43. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Security Council Consideration of (1) Kashmir and (2) the Cambodian Complaint
Kashmir: As you probably are aware, the Council has had this problem under consideration since mid-March when, after several inconclusive meetings, it adjourned until last week and has since met on the problem five times. It has been an extremely “ho-hum” exercise. The Paks originally believed they could push through a strong resolution condemning the Indians for not complying with the previous UN requests in connection with a plebiscite, troop withdrawals, etc.; but when it became evident that they could not get the votes, they asked for an adjournment. In the interim, we and other Council members tried unsuccessfully to get the Paks to agree to drop the matter entirely, but they felt they had committed themselves so heavily at home that it was necessary to come back to the Council. The situation now is that the Paks have abandoned hope of getting a resolution or even a consensus, and will be satisfied with a statement by the Chairman of the Council (Seydoux of France) which will sum up the views expressed during the Council meetings and which will note especially that the majority of the Council would like to see the SYG more strongly involved in the dispute than he now is. The USSR and Czechoslovakia, on behalf of the Indians, have come out strongly against this position. Seydoux convened a caucus of the Council members at 1130 today to try to work out final language and, having failed, he will convene another caucus at 1500 this afternoon. If he is successful, he may well hold what everyone hopes will be the final Council meeting on the problem still later in the day.2 The problem is the degree of SYG involvement desired. At this morning’s meeting, the Russians seemed to be taking a harder line than the Indians against a role for the SYG. For [Page 102] our own part, we would like to see the SYG in a procedural role which would allow him to explore quietly new methods of approach with the Indians and the Paks, e.g., is it feasible to seek out a third party who might be able to make some progress; perhaps even the SYG himself could play this role.3
[Here follows discussion of Security Council consideration of a complaint lodged by Cambodia.]
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Kashmir, Vol. I, 12/63–7/64. Confidential.↩
- The summary statement by Security Council President Roger Seydoux at the conclusion of debate on Kashmir on May 18 was forwarded to the Department in telegram 4182 from USUN, May 19. On the issue of the proposed involvement of the Secretary-General in facilitating negotiations between India and Pakistan on the issue, Seydoux noted that some members of the Council supported such a role for the Secretary-General and other members opposed it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK/UN)↩
- USUN reported that the mood of Foreign Minister Bhutto and his delegation as they left New York following the debate was one of bitter disappointment. Bhutto felt that Pakistan’s two major allies had failed to support it during the debate. (Telegram 3185 from USUN, May 19; ibid.) On May 21, Ayub told McConaughy that he felt India would “take succor” from the Security Council debate because the United States and the United Kingdom had “kept quiet” while the Soviet Union had actively supported India. He anticipated that this would make the Indians less inclined to settle the Kashmir dispute by negotiation. (Telegram 71 from Rawalpindi, May 21; ibid., POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK) The Embassy in India reported that while the popular reaction to the outcome of the debate was generally positive, credit for the outcome went to the Soviet Union. There was widespread resentment of U.S. and U.K. support for Pakistan during the debate. (Telegram 3466 from New Delhi, May 20; ibid., POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK/UN)↩