed visit by Governor Harriman and would be happy to see the prospect revived for a visit of a similar nature, which could provide the opportunity for frank discussions of the full range of problems and difficulties existing between us. In the meantime, we would hope that follow-up discussions could be carried on by Ambassador Deschamps, or through direct channels where they may be available, in a mutual effort to devise ways in which to bring about an improvement in the existing situation.³

With warm personal regards,

Dean”

2. Australian Embassy here being informed of contents of message.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ewing, cleared by Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.
2. In late February 1967, MACV launched Operation Junction City against Communist strongholds in an area northwest of Saigon to the Cambodian border. The operation was a major part of MACVʼs search and destroy strategy in Vietnam.
3. In telegram 6071 from Vientiane, April 3, Sullivan reported a conversation with Holt who had just left Cambodia and was visiting Laos. Holt and Sihanouk, according to Sullivan, “hit it off well.” Sihanouk frankly admitted that “the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were trespassing on some of his territory” and wanted to oust them. Sihanouk also realized that there would be occasional U.S. infringements and bombings in the heat of battle, which he would protest vigorously, but the United States should understand his protestations were pro forma. Sihanouk would not accept “permanent” U.S. occupation of Cambodian territory. Holtʼs advice to the United States, according to Sullivan, was “to let its relations with Cambodia just simmer along as they are” without reestablishing relations or sending missions to Phnom Penh. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Cables, 2/67–12/67)