Office of the Historian

187. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow)1

Washington, July 8, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • Next Moves on Cambodia

Chet Bowles has now talked to Cambodiaʼs Ambassador to India (New Delhiʼs 336 attached).2 The conversation contained no surprises, but the key will be Sihanoukʼs reaction. Despite Chetʼs doubts, Stateʼs analysts believe that Nong Kimny will view the Bowles approach as a deliberate, non-casual démarche and will report it in full to the Prince. So we should be prepared for some repercussions—favorable or otherwise—through FBIS, a return visit by Nong Kimny, or some other channel.

Meanwhile, as you know, the British have delivered a note from Stewart to Gromyko requesting reconsideration of the Soviet refusal to support the expansion of the ICC in Cambodia and proposing talks on the Cambodia problem in Geneva, Moscow, or elsewhere. Wilsonʼs visit may reveal the Soviet response.

These two developments seem to argue for a further postponement of decision on an early visit by Eugene Black to Cambodia. It would certainly be a mistake to risk a Cambodian turn-down until we learn of Sihanoukʼs reaction to the New Delhi conversation.

A third aspect of the Cambodian scenario is the proposed senatorial mission. The Vice President has received a very responsible letter from the President of the Cambodian National Assembly indicating willingness to receive three senators once Congress is out of session. Some of the Committee members, however, are apparently willing to consider a trip before the adjournment of Congress if the Executive Branch urges such a move (an urging that could not easily be kept quiet). State and Carl Marcy would like some guidance from us on this matter.

My own view is that the ideal arrangement would be for an earlier senatorial visit (perhaps late August or the Labor Day period) to be followed by a Eugene Black visit in October. The senators could carry a letter from the President and create a friendly atmosphere without going into substance. Black, however, carries with him the flavor of American money; he is therefore more potentially embarrassing to the Prince (who is currently [Page 411] far out on a limb in rejecting American funds) unless the way has been carefully cleared by preliminary visitors.

I donʼt know whether we can sell such a timetable either to the Congress or to the President, much less Cambodia. But I think it is worth a try—and I sympathize to some extent with Stateʼs desire not to press the Prince too hard at a time when he is gradually shifting his position of his own accord.

I attach some draft language which you might want to use in presenting this problem to the President.3

I also attach a memo from State in response to my Cambodia paper4 which I have held here for two reasons—first, because it was already out of date on arrival as a result of further developments on the ICC, and second because it was overtaken by the Eugene Black project and the instructions to New Delhi.

A final word on Bowlesʼ comments regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations: they make a good deal of sense (and are obviously influenced by Herb Spivack, who knows Cambodia well); they could serve as good basis for substantive discussions if the Prince is responsive.

Jim
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Vol. IV, Memos, 10/65–9/67. Secret.↩
  2. Dated July 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 CAMB)↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. Document 185.↩