80. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
There was one item on the agenda—a discussion of the Iranian situation by Ambassador Holmes. The substance of his remarks was as follows:
[Page 143]As an introduction, Ambassador Holmes stated that Iran has a 1200-mile border with the Soviet Union and has a long border with a stirred-up Arab World. If the Soviets again try to take over Iran, they would get Iranian oil and outflank all other sources of Middle East oil—a heavy blow to Western Europe. By taking over Iran, the Soviets would also have an open shot to East Africa. We, therefore, have to retain our influence over Iran, and it should not be too costly for us to do so.
In September 1959 Iran agreed not to permit any Thor missile bases on its soil. From the Cuban crisis to date the Soviets have followed a change of tactics. Radio Moscow has been relatively mild in its propaganda attacks on the Shah’s regime (although clandestine radio attacks continue). Natural trading patterns continue and the Soviets have increased slightly the numbers of their people in Iran—e.g., more cultural missions. Joint enterprises on border area irrigation and Caspian Sea fishing also have been developed. The Iranians, however, are very sensible and very suspicious of the Soviets.
The Shah is worried about his people’s becoming too complacent about the Soviets. He has asked the U.S. and the U.K. for recommendations to improve his security police. He has never made a move on a problem dealing with the Soviets without consulting the U.S.
The Shah is also very concerned about the Persian Gulf and the Arab minorities in the oil lands of southern Iran. There is considerable agitation of Arab minorities by the UAR-subsidized newspapers in Kuwait.
But the Shah is a Commander-in-Chief in fact, and he worries about various things a great deal, especially Arab unity. He uses his concerns to push us for more aid. He has stated he is concerned about CENTO. He is disillusioned, but in his own mind he has stopped worrying about military problems because he knows he can be assured of U.S. support. The modernization of the armed forces, a program agreed to in July 1964, is progressing well.
He is happy that the U.K. presence in the Persian Gulf continues, but the Shah worries about the day when the U.K. pulls out of the Gulf and he will have to fill the vacuum.
The Shah’s government reform program is going ahead—in a Persian way. The human materials in Iran are good. The literacy rate is still low but growing. Ambassador Holmes was impressed with the basic intelligence of the Iranian people and stated that the Shah now has a government he never had before.
The one great danger to continuing progress and stability is that some one will kill the Shah. Each year that passes, however, will decrease the chaos following the demise of the Shah. The main factor contributing to this improved situation is the improvements being made in the Iranian armed forces.
[Page 144]The present Chief, MAAG (Major General Eckhardt, U.S.A.) has done a superb job. Ambassador Holmes hoped that his successor (Major General Jablonsky, U.S.A.) would have similarly high qualifications to permit continued effective influence. Chief, MAAG serves as a military adviser to the Shah; he goes to the Shah and sees him alone; but he still has managed to maintain excellent relations with the Iranian General Staff. On the latest military shopping list of the Shah, Ambassador Holmes has talked to the Finance Minister to give the Shah the facts; it is a constant struggle to keep the Shah’s appetite within bounds—e.g., he is talking about getting one squadron of F–111’s by 1970. Nevertheless, so long as we recognize that the Shah is moody and he stays alive, the U.S. will be able to handle him.
General Wheeler commented that, when General Abdul Hassain Hejazi, Chief of the Iranian Supreme Commander’s Staff, visited the U.S., the Iraqis were getting more support from the UAR than we had estimated at the time. Nevertheless, General Wheeler argued that Arab unity was a long time in the future, and noted that General Hejazi was a mirror of the Shah and probably never has an original idea of his own. General Wheeler also noted that improved Iranian relations with the Soviets are all to the good. Ambassador Holmes replied that most officials in the Iranian Government are realistic. Only some of them appear to be complacent about the Soviets and they are really preoccupied with their own problems.
General McConnell2 stated that a USAF Brigadier General will be assigned as Deputy Chief, MAAG this coming summer. He then asked if the Kurds are currently a problem to the Iranian Government. Ambassador Holmes stated that the Iranian Army still occupies Kurdish areas, but that the government is now beginning to treat the Kurds as Persians and is instituting an aid program for them.
Ambassador Holmes noted that the Shah was very interested in the Concord Squadron, and was impressed with his visit to the Bon Homme Richard. He has talked with General Adams, CINCSTRIKE, and would be willing to have a floating U.S. reserve to be located in his ports.
Mr. Kitchen asked about Iran’s relations with Israel. Ambassador Holmes stated that the Israelis frequently force feed the Shah with raw information on the Arab threat. Israeli technical assistance men also aid and abet this in the oil areas of southern Iran.
Ambassador Holmes stated that in 1958 we did not live up to our MAP commitments. Ambassador Holmes urged that, in the current five-year modernization program for the armed forces, we do not arouse the Shah’s suspicions by permitting MAP slippages to develop. General [Page 145] Wheeler stated that there has been a great effort by all services to overcome MAP slippages—a problem not unique to Iran.
General Wheeler stated that the JCS were delighted to get such a favorable and encouraging report on Iran—such was not the case several years ago. Mr. Kitchen observed that a lot of the credit for the improved situation in Iran belongs to the Mobile Training Teams who served with the Iranian armed forces. Ambassador Holmes added that the training of Iranian officers in the U.S. also must be recognized as a reason for the improved situation, although it was agreed that a “Nasser” might well have been trained in the process.
- Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 490, Iran 1965, POL 1 Gen. Policy, Background. Secret. The meeting took place at the Pentagon. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler headed a 15-man delegation from the Department of Defense; Captain Zimmerman, Rivinius, and Lieutenant General Spivy represented J–5; and Brigadier General Strickland and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William Lang represented OSD/ISA. The Department of State was represented by Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador Holmes, Kitchen, and Colonel Evans. Bromley Smith represented the National Security Council and Jack Smith represented the CIA. The source text indicates that it is a State draft that has not been cleared with the Department of Defense.↩
- General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.↩