Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, January 27, 1965, 7:10 p.m.

1513. Embtel 1980.² Appreciate your detailed account January 14 conversation with Nong Kimny. Points he raised were of considerable interest, particularly Sihanoukʼs reported hope continue US/Cambodian dialogue and desire seek accords with Thailand and SVN.

At same time, juxtaposed to Nong Kimnyʼs forthcoming presentation, is continuing negative and difficult atmosphere created by Sihanouk, as you pointed out to Nong Kimny. Atmosphere made particularly difficult currently by preparations underway for “Indochinese Peoplesʼ Conference” which as presently contemplated will bring together in Phnom Penh assorted communist, pro-communist and other elements united in determination to destroy GVN and frustrate US (and Thai) objectives in SEA. Unreasonable to suppose that in such atmosphere RTG and GVN could credit RKG with sincerity in desiring rapprochement or that we could influence them to approach Cambodians in conciliatory spirit.

Nevertheless we would not wish have you break off dialogue with Nong Kimny. At this stage we primarily interested in testing this channel of communication to see whether any results produced in Phnom Penh. Therefore believe you should follow up Nong Kimnyʼs initiative by expression to him, at next suitable occasion, our interest in professed Cambodian desire to reach accord with RTG and GVN. You should indicate that, as Ambassador Bonsal made clear in December talks, USG stands prepared lend its assistance in bringing RKG and neighbors into negotiations, although obviously we cannot speak on behalf of the latter as to substance. You should reiterate, however, without seeming to be laying preconditions, that major problem in our efforts to bring parties together is negative atmosphere created in Phnom Penh especially by preparations for Indochinese Peoplesʼ Conference which can only make rapprochement more difficult.

Believe at this point your talk with Nong Kimny should continue to be general and exploratory in nature, expressing our attitude that resolution of bilateral questions between these neighbors is crux of problem and is first priority business, and seeking to draw Nong Kimny out on what his government, especially Prince Sihanouk, has in mind re reaching accord with its neighbors. We would want to be assured in our own minds, before approaching Thais or Vietnamese, that Sihanouk genuinely interested in rapprochement. We are of course far from this stage now and Nong Kimnyʼs words will have to be backed up by concrete manifestations from Sihanouk before we will be prepared undertake politically delicate approaches to RTG and GVN. If he really sincere, it should not be too difficult for RKG to create atmosphere which would be conducive to initiation bilateral negotiations.

During exploratory phase your talks with Nong Kimny, you should avoid as much as possible being drawn into discussion substantive issues, particularly those involving Thailand and South Vietnam, and for this reason we not now suggesting any specific response or rebuttal to points raised by Nong Kimny January 14—although his version of issues obviously highly partisan and should be received with utmost reserve.

Also suggest you tell Nong Kimny that, though we welcome any opportunity to exchange views in Delhi, we would not wish this to be regarded as substitute for normal diplomatic channels. You may recall that RKG itself has elected block direct communications by withdrawing Embassy from Washington, declining receive U.S. Ambassador Phnom Penh and imposing arbitrary restrictions on contacts with our Embassy staff Phnom Penh.

In your talks with Nong presume you will bear in mind Sihanoukʼs propensity for ex parte public revelation in Cambodia of even most “confidential” of his diplomatic exchanges as illustrated by his January 24 speech (Phnom Penhʼs 59 to New Delhi)³ in which he discussed his version of portion your January 14 conversation with Nong Kimny. It would probably be inadvisable to mention Princeʼs speech but you may remind Nong Kimny it was Cambodian side that proposed your conversations be confidential and your willingness continue and to speak frankly will depend upon confidential character being respected in Cambodia as well as U.S.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB–US. Confidential. Drafted by Dexter and Salans, cleared with Trueheart, in draft with Corcoran and Bonsal, in substance with Albert A. Lakeland, Jr. of SOA, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.
2. In telegram 1980 from New Delhi, January 14, Ambassador Bowles reported that he had spent an hour in “frank discussion” with Nong Kimny, Cambodian Ambassador to India, about U.S.-Cambodian relations in which Nong Kimny did 90 percent of the talking. Nong Kimny expressed the hope that he and Bowles could continue a U.S.-Cambodian dialogue on a confidential basis. (Ibid.)
3. Dated January 24. (Ibid., POL 15–1 CAMB)