Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

94. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 32–65

Washington, March 24, 1965.

THE PROSPECTS FOR PAKISTAN

The Problem

To assess the situation in Pakistan, and estimate developments over the next few years.

Conclusions

A. President Ayub is almost certain to retain his dominant position for the foreseeable future. Fairly effective economic management, if accompanied by continued large-scale foreign aid, probably would permit Pakistan to maintain its impressive annual GNP growth of five percent or so for the next two or three years at least. This will nevertheless leave Pakistan beset with numerous economic problems. (Paras. 1–15)

B. Tensions between Pakistan and India are likely to increase in the next few years over the issues of Kashmir, communal violence, and refugees. Nevertheless, we think the leaders of both countries will be able to prevent major hostilities. (Paras. 18–20)

C. Ayub sees little chance of persuading the US to alter its policies toward India and is, therefore, probably unwilling to change the basic direction of his foreign policies. Despite the growing divergence of US and Pakistani policies in Asia, Ayub probably believes that the US, because of its many interests in Pakistan, will continue to supply it with military and economic assistance. The initial Pakistani response to a direct US threat to reduce military and/or economic aid unless Pakistan modified its relations with China would probably be reciprocal threats against the alliances and the US special facilities. Nevertheless, if Ayub were convinced that the US really intended to reduce its support of Pakistan substantially, there is a better than even chance that he would mute though not abandon his China policy—at least until he could develop adequate alternative sources for US aid. (Paras. 23–28)

D. Ayub probably now regards a working relationship with Communist China as one of the key elements in Pakistan’s security against India. Ayub will continue his recent efforts to improve relations with the Afro-Asian states, keeping in line with the mainstream of Afro-Asian views on most issues—a policy which has great political appeal within Pakistan. He will also seek better relations with the USSR as a supplement to the main lines of his foreign policy. (Paras. 21–22, 29, 31)

[Here follows the 14-page Discussion section of the estimate.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA. All the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on March 24 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.