33. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1
The Shah’s visit is mostly an exercise in political massage. Like all our clients, he will be reassured simply to touch base with you (we didn’t invite him, but laid on a brief meeting once he decided to come collect a few honorary degrees).
A good personal relationship between you and the Shah is more and more essential to our influence in Iran. We’ve helped Iran generously ($1.5 billion since 1947) but our aid is dropping sharply as Iranian oil revenues mount ($450 million this year, probably $800 million by 1970—the Shah estimates even higher). For example, we’re now in the middle of a 5-year $300 million 1962–66 MAP program, but expect to shift later to a sales basis, because Iran can now afford it. So our chief problem becomes one of periodically reassuring this moody monarch, especially since he actually runs Iran.
Though we’ve kept telling the Shah that his real problems are internal not external, and that reform is first on the agenda, he keeps reverting to the military toys he loves. We’ve convinced him there isn’t much chance of Soviet attack, so now he’s talking up an Arab threat as his excuse. His main interest just now is replacing his aging M–47 tanks. M–48A3s like the Israelis want would be cheaper and more than ample, but he wants our new M–60s. To avoid a discussion about hardware, you might tell him right off that we can’t provide tanks as grant aid but will sell him some when available; you’ve directed Defense to work out the details. He’ll settle for this, because in his January letter to you he candidly offered to buy such equipment if Congress cut MAP funds too short. Nor [Page 71] do we want to commit ourselves to any MAP grant program for the period after our present arrangement runs out in 1967, but we can assure him we’ll continue to work with him.
It’s worth telling the Shah that we are beefing up our own strength in the Indian Ocean area by frequent carrier deployments (he recently attended a weapons demonstration on one). This gives us far greater combat power in the area, and is aimed largely at backing up Iran against the U.S.S.R. or the Arabs.
We want to reassure the Shah about the “Arab” threat. He runs scared of Nasser. For example, we don’t think the vague new “unity agreement” between the UAR and Iraq adds up to much. Since you’ve been so heavily immersed this week in Arab-Israeli affairs via the Eshkol visit, you might use that as a handle for expounding our view that the Arabs aren’t much of a military threat. The Shah also keeps beefing about our making Nasser our “chosen instrument” in the Middle East. It would help if you made clear that: (a) we’re not naive about Nasser—we’re simply trying to keep him from leaning too far toward Moscow—this is in Iran’s interest as much as ours; (b) we aren’t really giving Nasser much aid except food which he can’t convert into arms; and (c) we are still in effect containing Nasser by our aid to Israel, Jordan, Saudis, Sudan, and Libya as well as Iran.
After rebutting the Shah’s security preoccupations, we hope you can shift the conversation to his reform program. We still see this as his best defense against subversion—the real threat from both Moscow and Cairo. We’ve waged a successful campaign since the economic crisis of mid-1961 to shift his attention from defense to domestic economic progress. His land reform program is going fairly well, and two good harvests have eased initial dislocations. But the economy in the urban areas still hasn’t fully recovered (though it’s beginning to snap back now that public spending is picking up) and the Shah still needs to get the city people behind him along with the peasants.
So we’ve got to convince the Shah that he’s only begun the modernization process, and has to keep at it. We also want to nip in the bud any notion that he can relax as oil revenues climb. No matter how much money there is, demands are always so great that careful priorities have to be set. The Shah’s new government under Ali Mansur has recently taken steps to improve its machinery. But to keep his nose to the grindstone, you might mention how important you consider his new Budget Agency, his new Civil Service Code, and his plans for tax reform. You could also explain the rationale of your anti-poverty campaign. We want him to catch some of your enthusiasm for domestic reform.
Since the Shah will stop off in Morocco on his way home, I suggest you ask him to convey your regards to King Hassan. You might also enlist his aid to [Page 72] get Hassan too focussed on the need for sound administration and reform.
As background you should read the attached cable2 from Ambassador Holmes. Also attached are State briefs.3 I’ll give you a last minute reminder on talking points tomorrow.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Shah’s Visit, 6/5/64. Secret. The source text is attached to a memorandum to the President from Bundy which reads: “Here is another excellent memorandum from Bob Komer, this time on the Shah of Iran, which you may wish to read tonight. He will follow it up tomorrow with a last-minute one-pager on talking points.”↩
- Document 27.↩
- Not printed. The Special Talking Paper on Military Assistance is printed as Document 32.↩