195. National Intelligence Estimate1
NIE 57–66
Washington, October 6, 1966.
SIHANOUKʼS CAMBODIA
The Problem
To estimate the internal political prospects and the international orientation of Cambodia over the next year or so.
Conclusion
- A.
- Prince Norodom Sihanouk is still the dominant political force in Cambodia and his views are decisive in determining both domestic and foreign policy. His regime is strong, and rests on his own personal prestige and popularity with the masses, particularly the peasantry. There is some discontent in the army and among the Phnom Penh elite. This will probably continue to increase, but is not expected to reach serious proportions in the next year or so. (Paras. 1, 4–9, 14)
- B.
- Cambodia has some growing economic problems. Unemployment, inflation, and business failures are increasing, and private foreign and domestic investments have dwindled. The bad rice crop over the past year, resulting in reduced exports, will bring about an imbalance of payments and further aggravate budgetary deficits. These trends will probably continue, but economic problems are not likely to threaten the stability of the regime during the period of this estimate. (Paras. 11–12)
- C.
- Sihanoukʼs foreign policies reflect his basic concern over Cambodiaʼs ability to survive. He has a deep distrust, rooted in centuries of conflict, of the intentions of the Thai and the Vietnamese. As the US became more committed in Thailand and Vietnam, he became more distrustful of US intentions. At the same time, his conviction grew that Communist China would become the dominant power in Asia and that Hanoi was going to win in Vietnam. In these circumstances, his appraisal of Cambodiaʼs self-interest led him to a policy of increased accommodation with the Communists, without abandoning his basic policy of neutralism. (Paras. 17–19, 21, 23)
- D.
- Sihanoukʼs belief that the Vietnamese and Thai threaten Cambodiaʼs independence will continue to be the main determinant of his foreign policy. Sihanouk will almost certainly continue to seek guarantees for Cambodiaʼs independence and borders, through both bilateral agreements and international accords. He is likely to make tactical adjustments depending on his judgments with respect to the course of the war in Vietnam and the future prospects for Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. He appears to be reviewing these judgments and may be coming to conclusions that will bring him to adopt a less antagonistic attitude toward the US. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that Sihanouk would tie himself closely to the US even if he should become convinced that the Communists were going to lose in Vietnam. (Paras. 22, 27, 31–32)
[Here follow a 8-page Discussion section and a map of Cambodia.]
- Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 57–66. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside their jurisdiction. In a briefing memorandum to George F. Denney, October 5, Fred Green of INR/RFE noted that the White House asked for this estimate early in the summer of 1966 when it appeared likely that Harriman would go to Cambodia. According to Green, its terms of reference were broad because no NIE had been written on Cambodia since 1959. (Ibid.)↩