303. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
Tehran, July 7, 1968,
0825Z.
5600. Subject: Student Unrest. Ref: State 186094.2 Summary. Iran would have to be unearthly if student problems did not exist. However, for the moment at least, potential student demagogy is having trouble tilting against Iran’s economic boom and Shah’s “independent nationalism” policies. So student problems will probably remain low key, although in long run student unrest could erupt, particularly if Shah’s present highly successful policies should begin to falter.
- 1.
- Compared with recent events at Columbia University, Berkeley, Paris and Rome, student situation in Iran is at least for moment tranquil and well-controlled. Several minor student upsurges occurred this spring (A–476, A–520, A–539, and A–647),3 which surprised GOI and prompted charges of foreign inspiration but as reported by Embassy (A–576)4 these upsurges gained little momentum and were effectively brought under control by GOI.
- 2.
- In Iran, student unrest is largely function of political status quo. Politically, Shah and his regime have never been more firmly in saddle. As result of “white revolution” and “independent nationalism” policies, wind has been taken out of sails of opposition, i.e., remnants of Tudeh and National Front parties can no longer effectively accuse regime of being feudalist or U.S. puppet, meanwhile, economic boom, premised on $800 million oil revenues, leaves oppositionists, past or potential, with few flags to wave.
- 3.
- This is not to say that younger generation in Iran is less restive than youth elsewhere. Rebellious adolescent instincts exist. They are encouraged by epidemic of student unrest elsewhere in world, including even in Communist Bloc. They should never be judged as less than incipient. It must be remembered that massive student uprisings against Shah’s regime did occur here in early 1950’s, cleverly manipulated by demagogic leader, Mosadeq. As recently as 1963, major uprising occurred at Tehran University, which was quelled by rather ruthless police action.
- 4.
- Present day Iran affords some special opportunities for student unhappiness. Despite economic boom, there is almost legendary lack of [Page 538] identification. Decisions are made by Shah or not much lower than cabinet-technocrat level. There is thus little feeling of participation in decision-making, least of all among student groups. This frustration is, however, for the moment considerably offset by prospects of personal economic gain and by vague awareness (and pride) that compared with other countries in Mideast Iran is somewhat a model of economic development and social progress. Dissatisfaction which exists tends to be less focussed on Shah and has become more of an amorphous discontent with political structure. Specific issues for stirring up dissidence are, however, quite unpromising. In short, instead of passionate student hostility there is student apathy, which is less but still worrisome.
- 5.
- In Iran, Shah monarchy has 2500-year tradition. It may one day give way to liberal democracy, but it is institution which still is effective, particularly as so cagily manipulated by present Shah. Mosadeq sought to tilt with this institution and Shah as its personification with 20th century weapons, but, as so often happens in emerging societies, Mosadeq employed totalitarian tools as much or more than regime against which he tilting. Still today there is some lingering pro-Mosadeq sentiment. For example, there seems to be goodly number of secondary school teachers who mostly due to limited qualifications have never risen to prominence and who still tend to carry Mosadeq torch. Their teaching has some influence on university enrollment (which knew not Mosadeq), with sort of greener pastures overtones. But this sentiment, as all other oppositionism, bucks national self-congratulation induced by Iran’s present manifest prosperity and progress.
- 6.
- Some controversy inevitably develops over manner in which GOI copes with student manifestations. Thanks largely to university leadership, peaceful student marches have been condoned, but any activism is quickly suppressed by police (and SAVAK) action. This, of course, reaps student resentment. In case of Pahlavi University unrest several students were locked up and accused under highly questionable pretexts of being ChiCom agents. In future, ruthless police methods could contribute to student explosion. However, GOI leadership is convinced that strong police action is in keeping with exercise of authority as historically practiced in Iran. Its belief in efficacy such measures has only been strengthened by dramatic reports of recent student riots in US/other countries where in GOI eyes administration has been too lax.
- 7.
- Fact that Shah has always been good America friend, and in particular prevailed over Mosadeq with American blessing, tends to associate Shah’s regime, despite its flirtations with Soviets, with US. Since he is riding high, US is for present in relatively good position, although among student groups there is inevitably unhappiness over Shah’s military expenditures, as well as U.S. role in Viet Nam. Nonetheless, there have been no demonstrations in Iran re Viet Nam, even by students. [Page 539] Therefore, under present circumstances chances of student revolt being centered on anti-Americanism are not bright.
- 8.
- Student problem was reported in greater detail in A–576, along with GOI and USG activities connected therewith. Of course, student situation could explode at moment’s notice. However, our best guess is that student troubles in Iran will at least for present remain at relatively low key. Student grievances are apt for the present to center on university policies. In long run, however, political frustrations could mount up, particularly if Shah’s dream of transforming Iran into political entity with Western European standards of living does not materialize.
Meyer