52. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
404. Embtel 398.2 Majlis yesterday passed Vienna Convention and status bill re U.S. military personnel,3 by vote 74 to 61. Disappointingly, slim margin was due to number of factors as analyzed below, but what stands out is that New Iran Party leadership lost control over substantial number of its own followers.
There are presently 188 deputies in Majlis, of which 138 are New Iran Party members. Some 50 New Iran Party deputies seem to have been absent, and of those present we estimate at least 12 must have voted against government. This became easier for them when opposition was successful in forcing secret vote, which is highly unusual but can be obtained under Majlis regulations if 15 deputies ask for it.
Sequence of events and factors entering into the vote were as follows: 1. Monday’s New Iran Party caucus (reftel) seemingly went so well that Mansur, Yeganeh and Ziai decided to speed up schedule and bring both bills to vote Tuesday. That party leadership was obviously over-confident is shown by fact that majority made no special effort to round up its supporters to secure maximum attendance. (It is difficult to know how many absented themselves deliberately, but certainly not all absent New Iran Party deputies were busy elsewhere.) Mardom and Independents, who make up “opposition“, were practically all present.
2. From beginning of debate, PriMin was on the defensive. While Majlis contacts say they admired his composure under fire, Mansur apparently thought he was dealing only with usual “opposition” which could be steamrollered by New Iran Party majority. Fact that government was abandoned by some of its own supporters (either by adverse vote or deliberate absence) came as rude shock after outcome of vote was announced. Before the vote Ziai had told us New Iran Party expected only two or three defections.
3. Government made long and comprehensive statement about purport of bill, and Mansur offered repeated interpretations in course of [Page 104] debate. Since these may constitute important legislative history, we will submit separate analysis as soon as full record of debate available. Apparently government was forthright in explaining scope and status of bill and did not hedge in its explanations.
4. Opposition either did not get the word that Shah wanted status bill passed, or else it had license to attack government. In any case Mardom and Independents pulled out all the stops, especially after they were voted down in succession of procedural maneuvers designed to delay vote. Government apparently felt (erroneously) that if opposition did not want bill to be brought to vote, it must be weak.
5. What did not help at all is that yesterday’s press reported automobile accident in Tehran in which a US serviceman gravely injured an Iranian taxi driver. Some speakers claimed that status bill would wipe out civil liability in such cases. Among the more scurrilous arguments heard was that, “if status bill was passed, an American non-com could henceforth slap the face of an Iranian General with impunity.” Most violent speakers against status bill were deputies Zahtab-Fard and Sartip-Pur. Both independents; but many others also talked against, including Mardom group leader Rambod.
6. With Majlis Speaker Riazi in the US, presiding officer was Shafi-Amin who is unskilled in parliamentary tactics and was weak in controlling debate. (Senate President Sharif-Emami, a seasoned parliamentary strategist, commented to us last night that in similar situation he would have called secret session to “blow off steam” before permitting debate to proceed on the record.)
7. There were clearly anti-American themes employed by some of opposition speakers, some of them quite ridiculous (such as insinuation that PriMin must be an American puppet because he had once rented a house to U.S. Embassy officer who was alleged to be “running the government”). Government seems to have suffered this in silence. There were no enthusiastic supporters of status bill. All the emotion was on the other side.
In conclusion, we find that while it is heartening that long drawnout question of status of US military personnel in Iran is now settled in parliament, not only Mansur but to some extent also the Shah’s regime has paid an unexpectedly high price in getting this done. That price was due in large measure to ineptitude of government’s handling both in upper and lower house, but it would be idle to minimize the Nationalist reaction which passage of the bill called forth. It will take several days to assess whether this is a temporary phenomenon that will blow over, as now seems likely, or whether it will have some longer-lasting effects on our relations with Iran.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–3 IRAN–US. Confidential; Priority.↩
- Dated October 12. (Ibid.)↩
- In March 1962 the U.S. Government had proposed that U.S. military personnel and civilian employees of the Defense Department stationed in Iran and their dependents should have the privileges and immunities specified for “members of the administrative and technical staff” in the Vienna Convention, i.e., full diplomatic immunity. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVII, pp. 519–520. Additional documentation relating to the Vienna Convention and status of forces bill is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–3 IRAN-U.S.↩